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OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
An Address by Secretary General Kurt
Waldheim
Editor's Note: This address by Kurt Waldheim, Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations, was presented at the University of
Denver on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary Year of the
Social Science Foundation, on January 25, 1976. At that time, he
was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws by the Uni-
versity of Denver.
The establishment of the Social Science Foundation took
place during a period in American history which has come to
be known as the age of isolationism, in which Walter Lippman
wrote that "The people are tired; above all, they are tired of
greatness." Following the refusal of the Senate to approve
American entry into the League of Nations, and the tragic final
period of the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, this great nation
endeavored to turn its back upon international involvements.
But the American people learned, and learned most painfully,
that in our modern world it is impossible to escape from its
harsh realities, and that great issues and confrontations, if left
alone and ignored, will not usually vanish or resolve them-
selves. Out of this realization came America's leading role in
the great human experiment which is the United Nations.
Unquestionably, in 1945 there were many Americans-and
others too-who placed excessive hopes in this new venture in
international relations, a global institution designed to meet
global problems with a common response, whose members
would, in the words of the Charter, "practice tolerance and live
together in peace with one another." To peoples sickened and
shocked by the horrors of war, it seemed that a magical new
formula had been created, what former Senator Fulbright has
called "the one great new idea of this century in the field of
international relations." The gradual realization that there is
no such formula for avoiding the grim realities of a divided,
competitive world of individual nations, each with its own his-
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tory, habits, ambitions and fears, led to a disproportionate and
equally excessive disillusionment with the machinery for deal-
ing with international relations, including the United Nations.
This disillusionment persists, and on occasion rises almost to
fever pitch. We are, in fact, going through such a period in the
United States at the present time. This is an important politi-
cal phenomenon which deserves penetrating analysis.
It is easy, but obviously unrealistic, to believe that the
basic fault lies in the international machinery which has been
set up-"to blame the weather on the ship," as my predecessor,
Dag Hammarskjold, put it. The difficulties lie far deeper than
that.
We are unquestionably living in a period of great tension
and rapid evolution. How much that tension is accentuated by
the revolution in communications and the enveloping influence
of the media is a matter of opinion. But there can be no ques-
tion that the rate and scope of the changes in our world society
since World War II are completely unprecedented in history.
We have no choice but to live with this situation and to make
the best of it. In fact, one of the most important tasks of the
United Nations is to encourage the good and constructive as-
pects of our recent evolution and to identify and control the
damaging aspects. No human activity could be more important
for the future.
When we speak of the world situation we tend to think of
the more or less short-term problems which dominate the head-
lines. It is true that the picture of the world we receive through
the media and other sources each morning is usually far from
encouraging. The great international rivalries of our time per-
sist even though their form and emphasis may change. We see
tensions rising in many parts of the world as more and more
people aspire to a place in the sun and a reasonable share of
the world's goods. We are beset by global problems of enormous
complexity which are no more manageable or acceptable for
being, to a great extent, the by-products of our own ingenuity.
The technological revolution has, among other things, ele-
vated the armaments race to a level of sophistication, destruc-
tive potential and expense never before dreamed of. In particu-
lar, the nuclear deterrent, the theory and actual existence of
which is the most terrifying phenomenon of the age, has cast a
shadow over this generation and the previous one, with heaven
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knows what unsettling psychological and social effects. Unfor-
tunately, we have to recognize that there has been no decisive
breakthrough on this problem, and in most parts of the world
the traffic and sale in the most sophisticated and diversified
arms is at an all-time high level.
The effort to maintain reasonable relationships among the
greatest powers is surely of the highest importance for the fu-
ture of all, but the lavish distribution of sophisticated weapons
of war at all levels involves huge risks and fosters the develop-
ment of regional conflicts which inevitably in their turn make
the process of detente far more difficult. The armaments race
is a vicious circle which saps the strength and endangers the
existence of civilization, and almost everyone knows it. And yet
it has proved impossible so far to generate the necessary degree
of mutual confidence and political will to act upon this com-
mon knowledge before it is too late. This problem, in my view,
remains one of the highest priorities on the agenda of the world
community.
The gap between rich and poor has been the moving force
in the political evolution of many nations. It is now also one of
the major problems and preoccupations of the international
society which is developing in the United Nations. The emo-
tions which have always been aroused by this problem in na-
tional societies are now evident on the international level in the
debate on the future world economic order which has assumed
a predominant place on the international agenda, especially at
the United Nations.
It is now a commonplace that we live in an interdependent
world. It is widely accepted that a new degree of equity and
economic stability are prerequisites of a more peaceful and
stable world order. The recognition of these basic facts is cer-
tainly a first step in the right direction. The extent to which
their implications are now being publicly debated is, to my
mind, an encouraging and healthy development, provided we
are capable of following it up with a determined and concerted
effort to take practical measures to achieve commonly agreed
objectives. As in the case of disarmament, the problem is to
switch from confrontation over conflicting short-term interests
to cooperation in the pursuit of common, long-term goals. The
experience of the Seventh Special Session of the General As-
sembly on Economic Development was an encouraging sign of
1976
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
the willingness of all members of the international community
to cooperate realistically on the evolution of a new interna-
tional economic order.
In recent years the world has become increasingly aware
of the new generation of global problems which are, in large
measure, the result of the technological revolution. It is now
recognized that these problems, which include food, environ-
ment, population, raw materials and the future of the oceans
accentuate the fact of interdependence and are too large and
complex to be dealt with by any one nation or group of nations
alone. Much useful work has already been done in identifying
these problems and their relationship to each other, but we are
only at the beginning of the effort to concert our strength and
will to take practical steps to deal with them.
Finally, there are the conflicts and tensions which exist as
legacies of the past or which arise from the changing relation-
ships of nations. These tend to dominate the thinking of gov-
ernments and of international organizations, all too often to the
detriment of the long-term concerns and interests of the world
community. Since they mostly involve the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security, our capacity for dealing with
them will inevitably have a decisive effect on our ability to
shape a world society which can take a responsible long-term
view of the future. The aim of such a society would be, for the
first time in history, to try to realize on a global scale a just and
reasonable way of life for all the peoples of the world. These
may seem to be high-sounding and utopian phrases, but every-
thing we know and learn about our present condition empha-
sizes the absolute necessity of a conscious and concerted effort
to develop such a world society. The alternative may well be
anarchy and a growing paralysis of human society. Not for the
first time in history idealistic aims may prove in the long-run
also to be the most realistic.
Where does the United Nations stand in the general pic-
ture of the world which I have tried to outline? As everyone
knows, it is an imperfect institution with manifest shortcom-
ings. Its public face represents the turmoil and uncertainty of
our world and the frustrations and difficulties which govern-
ments have in finding their way in that world. It also repre-
sents, as most political institutions do, great aspirations and
the falling short of those aspirations through human weakness.
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Because it represents publicly all the conflicting interests and
elements of a world society in a state of flux, it naturally tends
to attract the criticism and hostility of people who feel baffled
or alarmed or confused by the times they are living through.
It has even been said by quite responsible people that, by
publicizing differences and conflicts of interest, the United
Nations encourages and spreads conflict. I strongly question
the validity of such thinking. I very much doubt if we shall
escape our problems by sweeping them under the rug. If we are
ever to solve the great human problems which beset us, we
must first be aware of their nature, their causes and their roots.
We should also remember that the United Nations reflects
the new geo-political structure of the world, a very different
structure even from the one in which the organization came
into existence thirty years ago. At that time the United Nations
had 51 members. It now has 144, but that is only a numerical
hint of the change that has taken place. The world of 1976 is
predominantly a world of independent nations. Some, of
course, are far more powerful than others, but the large major-
ity are independent and are determined to preserve their inde-
pendence. Thus a far wider range of views and interests than
ever before is being expressed in international forums, and the
problem of harmonizing different national policies is corre-
spondingly greater. This also means, or should mean, that
there is greater scope for leadership and a greater necessity to
develop an agreed international approach to major problems.
None would deny that the world has become very compli-
cated and that the future is unpredictable. At such a time it is
essential that governments should come together to discuss
their problems and to work out concerted plans for the future.
In the beginning, at any rate, such discussions are liable to
generate considerable friction. Great patience and tolerance
will be required if the process is to be productive. It should not
be necessary to remind ourselves that the governments of the
world have different backgrounds, different interests, different
political systems, different ideologies, and that they are in dif-
ferent stages of political and social development. Some have
only just attained nationhood and, in searching for their place
in the world community, are experiencing a strong and youth-
ful nationalism. Others, long established, politically sophisti-
cated, wealthy and well-versed in the ways of power and pros-
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perity, are seeking by various means to transcend the bounda-
ries of nationalism. These are the facts of international life. But
for all states it is true that to a greater extent than ever before
their future depends on their capacity to co-exist and to co-
operate. They are already interdependent and will probably
become more so. That is the key fact of our time. The question
is whether this interdependence will continue to be a source of
weakness and adversity for governments or whether it can be-
come a common source of strength and solidarity. Upon the
answer to this question the future may well depend. This, I
believe, is the basic raison d 'tre of the United Nations-to
develop the capacity of nations to co-operate and co-exist in an
increasingly interdependent world.
The maintenance of international peace and security is, of
course, the primary role of the United Nations. Here, as else-
where, the record of the United Nations is uneven, although I
am inclined to think that the Security Council plays a far more
important role in maintaining peace and in resolving conflict
situations than it is often given credit for. Of course the exist-
ence of the United Nations has not totally banished interna-
tional conflict any more than the existence of a police force can
totally banish crime. It does, however, provide the means by
which conflicts can sometimes be prevented, or by which they
can be contained or moderated. Resort to the Security Council
has often proved to be an acceptable alternative to a resort to
force.
We have to recognize that many international problems
are not susceptible to immediate solutions and that in such
cases a process of cooling-off, adjustment and containment of
actual conflict is the best alternative. To prevent intolerable
frustrations from building up, constant efforts must also be
made to maintain the search for the basic settlement of the
dispute in question through negotiation.
Of the many questions on its agenda, none is more diffi-
cult, of longer standing, or of more general concern than the
Middle East. For nearly 29 years the United Nations has been
intimately involved in the troubled affairs of that vital and
historic region, and has played an indispensable role in peace-
keeping, in the search for a settlement, and in the humanitar-
ian problems involved. As you know, the Security Council is
just concluding an important debate on the Middle East in
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which special emphasis has been given to the question of the
Palestinians, whose future is a central element in any solution
to the problem. It is absolutely vital that all concerned persist
in the search for a way forward. Stagnation can only lead to
further frustration, and continued frustration will inevitably
lead to further violence, with dire consequences which will not
be confined to the region itself. The recent tragic developments
in Lebanon also underline the absolute necessity to persist in
the effort to secure peace, no matter how great or insurmount-
able the obstacles may appear.
Time does not allow me to elaborate upon the other impor-
tant and potentially dangerous problems and conflicts the
world faces today. There can be no doubt that Angola, the
situation in Southern Africa, or the Cyprus problem each in
their own way constitute serious potential threats to the wider
peace.
Is it, as some of the more embittered critics now say, a
dangerous and utopian illusion to believe that a world order
can, in the present state of the world, be built through interna-
tional orgaAization? If that is so, what is the alternative? We
have, already twice in this century, paid the price of world war
for the belief that so-called realpolitik was enough and for fail-
ing to persist in the effort to develop the necessary degree of
international responsibility and co-operation. Nor does the
experience of trying to settle problems by force outside the
international framework of the United Nations provide much
encouragement for the future.
The agenda of the Security Council for the coming year,
like that of other organs of the United Nations, is fuller than
ever, and governments appear more, rather than less, inclined
to resort to it in times of crisis. For all the criticism which is
directed at the world organization, there seems, in the minds
of governments at least, to be no alternative in times of trouble
to its admittedly imperfect procedures.
In the absence of a practical alternative, I see no choice but
to try to make our international institutions, and especially the
United Nations, work better. It is no good to complain of the
diversity of culture and backgrounds and standards prevailing
among the member states. Rather that diversity should be used
to breed new and more promising political ideas and forms for
the future.
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Shortcomings, failures and periods of tension and confron-
tation cannot be avoided in international political institutions
any more than in national ones, although it is in everyone's
interests to bridge gaps and differences as soon as possible. We
have been through such a period in this last year at the United
Nations, and we can certainly expect more stormy weather in
the year ahead. To my mind, this accentuates the necessity of
the institution, for the tensions and conflicts which are chan-
neled into its proceedings exist in any case and cannot be ig-
nored. It is surely far better to deal with them within the frame-
work of an organization where virtually all nations are mem-
bers, and to be aware of their dangers than to remain in igno-
rance only to be taken by surprise later on. And if our ultimate
aim is a wiser, more just and more productive world society,
where else can the effort begin than in a universal organization
where all governments, great and small, can make their voices
heard?
This year will not be an easy one, nor will the long-term
goals which we have set ourselves be achieved without stren-
uous and untiring effort. Governments alone cannot possibly
surmount the obstacles ahead nor provide, unassisted, the
ideas, the leadership and the will required for such an immense
task. Only with a vastly increased public support and a new
and widespread understanding of ourselves and of the world we
live in can we hope to master our fate in the enormously com-
plex world which we have created.
You, as political and social scientists, belong in the front
rank of such a march toward the future. New ideas, new con-
cepts and a fresh and fundamental analysis of problems are
indispensable to the proper development of human society. No
challenge could be more fascinating or more urgent. Much will
depend on how far the public can understand the true nature
of our problems, and how far it will react to them in positive
and constructive ways. The world is not as bad as people some-
times think. In fact never before has mankind been confronted
with such great opportunities or been given such means to
grasp them. Our weakness lies in our ability to understand each
other and co-operate. This, in my view, is the great challenge
of our time. Let us determine to meet this challenge in a posi-
tive spirit, and, in doing so, contribute to a future worthy of the
human race.
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MYRES S. McDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
D tente and World Order
JOSEF KORBEL*
This is the first annual Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lec-
ture in International Law and Policy, presented at the University
of Denver College of Law, April 20, 1976. Sponsored by the Stu-
dent Bar Association, the International Legal Studies Program,
the Denver International Law Society and the DENVER JOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, the lecture series will present
eminent jurists and scholars addressing topical issues of interna-
tional law and policy.
I.
I feel greatly honored by being asked to open this series of
lectures in honor of the doyen of international legal studies,
Professor McDougal. I really cannot add anything to the acco-
lades except to say that I join with all others in my profound
admiration and respect for Professor McDougal. I am also in-
clined to extend my admiration to all professors and students
of international law, whose intellectual stamina and courage as
they plow so laboriously the arid lands of international behav-
ior I greatly admire. It is a big task and requires tremendous
optimism and idealism.
Now, you all know that the basic tenet, a normative theo-
retical tenet of international law, going back to Roman law,
was and is pacta sunt servanda (agreements are to be ob-
served). A cynic might "slightly" change the dictum and say
pacta sunt frangenda (agreements are to be violated).
One of the fundamental principles of international law in
modern times has been the principle of nonintervention in in-
* Andrew W. Mellon Professor of International Relations, Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver. Doctor of Jurisprudence, Charles Univer-
sity. Prague, 1933. Former Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies and
Director of the Social Science Foundation, 1959-1969. Former Czechoslovak Ambassa-
dor to Yugoslavia; Chairman of the United Nations Kashmir Commission; Chairman
of the Economic Committee for the Balkan countries and Finland at the Paris Peace
Conference, 1946. Author of TITO'S COMMUNISM (1951); DANGER IN KASHMIR (1954,
revised edition 1966); COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1938-1948: THE FAIL-
URE OF COEXISTENCE (1959); POLAND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST: SOVIET-GERMAN DIPLO-
MACY TOWARD POILAND. 1919-1933 (1963); DETENTE IN EUROPE: REAL OR IMAGINARY?
(1972); and numerous articles in professional journals.
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ternal affairs, and it is this principle which I plan to relate later
to the other part of my topic, that is, to the topic of detente
and its meaning.
The principle of nonintervention has not always existed as
a norm of international law. To give one example, after the
Napoleonic Wars and the Congress of Vienna, three big Euro-
pean powers created the Holy Alliance and (entirely in contrast
to the principle of nonintervention), its raison d'Ptre was, in
fact, to legitimize their intervention in the internal affairs of
other countries in order to prevent the disruption of the inter-
national system which the Vienna Congress had created, and
to prevent any upheavals which might disturb the order which
the Vienna Congress had established.
However, in the past 50 or 60 years, the principle of nonin-
tervention in domestic affairs has been embodied in many doc-
uments of international law. The League of Nations Covenant
carried such an article, and the present-day United Nations
Charter speaks of domestic affairs as being outside the jurisdic-
tion of this international organization. Yet, in spite of the fact
that the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs has
been embodied in many international documents, we have wit-
nessed many violations of this principle. I shall refer to but a
few.
In the inter-war period the Italian Fascist government in-
tervened all around the Mediterranean, particularly in the Bal-
kan countries, supporting fascist movements in those coun-
tries. Nazi Germany, using the German minorities spread
throughout the Balkans and Central and Eastern Europe, in-
tervened in the domestic affairs of the respective countries in
which these German minorities lived. We now know that in the
Nazi period, many prominent French journalists were sup-
ported by the Nazi government's money in order to further the
ends of German foreign policy. We knew at the time of the civil
war in Spain that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were openly
supporting Generalissimo Franco. We also knew at that time
that the Soviet Union supported the Loyalist government of
Spain. The democracies, on the other hand, generally ab-
stained from intervening in the internal affairs of other coun-
tries. In the case of the Spanish Civil War, they even created a
Committee on Nonintervention in an attempt to supervise the
policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of Spain. With
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a cynicism that is all too familiar in international affairs, the
Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy were members of that Com-
mittee of Nonintervention.
It is a tremendous political, legal, and ethical problem
whether to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.
An experience from my diplomatic career highlights this prob-
lem. I was a young diplomatic officer in Belgrade before the
war. This was the Belgrade of the half-fascist Stojadinovic'
government with which the democratic Czechoslovakia was
allied. This was the Belgrade when publications were subjected
to a very strange and vicious form of censorship. No form of
preventive censorship was practiced; rather periodicals were
permitted to publish whatever they wanted, and then, when
the periodical was printed, it was brought before the censor
who could then confiscate the entire issue if it contained objec-
tionable material. The whole purpose behind this practice was
not only censorship itself but also to cause tremendous eco-
nomic damage to the editor and the publisher of offending
journals.
It was at this time-during 1937-that a man named Niko
Bartulovic', who was later executed by the Communist parti-
sans, came to me. He published a very courageous fortnightly
called Javnost, of which, perhaps, every third or fourth issue
was confiscated by the censors. Bartulovic' said to me, "I can-
not go on like this any more. I am defending your cause, the
cause of democracy. I am defending the cause of the Yugoslav-
Czechoslovak alliance and the Yugoslav-French alliance. I
need money and I am openly asking you for support." I sent a
telegram to my government in Prague recommending such sup-
port. Within 24 hours, I received an answer from Foreign Min-
ister Kamil Krofta asking me to tell Mr. Bartulovic' that while
we greatly appreciated his services, we could not give him any
support because to do so would mean intervention in Yugoslav
internal affairs. That was the last time that the periodical
Javnost appeared. We lost a good friend and the cause of de-
mocracy lost a great supporter.
Since World War II, the principle of nonintervention in
internal affairs, although embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations, has been violated time and time again. And
the United States has not been innocent. For example, it tried
to influence the result of the elections in Italy in 1948 and has
since supported the Italian Christian Democratic party. We
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know about U.S. intervention in Allende's Chile and in the
Dominican Republic. On the other hand, we know that the
Soviet Union supports the Italian Communist Party through
Italian commercial firms which have export-import interests in
the Soviet Union. Again, we know that both Western Europe
and the United States have helped the democratic movements
in Portugal; and there are many other instances of the United
States and Western Europe intervening in the internal affairs
of other countries.
In the case of the U.S.S.R., one must remember that their
intervention in the internal affairs of other countries is based
upon their Marxist beliefs. It is a matter of Marxist theory, of
Marxist duty, to support the international communist move-
ment. Years ago, Vyshinsky wrote a book on international law'
in which he said (on the whole, probably correctly) that every
law is the product of the class structure of a certain society;
furthermore, that international law is a reflection of the inter-
national class struggle.
On the occasion of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in Au-
gust 1968, Soviet writers tried to defend the invasion-which
was an act of aggression, an act of brutal intervention in the
domestic affairs of Czechoslovakia-on legal grounds. On Sep-
tember 26, 1968, Pravda2 explained the invasion as an act of
socialist legal right and duty. The article rejected as a "non-
class approach" the argument that the occupation violated the
principles of sovereignty and self-determination, since every
communist party is responsible not only to its own people but
also to all socialist countries and to the entire world communist
movement. In the Marxist conception, the article continued,
the norms of law cannot be interpreted in a narrowly formal
way outside the general context of the class struggle in the
present-day world. All laws are subordinated to the principles
of the class struggle; that is, the article concluded, the class
struggle approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the
name of legalistic considerations. This article, and other arti-
cles, as well as Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement before
the United Nations in October,' were later dubbed by Ameri-
I. A. VYSHINSKY. INTERNATIONAL LAW (1948).
2. Pravda, Sept. 26, 1968, at 4. An english translation can be found in CURRENT
l)oEsT oF" THE SOVIET PRESS. Oct. 16, 1968, at 10.
3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
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can reporters as the Brezhnev Doctrine, or the concept of "lim-
ited national sovereignty."
II.
It is at this point that I wish to link the problem of nonin-
tervention in domestic affairs to the problem of detente. One
might first say what detente is not. It is not a norm of interna-
tional law. It is not a new concept of world order. It is not a
new international system. At best, detente can be defined as a
policy (and a vague one at that), which tries to solve the prob-
lems which, as a consequence of World War I and the Cold
War, have divided the East and West.
We in this country are now, and have for the past few
months been, passing through a sort of malaise about detente.
The word has a bad taste-and I presume I should extend my
apologies to President Ford for even using the word "detente,"
since he has declared that he no longer intends to use it. But
the malaise stems from the fact that we have misconstrued,
misconceived, and misinterpreted the meaning of detente, that
we have very different perceptions of the meaning of detente
than does the Soviet Union.
Americans are prone to cliches; we attempt to cram vast
concepts into catchwords or slogans. How many doctrines have
we invented? The Truman Doctrine in 1947, the Eisenhower
Doctrine in 1958, the Nixon Doctrine in 1972, and now, we
sometimes hear about a Ford Doctrine. These are not doc-
trines, but rather enunciations of a certain policy at a certain
time. Similarly, we have succumbed to the lure of another
catch word-detente. And we are disappointed.
We must thank General DeGaulle for having brought the
term detente out of the obscurity of the French dictionary and
on to the scene of international politics. He had a great talent
for coining phrases and slogans. He spoke of a policy of detente:
from detente to entente, from entente to cooperation. The mo-
tivation of this fine sounding formulation was, as he himself
put it, to free France and Europe from the influence of the
hegemony of the two Super Powers. In seeking to relieve the
supposed American pressure on European politics, he sought
rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union
was quick to respond.
To recapitulate very briefly, the Warsaw Pact countries
held a meeting in Budapest in 1966 at which they launched the
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policy of detente. They issued an appeal to the Western Euro-
pean countries to prepare a European Security Conference with
certain specific goals. In that appeal, which they repeated
every half-year after 1966, they made it clear what their goals
were. They wanted the participants of the envisioned Security
Conference to proclaim their respect for the principles of nonin-
tervention in the internal affairs of other countries, of respect
for national sovereignty and national independence. They
wanted that conference to confirm the finality of the division
of Germany by the recognition of East Germany (GDR). They
wanted the West, at least by way of implication, to recognize
that Central and Eastern Europe are within the Soviet sphere
of influence. They wanted the conference to deal with problems
of mutual East-West trade and with technological, scientific
and cultural cooperation. Interestingly enough, the original
appeal from the 1966 Warsaw Pact conference was limited to
European countries only. The exclusion of the United States
and Canada from this proposal was no oversight. Only when
the NATO countries had unanimously rejected the proposition
did the Soviet Union and its allies "graciously" agree that the
United States and Canada might participate.
The reaction of the West to these appeals was very slow.
It was only in 1970-four years later-that the West, including
Canada and the United States, issued a statement expressing
their willingness to participate in such a Conference. The West,
however, wanted to add two points to the agenda submitted by
the Soviet Union and its allies: (1) to discuss the idea of mu-
tually balanced reduction of forces in Europe (MBFR); and (2)
the question of the free flow of ideas between the East and
West.
Now, I do not know whether the person who worded the
phrase "free flow of ideas" seriously entertained the thought
that the Eastern world would ever permit a free flow of ideas.
But if he did, the illusion was very quickly dispelled. For al-
though the Soviet Union, with some reluctance, accepted the
idea of discussing the mutually balanced withdrawal of forces
from Europe in a separate forum, it emphatically rejected any
idea of the free exchange of cultural values and ideas. Indeed,
since 1970, the Soviet Union has developed a fierce campaign
accusing the West of efforts, under the cloak of cultural cooper-
ation and trade cooperation, to infiltrate and subvert the com-
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munist system. The Soviets have stated that they will never
permit that kind of free flow of ideas.
As a result of these exchanges, the Geneva conference was
finally held, which labored for two and one-half years. Last
summer it culminated in the Helsinki summit conference
(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE).
I will not go into the tremendously long and elaborate
document of the Helsinki conference, except to say that while
my general attitude toward the policy of detente is critical, I
think it only fair to say, and important to stress, that some
concrete results have come from this process of mutual rap-
prochement. There exists in Europe a sense of relaxation; ten-
sions have subsided, and contacts-technological, cultural and
trade contacts-have developed, particularly in matters of
trade between East and West Europe. But all this relates to
Europe, that is, to European detente. Thus, while the United
States participated in this effort for European detente, there
was no detente between the United States and the Soviet
Union in their direct relations.
The Cold War continued, even though it must be recog-
nized that President Nixon did bring about a change. In his
Inaugural Address in January 1969, he proposed the replace-
ment of confrontation by negotiation in the relationship be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. Shortly there-
after, SALT I explorations started, and gradually, some very
important agreements have been reached within the framework
of detente with the Soviet Union. The SALT I agreement was
signed in May 1972, an important step, although its durability
depends on the signing of SALT II. Further foundations were
laid at the meeting of President Ford and General Secretary
Brezhnev in Vladivostok in December 1975. At this moment,
however, the negotiations are, or appear to be, stalled. They are
certainly very complex; no one can say whether SALT II will
finally be signed. We have also reached an agreement on pro-
hibiting the use of the seabed for placing nuclear weapons; we
have reached a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological
warfare; we have reached an agreement on limiting under-
ground atomic tests to 150 kilotons. Just recently, we initialed
an agreement limiting nuclear tests for peaceful uses to 150
kilotons. We have reached agreements on scientific and eco-
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nomic cooperation, in matters of medicine and the environ-
ment, and so on.
In matters of trade, according to the official data of the
U.S. Department of State, the trade of the members of the
OECD (Western Europe, Japan, Canada and the United
States) with the communist countries, between 1970 and 1974,
increased three-fold, from $16.5 billion to $49 billion. The U.S.
share has increased nearly six-fold in the same period-from
$580 million to $3.2 billion. In matters of technology, according
to the same source, the U.S. Government in 1974 issued 156
licenses for the export of technological data and signed some
21 agreements on the flow of technology to the U.S. from the
Soviet Union. As you can see, there is considerable validity in
the charge that the Soviet Union is the winner in this East-
West technology relationship. The Soviet tendency is to ex-
pand this trade and technology cooperation because the Soviet
Union desires to bridge the technological gap and to help solid-
ify its economic basis. But in the West, whether it be France,
Britain, Italy, Canada or the United States, we all seem to be
very anxious. We compete with each other in trading with the
Soviet Union. Or, as Lenin put it many years ago, "the capital-
ists in their search for profit will sell us the rope with which we
will hang them."
However, politically speaking, the most important aspect
of detente was the summit meeting of President Nixon with
General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow in the spring of 1972.
This is the real source of the malaise which we witness today.
On that occasion, many agreements were signed, including the
most important one-the Agreement on Basic Principles of
Mutual Relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.' As
would always be the case on such occasions, these basic princi-
ples stated that the relations between the two countries are
governed by the principles of peaceful coexistence, that ideo-
logical differences are not an obstacle to cooperation by the two
powers, that the two powers respect the principle of noninter-
vention in internal affairs, the principle of respect for national
sovereignty and national independence of other countries.
They further promised to refrain from the use of force against
each other, against each other's allies and against "other coun-
4. 66 DEP'T STATE Buu.. 898 (1972).
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tries." The phrase "other countries" is very important, as I
shall try to demonstrate in a moment. But we, at that time,
seemed to have overlooked the importance of the afterthought
of adding "other countries."
The malaise spreading in this country about detente stems
from the fact that we fail to understand the Soviet meaning of
detente. First, if you have studied the documents, the state-
ments made by Soviet leaders, and the newspapers in the So-
viet Union, you would see that their concept of detente is really
limited to Europe. Relations between the United States and
the Soviet Union are of a special nature-sui generis-relations
between two Super Powers.
The Soviet understanding of detente, further, does not in-
clude detente in ideology. On the contrary, Soviet speakers
from Brezhnev down, have repeatedly said that there is no
peaceful coexistence in ideology; that is, the ideological strug-
gle continues and the class struggle in fact intensifies. To sup-
port this point, I will give a few quotations.
Izvestia, November 30, 19751 stated that detente gave in
fact "a powerful impulse to the national liberation movement
of colonial and oppressed peoples." Izvestia, on December 2,
1975 said: "Detente does not mean, and has never meant, the
freezing of the socio-political status quo in the world." World
Marxist View of September 19757 stated that detente refers to
interstate relations between capitalist and socialist countries.
In the same month Izvestial elaborated that detente was a
concept of friendly cooperation at the state-to-state level, but
with "continuous ideological struggle on all other levels, espe-
cially in the realm of the international class struggle." General
Secretary Brezhnev, at the 25th Congress of the CPSU in
February-March 1976, in describing the inevitable decay of
capitalism-for "capitalism is a society without a fu-
ture"-spoke of the progress of social forces that cannot be
stopped. He said, "In helping wars of national liberation we are
acting as our revolutionary conscience and our communist con-
5. Izvestia, Nov. 30, 1975.
6. Izvestia, Dec. 2, 1975.
7. Social Progress and Detente, WORLD MARXIST REVIEW, Sept. 1975, at 58, 61.
8. Izvestia, Sept. 4, 1975, at 3. An english translation can be found at Arbatov,
Maneuvers of the Opponents of Detente, 'CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Oct.
1. 1975, at 1, 5.
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victions permit us, for detente does not in the slightest way
abolish and cannot abolish or change the laws of class strug-
gle.""
I could go on and on in support of my argument that the
Soviets have given a specific interpretation to the policy of
detente which we have failed to understand. Had we under-
stood it, we would also have understood the Soviet and Cuban
intervention in Angola as a continuation of the class struggle,
as the continuation of the ideological struggle, and not as an
adventurist policy, as Secretary of State Kissinger character-
ized it recently.
To conclude, then, detente has recorded some positive
achievements, but it is limited in scope, nature, and time. At
best, in the long run, it is uncertain. It is not a matter of
international law-there I can take students of international
law off the hook-it is a matter of policy, subjected to different
interpretations. Last but not least, the underlying factor of any
international negotiations, whether bilateral or multilateral, is
the element of trust, an element overriding all other considera-
tions, a highly elusive element in the study of international
law, yet ever present in international negotiations. The estab-
lishment of at least a modicum of mutual trust between the
negotiating parties is a prerequisite to the successful outcome
of any negotiations. That modicum does not presently exist in
the relations between the East and West, and without
it-lacking that essential modicum of mutual trust-detente is
based on very shaky ground.
9. Excerpts of Brezhnev's speech are found in N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1976, at 14,
Col. 1.
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From Gandhi to Gandhi*-INTERNATIONAL
Legal Responses to the Destruction of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in India
VED P. NANDA**
I. INTRODUCTION
Emerging norms of international law require the protec-
tion of individuals from the dehumanizing acts of their own
ef.. .--
'My name ii Gandfii, but I ani not
related to that wonan'
Copyright" 1975 Chicago Sun-Times. Reproduced by courtesy of Wil-Jo Asso-
ciates, Inc. and Bill Mauldin.
** Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law; Co-Chairman, World Committee for Human Rights in
India.
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governments.' Consequently, when. gross violations of human
rights occur, the international community is obligated to in-
voke pressures against the offending government.'
In December 1975, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a Declaration against "torture and other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment" of persons in de-
I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude my personal debt to so many students,
colleagues and personal friends, and to individuals and groups concerned with promo-
tion and protection of human rights both in the United States and abroad, who have
been the source of inspiration, encouragement and assistance in the continuing effort
since June 26, 1975, for the restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
India. I am especially grateful to: my students-Ian Bird, Edward Buckingham, Mark
Caldwell, Constance Cox, Katharine Kunz, David Pansius, Steven Peden, Myra
Rainey, Douglas Scrivner, James Walczak, and Jeffrey Wilson; Luis Kutner, Esq.,
Co-Chairman, and Members of the Consultative Council, the World Committee for
Human Rights in India; several officers and members of the Denver International Law
Society, Indians for Democracy, Indians for Freedom Internatonional, and the Interna-
tional League for Human Rights; my friends and colleagues-in Denver, Britt Ander-
son, Bill Barker, William Beaney, Robert Burns, John Carver, Jonathan Cox, Phil
Gauthier, Tom Gavin, Ed Goodin, Leon Drozd, Genevieve Fiore, William Hornby,
Michael Howard, William Key, Tony Larsen, Neil Littlefield, Thompson Marsh,
Maurice Mitchell, Wilbert Moore, Christopher Munch, Lee Olson, Stanton Peckham,
George Salem, Harley Shaver, William White, Robert Yegge and Mrs. Ronald Yegge;
in Chicago, Cherif Bassiouni and Robert Friedlander; in Iowa City, David Baldus, Dale
Bentz, Willard Boyd, Helen Buckley, Helen Clark, Paul Neuhauser and Allan Vestal;
in New York, Blair Clark, Thomas Franck, John Hazard, Egon Schwelb, Douglas
Wachholz and Burns Weston; in Washington, D.C., Edward Derwinski, Donald Fraser,
Gary Hart, Floyd Haskell, Nicholas Kittrie, Bert Lockwood, Dayton Olson, Joseph
Page, William Ris, Jr., John Salzberg, Pat Schroeder, Michael Walter; Edward Gordon
at Albany; Frank Newman at Berkeley; Houston Lay at California Western; Irvin
Ritter at Cincinnati; Ralph Lake at Dayton; Richard Baxter at Harvard; John Murphy
at Kansas; James Nafziger at Oregon; Covey Oliver at Pennsylvania; Albert Blaustein
and Roger Clark at Rutgers; Kenneth Penegar at Tennessee; Thomas Buergenthal at
Texas; Harold Maier at Vanderbilt; Richard Lillich, John Norton Moore and Mason
Willrich at Virginia; Myres McDougal, Michael Reisman and Eugene Rostow at Yale;
S. Swamy in London; A. Bhide in Nairobi, Kenya; and . . . in India.
1. Pertinent documents and the existing literature are too voluminous to list. See,
e.g., The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A,
U.N. Doc. A/810, at 174 (1948), adopted Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R.
Lillich, ed., 1973); Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of
Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1975); Humphrey, The Revolution in the
International Law of Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 205 (1975); McDougal, Lasswell
& Chen, Protection and Respect for Human Rights: Freedom of Choice and World
Public Order, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 919 (1975); Newman, Interpreting the Human Rights
Clause of the UN Charter, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 283 (1972), Schwelb, The International
Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(1972).
2. See, e.g., Nanda, A Critique of United Nations Inaction in the Bangladesh
Crisis, 49 DENVER L. J. 53, 66-67 (1972).
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tention and imprisonment.' The General Assembly also
adopted a resolution expressing "its profound distress at the
constant, flagrant violations of human rights, including . .
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
arbitrary arrest, detention and exile . . .which have taken
place and, according to existing evidence, continue to take
place in Chile,"' and calling upon the government of Chile to
take all necessary measures to restore basic human rights and
fundamental freedoms in that country.'
But ironically, and unfortunately, at the same time that
the Government of India was supporting these human rights
resolutions, its own conduct mocked the very standards it had
ratified.' I was visiting India at the time and had the opportun-
ity to verify some of the reported incidents of arbitrary arrest
and detention, and inhuman, degrading treatment, and torture
of those held in detention or imprisonment on political
grounds.7 My personal observation and investigation coupled
with the evidence gathered by others,8 have led me to conclude
that gross and massive violations of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms have occurred and continue to occur in India.
These violations will be discussed in this comment in light
of appropriate provisions of the U.N. Charter and of the appli-
cable human rights instruments- covenants, declarations, and
resolutions.' This discussion will be followed by a section on
appraisal and recommendations.10 Specifically, a few alterna-
tives will be explored which might be helpful in seeking restora-
tion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms
3. G. A. Res. 3452, 30 GAOR Supp. - at ., U.N. Doc. A/ - (1975). The
resolution is also printed in 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1976, at 91.
4. Art. 1, G.A. Res. 3448, 30 GAOR Supp. - at _, U.N. Doc. A/ -. (1975).
The resolution is also printed in 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1976, at 90.
5. Id. art. 2.
6. See § II infra, at text accompanying notes 16-100.
7. See Nanda, Passage Through India-Whip of the New Raj, NATION, Feb. 21,
1976, at 203-204.
8. The evidence I have relied upon was gathered primarily by the Lok Sangharsh
Samiti (People's Struggle Committee in India, hereinafter cited as the Samiti) and
already has been used by two groups-Indians for Freedom and the International
League for Human Rights-in their respective communications to the United Nations.
The copies of the Samiti reports and the official bulletins and copies of these communi-
cations are on file at DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY.
9. Supra note 6.
10. See § III infra, at text accompanying notes 101-142.
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in India. The purpose is to suggest selected measures which
states as well as intergovernmental organizations and nongov-
ernmental groups might take to seek the implementation by
India of the applicable human rights prescriptions for the one-
sixth of the human race living in that country.
II. PATTERN OF CONSISTENT AND GROSS VIOLATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF
INDIA
A systematic and steady erosion of the fundamental free-
doms guaranteed by the Constitution of India" began with the
imposition of a state of Emergency by the Government of India
on June 25, 1975.12 Since then, repressive legislative and execu-
tive measures have cut deeply into the enjoyment of human
rights by the people of India. These measures directly contra-
vene the obligation of states under the U.N. Charter. For
example, article 55 requires member-states to promote univer-
sal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms; and article 56 demands that they take joint
and separate action, in cooperation with the United Nations,
toward that end.
Clearly, the Government of India is pursuing a policy of
harassment, arrests, detention and imprisonment of political
opponents, and of treating inhumanly those detained and im-
prisoned on political grounds. The Government of India justi-
fies its acts, its extraordinary "disciplinary" sanctions, on
grounds of national security. In Indira Gandhi's words, the
purported reason for imposing the Emergency and for under-
taking these extraordinary measures was to protect India from
threats to national unity, to discharge the Government's "para-
mount duty to safeguard unity and stability. The nation's in-
tegrity demands firm action."13 The continuation of these mea-
sures is rationalized by invoking the need to instill discipline
and to improve the country's economy." As the following
11. CONST. OF INDIA arts. 12-35 (1950). For an incisive commentary see G. AUSTIN,
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A NATION, 50-115 (1966).
12. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
13. MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI ON EMERGENCY
IN INDIA, 1, 10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as INDIRA GANDHI ON EMERGENCY]. See also
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 12, col. 3; SATURDAY REv., Aug. 9, 1975, at 10, col. 2.
14. See, e.g., INDIRA GANDHI ON EMERGENCY, supra note 13, at 23-25; Kaul, In
Which Reasons for the State of Emergency Are Explained and Defended, N.Y. Times,
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discussion will demonstrate, the Government's contentions are
neither supported by facts, 5 nor can they be justified on legal
grounds.
A. Torture and Mistreatment of Detainees and Prisoners
Torture and other practices of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment of detainees and prisoners are cate-
gorically prohibited under international law. Specific interna-
tional prescriptions on the subject include article 5 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights6 and article 7 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'" (which came
into force in March 1976)'" both of which proscribe such mea-
sures against any person under any circumstances. The Cove-
nant further stipulates that a person's right not to be subjected
to torture or to cruel, degrading or inhuman treatment or pun-
ishment is so fundamental that it cannot be derogated even in
time of public emergency. 9 The Covenant mandates that all
persons deprived of their liberty are to be treated "with hu-
manity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person;" 0 the necessary guidelines as to lawful sanctions are
contained in the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners.2'
July 28, 1975, at 21, col. 1; GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, TIMELY STEPS (1975). Criticizing
Indira Gandhi's recent statement that "the gains of the emergency were economic and
not political," Jaya Prakash Narain, the ailing opposition leader said on July 14, 1976,
"The relevant question, however, is whether the imprisonment of tens of thousands of
persons and their detention without trial, the suppression of civil liberties and of the
freedom of the press and establishment of a virtual police Raj [state], were necessary
to achieve the paltry economic gains." Satya Samachar 1 (n.d., official bulletin pub-
lished by the Samiti), on file at DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY.
15. See, e.g., Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 1976, at 10, col. 1 [hereinafter
cited as C. S. Monitor]; Nanda, If Mrs. Gandhi has her way, India Will Have a
Dynasty, Rocky Mountain News, Apr. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
16. Art. 5 reads: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 72 (1948),
reproduced in Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1, at 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Human
Rights Instruments].
17. U.N. Human Rights Instruments, at 9.
18. The covenant came into force on March 23, 1976. See After 30 years, an
International Bill of Human Rights, 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Apr. 1976, at 50.
19. Art. 4(2), UN. Human Rights Instruments, at 8.
20. Art. 80(1), id. at 9.
21. The U.N. Economic and Social Council approved the Standard Rules in Au-
gust 1957. ECOSOC Res. 663(c), 24 U.N. ECOSOC Supp. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048
(1957). For the General Assembly action recommending implementation and adoption
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More recently, the U.N. General Assembly, at its Thirtieth
Session, adopted a Declaration 2 which condemns such inhu-
man practices as a denial of the purposes of the U.N. Charter
and violative of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.23
The Declaration defines torture as "any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person
for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person infor-
mation or confession, punishing him for an act he has commit-
ted or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him
or other persons. ' ' 24 States are not to permit or tolerate such
practices,2 5 and are obligated: (1) to take effective measures to
prevent these practices;2 1 (2) to conduct impartial investigation
of charges against such practices;27 and (3) to take appropriate
action against the offender 28 and to afford redress and compen-
sation to the victim. 29 These prohibited practices cannot be
excused or justified even under exceptional circumstances such
as a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability,
or any public emergency. 30
These guidelines are to be further studied by the Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities [hereinafter to be referred to as the Sub-
Commission], which is a subsidiary organ of the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights [hereinafter to be referred to as the
Commission]. The study will be undertaken pursuant to the
Commission's request that the Sub-Commission draft a body
of principles for the protection of all persons under any form
of detention and imprisonment.3 1 Subsequently, at the April-
May 1976 session of the Economic and Social Council
[hereinafter to be referred to as ECOSOC], the Council called
of the Rules see G.A. Res. 2858, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 29, at 94, U.N. Doe. A/8588
(1971), and G.A. Res. 3144, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/9425 (1973).
22. Supra note 3.
23. Id. art. 2 of the Declaration.
24. Id. art. 1.
25. Id. art. 3.
26. Id. arts. 4, 6.
27. Id. arts. 8, 9.
28. Id. art. 10.
29. Id. art. 11.
30. Id. art. 3.
31. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Mar. 1976, at 38.
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upon all Governments fully to observe and to implement the
Declaration.32
Reports' from India suggest that the Government has sys-
tematically and consistently violated these substantive rights.
The Loka Sangharsh Samiti (People's Struggle Committee in
India), has made serious allegations against the Government of
India regarding mistreatment of detainees and prisoners and of
torture in police stations and jails.33 Many observers of the
Indian scene have made similar charges. 3' The methods of tor-
ture often used by the police to induce or extract a confession
to or implicate others in a nonexistent plot against the Govern-
ment of India, to seek information concerning the activities of
the underground, or to punish a victim for his or her activities
in the underground are as varied as they are inhuman and
revolting. After personally verifying the alleged accounts of po-
lice brutality I reported after my visit to India last December:
The victims who talked with me related incidents where they or
other political prisoners were hung upside down; were stripped
naked and severely beaten with shoes, steel rods and gun butts;
had burning candles applied to their bare soles, which were then
punctured with nails; had chili powder smeared into their noses
and other parts of their bodies; were kept awake while icy water
was thrown on them on cold winter nights; were starved and even
denied water; had rods tied to their necks, creating an intolerable
strain on the spinal cord.
The doctor I met was not personally tortured. However,
while he was in jail as a political prisoner, illegally detained on
trumped-up charges, he had treated more than twenty prisoners
who, he said, must have been "mercilessly beaten." The sole
fault of the lawyer, arrested on the charge of being a "hooligan,"
was, he said, that he had appeared in court on behalf of a political
prisoner. A member of the Indian Supreme Court Bar Association
showed me a resolution adopted by that organization which con-
demned police atrocities and harassment of attorneys defending
opposition members. The Bar Association noted that even the
families and relatives of such attorneys were not spared police
wrath.'5
32. Id. June 1976, at 26.
33. Copy on file at DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY.
34. See, e.g., statement by George Fernandes, Chairman, Socialist Party of India,
of Nov. 8, 1975, at 19 (copy on file at DENVER J. INT'L LAW & POLICY); Swamy, The
bed of nails that Mrs. Gandhi made, Manchester Guardian Weekly, June 13, 1976, at
9; Anderson & Whitten, Torture of Political Prisoners Continues, Washington Post,
March 27, 1976, at E14, cols. 2-3; Nanda, supra note 7, at 204.
35. Nanda, supra note 7, at 204.
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The massive arrests since the imposition of the Emergency
have resulted in overcrowding in Indian jails. Political prison-
ers are kept in conditions violative of the Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners .3 Even before the promul-
gation of the Emergency, thousands of "Naxalites" were kept
in Indian jails without trial, and many of them were physically
abused. 7
One cannot argue that these continuing violations of inter-
national norms could occur without some knowledge, toleration
or direction by the Government of India. Furthermore, the
Government has ignored repeated requests for the appointment
of a commission of inquiry to conduct an impartial investiga-
tion of these charges, and has not responded to or even ac-
knowledged communications on the subject from opposition
Members of Parliament.Y
B. Suspension of the Rights to Life, Liberty and Security of
Person and to Due Process of Law
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects the
rights of all persons to life, liberty and security of person,3 ' and
to due process of law, including "the right to an effective rem-
edy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights" guaranteed a person by the constitution
or by law,' 0 protection from arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile,4 the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal," and the presumption of innocence . 3
These rights were subsequently codified in articles 9, 14
and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights." More recently, the Commission has shown special
concern for "the question of human rights of all persons sub-
jected to any form of detention or imprisonment."45 At its
36. Appendices 5, 6 and 8 of the communication submitted to the U.N. Secretary-
General by Indians for Democracy [hereinafter cited as Indians for Democracy
Communication].
37. Id. appendices 3 and 4.
38. Id. appendices 7, 9, 10, lla-lld, 12-14.
39. Art. 3, U.N. Human Rights Instruments, at 8.
40. Id. at art. 8.
41. Id. at art. 9.
42. Id. at art. 10.
43. Id. at art. 11(1), and 2.
44. Id. at 9-10.
45. 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Mar. 1976, at 38.
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February-March 1976 session, the Commission asked the Sub-
Commission "to draft a body of principles for the protection of
all persons under any form of detention and imprisonment.""
It also drew the attention of all states "to studies and principles
relating in particular to freedom from arbitrary arrest and de-
tention."47 The Commission's contribution to the promotion of
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms at its 1976
session was endorsed by ECOSOC.15 It is significant to note
that earlier, in 1974, the Sub-Commission had already decided
by its resolution 7 "to review annually developments in the
field of human rights of persons subjected to any form of deten-
tion or imprisonment."" The resolution also called for attested
information on the subject from governments, intergovern-
mental organizations, and non-governmental groups.
Since the beginning of the Emergency, the Government of
India has consistently and flagrantly violated these fundamen-
tal rights. To briefly recapitulate, the fundamental rights guar-
anteed under the Constitution of India were suspended by
Presidential orders" issued under article 359 of the Constitu-
tion."1
The rights suspended include: the rights to life and per-
sonal liberty;" equality before the law;53 protection against ar-
rest and detention without being informed of the grounds for
arrest, and the duty to produce an arrested person before a
magistrate within 24 hours.54 The Emergency destroyed these
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id., June 1976, at 26.
49. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1160, E/CN.4/Sub. 2/354, at 52-53 (1974). For a thorough
and incisive analysis of the Sub-Commission's role see Burke, New United Nations
Procedure to Protect Prisoners and other Detainees, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 201 (1976).
50. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 28, 1975, at 1, col. 6; id. June 30, 1975, at 1, col.
1; id. July 23, 1975, at 1, col. 3; id. July 25, 1975, at 3, col. 1; id. Aug. 8, 1975, at 3,
col. 7; id. Oct. 19, 1975, at 18, col. 5.
51. Art. 359 authorizes the Government to take measures suspending some or all
of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution once the President has
proclaimed an emergency under art. 352, that is, when the President is "satisfied" that
there is a threat or imminent threat to India's security. See Nanda, The Constitutional
Framework and the Current Political Crisis in India, 2 HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 859
(1975).
52. CONST. OF INDIA art. 21 (1950).
53. Id. art. 14.
54. Id. art. 22. The President of India issued an ordinance soon after the proclama-
tion of the Emergency stating that it was no longer necessary to communicate to
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protections. Tens of thousands of political opponents have been
arrested since the declaration of the Emergency,55 and sweep-
ing police powers have been exercised under repressive mea-
sures such as the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA)
and the Defense of India Rules. 6
The citizen's right to move judicial tribunals for writs of
habeas corpus, guaranteed by the Constitution of India, was
challenged by the Government in the Supreme Court of India.
In its four-to-one ruling of April 28, 1976, the Supreme Court
upheld the Government's suspension of the right of habeas
corpus during the Emergency.57 It accepted the Government's
contention that "the President's power to take any action dur-
ing the emergency under Article 359 was absolute and by such
action, if a citizen was deprived of his liberty and life, he could
not complain that the action was without the procedure estab-
lished by law." 5 Thus, there "is no personal rights law for the
time being."59 Consequently, no detainee or prisoner during the
Emergency could seek judicial intervention, "even if an action
taken by the executive was unlawful.""0
The Court also upheld a law enacted in January 1976,
detained persons reasons for their detention. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
55. The number of political prisoners in Indian jails has been estimated at nearly
200,000 by the opposition. Satya Samachar, supra note 14, at 6. "It's a small number
of people, very small, relative to India's whole population' " is how Indira Gandhi
responded to a question in April 1976. Borders, New Delhi Balks on Prisoner Data,
N.Y. Times, April 27, 1976, at 11, col. 1. The number was put, "by conservative
estimates," at more than 100,000 in a special report to the Washington Post from
London. Lifschultz, India Still Holding 100,000 in Jails, Washington Post, Mar. 5,
1976, at Al, col. 1. A staff writer of the Los Angeles Times reported from New Delhi
on June 25, 1976: estimates of political prisoners run to the tens of thousands. Most
foreign diplomats have stopped playing the guessing game." Rosenhause, A New India:
Democracy in the Past Tense, L.A. Times, June 25, 1976, at 1, col. 1. In January 1976,
a Washington Star staff writer reported the number of arrested political prisoners to
be 95,000. Bradsher, Mrs. Gandhi Obliterating Nehru's Consensus Rule, Washington
Star, Jan. 23, 1976, at A7, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, May 2, 1976, § IV, at 14, col. 5.
56. For recent amendments to MISA see an Associated Press report in Rocky
Mountain News, June 17, 1976, at 26, col. 1. See also Borders, supra note 55.
57. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 5.
58. The Government's contention was made by the Attorney-General of India,
Niren De, in his arguments before the Supreme Court. Indian Express, Dec. 18, 1975,
at 1, col. 5. I confirmed the accuracy of Mr. De's statement in a conversation with Mr.
De in Denver in April 1976.
59. Supra note 57, at 8, col. 1 (Mr. De's contention before the Supreme Court).
60. Hindustan Times, Dec. 16, 1975, at 1, col. 1. (Mr. De's contention before the
Supreme Court).
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under which the grounds for detention were made confidential
"matters of state, [which are] against the public interest to
disclose."'" Writing for the majority, Chief Justice A.N. Ray
said:
Material and information on which orders of preventive de-
tention are passed necessarily belong to a class of documents
whose disclosure would impair the proper functioning of public
service and administration. The file relating to a detention order
must contain intelligence reports whose confidentiality is beyond
reasonable question2
Pursuant to executive decrees and ordinances and legisla-
tive measures, government actions have deprived political de-
tainees of their fundamental rights. These actions include: 3 (1)
failure to bring detainees before a magisrate promptly, or to
identify the grounds for detention-it is now sufficient that the
authorities are satisfied that detention is necessary to safe-
guard the security of India; (2) failure to bring detainees to trial
within a reasonable time-a political prisoner may be held in
detention for up to one year without bail, notification of
charges, or arraignment or trial; (3) denial of visitors and/or
counsel; (4) unjustified solitary confinement; and (5) rearrest
and detention of released prisoners under the same circum-
stances.
Since there is no time limit on the duration of the Emer-
gency, 4 a person detained or arrested has no legal or judicial
recourse to safeguard his or her right to personal liberty during
the period of the Emergency, even if such a person is totally
innocent and illegally detained on false information or on im-
material or nonexistent grounds.
61. Supra note 57, at 8, col. 1.
62. Id.
63. Id.; supra notes 50-55 and the accompanying text; MATCHBOX (Amnesty Int'l
newsletter), Summer 1976, at 1-2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1976, at 10, col. 1; Denver Post,
Aug. 16, 1976, at 4, col. 1. See, e.g., the communications to the United Nations
Secretary-General by the International League for Human Rights and Indians for
Democracy, and various official bulletins and reports by the Samiti on file at the
DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY.
64. On July 23, 1975, the Lok Sabha-lower house of the Indian Parlia-
ment-ratified the Government's declaration of state of emergency, which empowered
the Government to keep the Emergency in effect indefinitely. Lok Sabha also ratified
a constitutional amendment precluding judicial review of the President's proclamation
of emergency. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1975, at 1, col. 7; id. July 25, 1975, at 3, col. 1; id.
July 30, 1975, at 2, col. 1.
65. For Additional Solicitor-General of India's contention on the subject in the
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The repressive governmental measures which have de-
prived a citizen of recourse to the law and the judiciary include
the following: (1) suspension of the fundamental rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution of India;66 (2) various amendments to
MISA, further curtailing the rights of the detainees;" and (3)
amendments to the Constitution of India, depriving the courts
of jurisdiction to review any claim that the Emergency powers
have been misused.66
The Government of India has used these repressive mea-
sures primarily against its political opponents. Among those
arbitrarily arrested and detained are former cabinet ministers,
Members of Parliament, leaders of opposition parties and even
dissenters from within the ruling Congress Party, journalists,
university professors, and students.6" As the later discussion
will demonstrate, no legal justification exists for taking these
extraordinary measures.
C. Denials of Freedom of Expression, Assembly and
Association, and Freedom of the Press
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
guarantees the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 0
Article 20 of the Declaration protects the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association.7 These rights are codified
in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights-Article 18 recog-
nizes the right to freedom of thought and conscience,7" article
Supreme Court, see Times of India, Jan. 19, 1976, cited in the Indians for Democracy
Communication. MISA was removed from judicial scrutiny as early as August 1975.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1975, at 3, col. 7. In October 1975 MISA was further amended by
a Presidential ordinance, according to which the Government was no longer required
to disclose reasons for arrests made under MISA. The ordinance was made retroactive
to June 29 to keep prisoners already in jails from challenging their arrests. Id. Oct. 19,
1975, at 18, col. 5. See also, id. Nov. 18, at 8, col. 6; Rocky Mountain News, June 17,
1976, at 26, col. 1; Denver Post, Aug. 16, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
66. Supra notes 52-54 and note 78 infra and the accompanying text.
67. Supra note 65.
68. Supra note 64.
69. See, e.g., Lukas, India is as Indira Does, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1976, § 6, at 19,
89, col. 1; id. June 27, 1975, at 1, cols. 6, 8; id. at 12, col. 5; id. July 8, 1975, at 7, col.
1; id. July 27, 1975, at 1, col. 7; id. Aug. 5, 1975, at 10, cols. 3, 5; id. Dec. 20, 1975, at
6, col. 4; id. Feb. 2, 1976, at 9, col. 2; id. Feb. 5, 1976, at 5, col. 1; id. March 9, 1976,
at 3, col. 3; id. Apr. 27, 1976, at 11, col. 1; id. May 2, 1976, § IV, at 14, col. 5; id. May
19, 1976, at 10, col. 4; id. May 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
70. U.N. Human Rights Instruments, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 10.
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19 states the right to freedom of opinion and expression;7" arti-
cle 21 protects the right to peaceful assembly;74 and article 22
guarantees the right to freedom of association.75
The President of India has suspended the seven basic free-
doms guaranteed under the Constitution of India-freedom of
speech, of assembly, to form associations and unions, to move
throughout the country, to live in any part of the country, to
own property, and to follow any profession, trade or business.76
The mass arrests of political opponents, designed to silence
opposition to the Government, clearly violate the right to free-
dom of expression. In addition, the Government has outlawed
26 organizations77 and has stifled the once lively Indian press
by placing it under severe censorship.78 In December 1975 it
promulgated the Prevention of Publication of Objectionable
Matter Ordinance,7" under which any words, signs or visible
representations considered defamatory of the executive author-
ities including the President, Prime Minister or any other
member of her Council of Ministers, the Speaker of the Lok
Sabha-lower house of the Indian Parliament-or Governor of
a State, constitutes a punishable offense.80
Under the Ordinance, the definition of the objectionable
matter includes any words, signs or visible representations
which are likely to "[blring into hatred or contempt or excite
disaffection towards the Government established by law in
India or in any State thereof and thereby cause or tend to cause
public disorder."'" The executive is authorized to take action
73. Id. at art. 19(2), at 11.
74. Id.
75. Id. at art. 22(1).
76. CONST. OF INDIA art. 19 (1950). The suspension came on Jan. 7, 1976. See also
Indians for Democracy Communication.
77. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1975, at 1, col. 4. See also statements by Ved Nanda and
Jagjit Singh Chohan at Congressional Hearings, Hearings on Human Rights in India
Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations of the House Comm. on Interna-
tional Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Session, at - (June 28, 1976) [hereinafter cited as
House Hearings].
78. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 26, 1976, at 3, col. 1; id. May 29, 1976, at 22, col.
2; id. Feb. 15, 1976, § 1, at 4, col. 1; ECONOMIST, May 29, 1976, at 47; notes 79-89 infra
and the accompanying text.
79. Hindustan Times, Dec. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 1; Int'l Herald Tribune, Dec. 9,
1975, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1975, at 8, col. 3.
80. § 3(B)(I), Hindustan Times, Dec. 10, 1975, at 5, col. 1.
81. Id. at § 3(I).
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to prevent or combat "any activity prejudicial to the interests
of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or
morality. 82 The penalties for disobedience are severe83 and the
executive has wide discretion in implementing the ordinance. 84
In January 1976 the Parliament of India gave the measure its
stamp of approval,85 thereby allowing strict press censorship to
survive even should the Emergency end.
Earlier, in July 1975, the Government promulgated censor-
ship guidelines 6 which prohibit the publication, without prior
approval, of opposition speeches in Parliament, details of court
proceedings, names of detainees and their places of detention,
demonstrations against the government and matters critical of
the government. Thus, the publication of anything the
Government finds objectionable is forbidden-even to the ex-
tent of prohibiting quotations from Gandhi, Nehru and certain
statements made by Indira Gandhi herself before the imposi-
tion of the Emergency. 7
In January 1976, the Government further stifled the right
of free expression by repealing the immunity of the press in
reporting parliamentary proceedings.8 It also abolished the
Press Council of India, which was an independent agency es-
tablished to protect freedom of the press. 9 Censorship has re-
portedly been extended to censoring mail, confiscating foreign
literature including newspapers and periodicals containing ar-
ticles critical of the Government, and telephone bugging and
wiretapping of political opponents and dissidents.
The Emergency decree and the suspension of article 19 of
the Constitution have severely curtailed the right to peaceful
assembly, which is essential to the Gandhian concept of resist-
ance and disobedience. Thus protest marches, demonstrations,
82. Id. at § 5(1)(A), at 5, col. 2.
83. Id. at §§ 8-15, at 5, cols. 2-3; at 7, col. 6.
84. See, e.g., id. at § 4, at 5, cols. 1-2; id. at § 17, at 7, col. 6; id. at §§ 20, 22, 23,
at 7, col. 7.
85. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1976, at 3, col. 5.
86. Id. July 22, 1975, at 6, col. 5; at 1, col. 2: at 7. col. 1.
87. Nanda, supra note 15.
88. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
89. Id.
90. Id. Jan. 18, 1976, at 12, col. 1; Appendices 17-20, Indians for Democracy
Communication.
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and political rallies are illegal. When in defiance of the Govern-
ment's prohibition of assemblages of more than five persons,
countrywide Satyagrahas (peaceful resistance) took place from
November 1975 to January 1976,"1 brutal police tactics were
often used to disperse the demonstrators." Also, under the cen-
sorship laws, the press could not report these Satyagrahas. 3
Fear of arrest for expression of dissident views has severely
curtailed public debate in Parliament, in educational institu-
tions, and in various public forums known for lively discussion
on political, economic and social matters before the Emer-
gency. This blanket of silence imposed on the Indian press and
people denies not only the freedom of expression but the con-
comitant right to impart and receive information, a right basic
to democratic society.
D. The Right of Self-Government
Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
recognizes the right of a person to take part in the Government
of his or her country, to have access to public service, and states
that the will of the people, expressed through periodic elec-
tions, shall be the basis of governmental authority." These
rights were subsequently codified in article 25 of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which stipulates that all citizens
shall have the right and the opportunity to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections held by secret ballot. 5
The Government of India has postponed the national elec-
tions for a year (and perhaps much longer)." It has dismissed
the only existing opposition governments-in the States of Gu-
jarat 7 and Tamil Nadu'-and has imposed direct presidential
rule there from New Delhi. The term of the state government
in Kerala where the ruling Congress Party and its allies are in
91. Nanda, supra note 7, at 204; Nanda, Little Hope for Rights in India, Rocky
Mountain News, June 27, 1976, § Trend, at 2, col. 1.
92. Id.
93. Id.; Lukas, supra note 69, at 89; Lifschultz, supra note 55, at A14, col. 3.
94. U.N. Human Rights Instruments, at 2.
95. Id. at 11.
96. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1976, at 5, col. 1. See also id. Dec. 30, 1975, at 1, col. 5;
id. Jan. 4, 1976, § 1, at 3, col. 4; § IV, at 2, col. 2.
97. Id. Mar. 13, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
98. Id. Feb. 1, 1976, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
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power has been extended." It has detained and silenced politi-
cal opposition leaders,' and has transformed the Parliament
into a mere rubber-stamp body.' Thus, through the
Emergency proclamation and its subsequent actions, Indira
Gandhi's regime has effectively destroyed the right and oppor-
tunity of the citizenry to take part in the Government of
India.' 10 .' The end result is that the once vital Indian political
system has been rendered listless and impotent.
III. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION
Since the standards used in this comment to judge the
actions of the Government of India have been primarily those
contained in the U.N. Charter and various U.N. instru-
ments-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the reso-
lutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly and the ECO-
SOC-do not India's actions constitute a challenge to the legal
status of these instruments, or at least imply a claim that she
is not bound to comply with their pertinent provisions outlined
in the preceding discussion?
While the debate is likely to continue on the nature and
scope of the legally binding obligations, if any, created by Gen-
eral Assembly resolutions, recommendations and declara-
tions,1 1 and even though India has not ratified the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, it is submitted that India is nev-
ertheless legally bound to comply with the U.N. Charter and
the provisions of the U.N. instruments discussed above. 03 The
reasons are as follows:
99. Id. July 21, 1975, at 9, col. 1.
100. Supra note 69.
101. For a letter by the Opposition members in India's Parliament to President
Ahmed announcing their boycott of Parliament's opening session in January 1976, see
N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1976, at 3, col. 5. A member called it "a captive Parliament." S.A.
Shamin's remarks, cited in Lifschultz, supra note 55, at A14, col. 3. Rosenhause, supra
note 55, Pt. I, at 24, col. 5, reports: "Once a lively body, Parliament is now considered
a rubber stamp." Since the speeches by opposition members could not be reported
under strict press censorship and opposition members were frequently absent for fear
of arrest, there was little opposition to the adoption of legislative measures introduced
by the ruling Congress Party at Parliament's January and March sessions.
101.1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1976, at 3, col. 1; id. Sept. 3, 1976, at A3, cols. 5, 7.
102. See, e.g., 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966); Falk, On the Quasi-Legislative
Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966).
103. The parties to the covenant are listed in After 30 Years, an International Bill
of Human Rights, 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE Apr. 1976, at 50, 52. The general rule
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(1) The Universal Declaration, adopted by the General Assem-
bly in December 1948, without dissent, has been constantly
reaffirmed by the United Nations. As Chief Justice Earl War-
ren said in his address at the World Peace Through Law Con-
ference in 1973: "In the legislative work of the United Nations,
the declaration has become an arbiter and a standard of refer-
ence against which every new text on human rights is mea-
sured."'' 4 The Declaration has been referred to in the constitu-
tions of many new states, 105 and in the decisions of various
national tribunals.' In its Preamble, the Declaration is pro-
claimed as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples
and all nations."'0 7 To this end "every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind,
shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, na-
tional and international to secure their universal and effective
recognition and observance."' 10 On the occasion of the twen-
tieth anniversary of the Declaration, Professor Sohn concluded,
after a study of its legal status, that it had already "become a
part of the constitutional law of the world community. .. .
He noted that "the constant and consistent practice of the
United Nations . . . has imbued the Declaration with a status
almost equal to that of the Charter itself."110 Further, the Dec-
laration gives "a more precise meaning to the general phrases
of the Charter,""' and provides an authoritative interpretation
of the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter."2
is stated in art. 18 (a) of the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Treaties: "A
treaty may not impose obligations upon a State which is not a party thereto." 29 AM.
J. INT'L L. Supp. 653, 661 (1935). The rule is codified in art. 34 of the Vienna Conven-
tion. See A. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 309-21 (1961); Kearney & Dalton, The
Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 521-23 (1970). On interpretation of treaties
see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).
104. Warren, It's Time to Implement the Declaration of Human Rights, 59
A.B.A.J. 1257 (1973).
105. Id.
106. Id.; McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the UN, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 639-
40 (1964).
107. United Nations Human Rights Instruments, at 1.
108. Id.
109. Sohn, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMM. JURIST.
17, 26 (No. 2, Dec. 1967).
110. Id. at 25.
111. Id. at 26.
112. Id. at 17-23.
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It is submitted that, as an authoritative expression of
world community standards on human rights, the Declaration
was imbued from its inception with a great moral and political
force. In the last 28 years it has played a most significant role
in creating community expectations, thus developing the cus-
tomary international law of human rights."' Many of its provi-
sions, notably the ones mentioned here, have thereby attained
the status of general principles of customary international law.
As Professor John Humphrey, a former director of the U.N.
Division of Human Rights, has recently noted, "the Declara-
tion has [now] become, next to the Charter itself, the most
authoritative of all contemporary international instruments. It
may be more important even than the Charter; for it will retain
its authority long after the United Nations has been replaced
by a more effective world organization.""'
(2) The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as an authori-
tative codification of the principles enunciated in the Declara-
tion, is similarly an expression of the prevailing community
standards in matters relating to civil and political rights. Thus
it can be argued that even states which have not ratified the
covenant are no longer absolved of their obligation to comply
with its terms; they can no longer rely on the traditional norm
of international law that only a state party to a treaty is bound
by it."' A similar argument can be made that the U.N. resolu-
tions and the Declaration on Torture mentioned earlier also are
binding on India, because in the international arena, resolu-
tions, declarations and recommendations "perform similar
functions to those rules and principles we call 'law' without
hesitation. ""'
(3) Furthermore, India is estopped from contending that it is
not bound by the Charter provisions and other pertinent provi-
sions of international instruments enumerated above. These
provisions contain international law standards and reflect the
113. For a short but incisive commentary on the application of the Declaration
in the practice of the United Nations, see id. at 23-26.
114. Humphrey, Human Rights and Authority, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 412, 414
(1970).
115. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction Power & Light Co., [19701 I.C.J. Rep. 32;
Newman, supra note 1, at 290 notes 7, 8, 11.
116. Clark & Nevas, The First Twenty-Five Years of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights-And the Next, 48 CONN. BAR J. 111, 113 (1974).
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expectations of the world community-standards India has
held for herself in the past and to which she has held others
accountable,"' standards she now defies when applied to her
own actions. Thus India's own traditional stance dictates the
criteria by which her present acts may be judged.
(4) Finally, it is submitted that no adequate legal justification
exists for the far-reaching and pervasive measures undertaken
by the Government of India. Admittedly, the exigencies of
emergency situations have been recognized by the interna-
tional community as allowing some derogation of human
rights. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, in article 4, provides that states may depart
from their obligations when an emergency "threatens the life
of the nation,""' but only "to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.""'  While war with Pakistan or
China-the situations when India previously declared emer-
gencies-may be said to threaten the life of the nation, the
constitutional repudiation of a Prime Minister or a political
party in power most certainly does not comprise such a threat.
The Government has made allegations and charges of a pur-
ported conspiracy to threaten national security 20 but has failed
to substantiate the charges. However, even if such a grave situ-
ation existed, the extraordinarily repressive measures taken by
Mrs. Indira Gandhi's government far exceed those required by
the exigencies of the situation. In addition, article 4 specifically
stipulates that torture, inhuman treatment, and retroactive
application of criminal laws are prohibited and that freedom
of thought and conscience is to be protected, even in times of
emergency. " '
117. For instance, India played a significant role in the General Assembly's appli-
cation of the Declaration principles to the question of the treatment of people of Indian
and Pakistani origin in South Africa. See, e.g., various Assembly resolutions beginning
with G. A. Res. 265, U.N. Doc. A/900 at 6 (1949). The last resolution on the subject
was adopted at the Sixteenth session of the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 1662, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 17, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). Following 1961, the General Assembly
began considering the question in the context of the broader question of apartheid.
118. U.N. Instruments on Human Rights, at 8.
119. Id.
120. Mrs. Gandhi said in an interview that the "threat of disruption was clear and
imminent." SATURDAY REV., Aug. 9, 1975, at 10, col. 2. See, e.g., INDIRA GANDHI ON
EMERGENCY, supra note 13, at 1-9.
121. Art. 4(2), U.N. Instruments on Human Rights, at 8.
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The conclusion is inescapable that the Government of
India has flagrantly and brutally violated the commonly ac-
cepted standards of respect for human rights. The Government
cannot justify its repressive measures by invoking either na-
tional security or the alleged need to bring about economic and
social reforms.' Nor can the Government's actions be excused
on the pretext that it is not alone in violating human rights,2 3
that others such as Uganda and Chile are even worse offenders,
and that current State practices do not provide much hope for
early, worldwide compliance with evolving norms on human
rights.
What role can states, intergovernmental organizations and
non-governmental groups play in persuading India to restore
human rights and fundamental freedoms? It is submitted that
world public opinion, admittedly fragile, should not be ignored
as an effective tool in the protection of human rights. In recent
history, the pressure of external public opinion has been a sig-
nificant factor in changing the policies of many states, includ-
ing the Soviet Union, Chile and Indonesia, on specific human
rights questions.' Specifically, concerned states should hold
India accountable in the United Nations and in international
conferences. While the situation in India may not call for a
Security Council resolution censuring India, it certainly war-
rants discussion in the General Assembly, where it might be
offered as an agenda item by a member state. Similarly, at
international conferences, the subject can be discussed at the
initiation of a concerned state, as has been frequently done
with South Africa and Chile.
Concerned states can also use various political strategies
to seek a change in India's policies and conduct on human
rights and freedoms in India. For example, the United States
House of Representatives recently held hearings to discuss the
Indian situation.' While the role the United States can play
122. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 15.
123. India's own conduct as the champion of human rights in other countries
would preclude its reliance on this argument.
124. Some recent examples are: the permission by the Soviet Union to allow
emigration of its citizens, including some of its staunchest critics, and the release of
political prisoners both by Chile and Indonesia.
125. The hearings were held on June 23, 28 and 29. House Hearings, supra note
77. Witnesses who testified that the Government of India had violated human rights
included Jagjit Singh Chohan, Homer Jack, Ram Jethmalani and Ved Nanda.
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in the restoration of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on the sub-continent is certainly limited, the value of the hear-
ings in raising public awareness is indisputable. Without wide-
spread concern, no changes will be forthcoming.
Prior discussion has also demonstrated that no adequate
domestic remedies are presently available for protection of
human rights in India. The current situation in India meets the
criterion of the admissibility of communications before the
Sub-Commission, which has adopted a procedure that "com-
munications shall be inadmissible if domestic remedies have
not been met."'26 Once this criterion is met, non-governmental
groups (NGOs) are entitled to use various procedural devices
to bring the issue before the Commission.'2 To illustrate, ECO-
SOC resolutions 728F (XXVIII) of July 30, 1959,128 1235 (XLII)
of June 6, 1967, 12 1296 (XLIV) of May 23, 1968,130 and 1503
(XLVIII) of May 27, 1970'1' lay down the procedures to be
followed by such groups to present complaints of violations of
human rights. While resolution 1235 authorized both the Com-
mission and the Sub-Commission, "to examine information
relevant to gross violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms" contained in the communications concerning
human rights which the Secretary-General is to compile
pursuant to resolution 728F, and resolution 1296 authorizes
NGOs to submit written statements, resolution 1503 provides
detailed procedures and new machinery to assist the Commis-
sion and the Sub-Commission in the discharge of their func-
126. Sub-Commission Res. 1, para. 4(b), 24 Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Summary Report, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1070 (1971). For a commentary analyzing the procedure see Cassese, The
Admissibility of Communications to the United Nations on Human Rights Violations,
5 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 375 (1972); Comment, The Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies in
the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 643 (1975).
127. See, e.g., Prasad, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
United Nations Procedures for Human Rights Complaints, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL.
441 (1975).
128. ECOSOC Res. 728F, 28 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 19, U.N. Doc. E/3290
(1959).
129. ECOSOC Res. 1235, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393
(1967).
130. ECOSOC Res. 1296, 44 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548
(1968).
131. ECOSOC Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1A, at 8, U.N. Doc.
E/4832/Add. 1 (1970).
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tions pertaining to violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 32 Resolution 1503 authorizes the Sub-Commission to
appoint a working group which would meet annually to con-
sider all communications received by the Secretary-General
under resolution 728F "with a view to bringing to the attention
of the Sub-Commission those communications, together with
replies of Governments, if any, which appear to reveal a consis-
tent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human
rights and fundamental freedoms within the terms of reference
of the Sub-Commission." 1 The Sub-Commission, in turn, is to
consider the communications referred to it by the working
group to determine whether "to refer to the Commission on
Human Rights particular situations which appear to reveal a
consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of
human rights requiring consideration by the Commission.' 134
The Commission is then to determine whether a situation de-
serves further study or investigation by the Commission, and
a report and recommendation thereon to ECOSOC. 3 5
Human rights of detainees and prisoners were the subject
of a resolution adopted by the Sub-Commission in 1974. 13
Under the resolution, in operative paragraph 1, the Sub-
Commission decided "to review annually developments in the
field.' 1 37 In reviewing these developments,
the Sub-Commission will take into account any reliably attested
information from governments, the specialized agencies, the re-
gional intergovernmental organizations and the non-
governmental organizations in consultative status with the Eco-
nomic and Social Council concerned, provided that such non-
132. For a summary of the functions of the Commission and the Sub-Commission,
see United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/2, at 137-
44 (1974). For comments on their functions, see Humphrey, The United Nations Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities, 62
AM. J. INT'L L. 869 (1968); Murphy, The U.N. and Human Rights: The Human Rights
Commission in 1973-74, 4 ISRAELI Y.B. HUMAN RIGHTS 48 (1974); Comment, UN. Sub-
Commission on Minorities and Discrimination, 13 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 29, (Dec.
1974).
133. ECOSOC Res. 1503, supra note 131, at para. 1.
134. Id. para. 5.
135. Pursuant to ECOSOC Res. 1235. supra note 129.
136. The Question of the Human Rights on Persons Subjected to Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment, Sub-Commission On Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Res. 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1160, E/CN.4/Sub.2/354, at 52-53
(1974).
137. Id.
VOL. 6:19
DEMISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN INDIA
governmental organizations act in good faith and that their infor-
mation is not politically motivated, contrary to the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations. 38
In operative paragraph 2, the Sub-Commission requested "the
Secretary-General to transmit to the Sub-Commission infor-
mation referred to in paragraph 1.' ' 3 Since the resolution re-
fers to "persons subjected to any form of detention or imprison-
ment," and the Sub-Commission has taken further steps in
1975 to put the new procedure to constructive and effective
use, "' it is submitted that NGOs should utilize this procedure
to bring the situation in India before the Sub-Commission
which could refer the situation to the Commission and eventu-
ally it could be discussed in ECOSOC. The World Committee
on Human Rights in India is already preparing a well-
documented study, to be presented to the Sub-Commission,
through an NGO in consultative status with ECOSOC.1'4 A
specific request would be to seek an impartial, on-site investi-
gation by a Sub-Commission member of the charges contained
in the communication. Another significant effort would be to
invoke a World Habeas Corpus proceeding, a procedure initi-
ated, refined and used by a distinguished advocate of human
rights, Luis Kutner.'
A possible study and investigation of the situation in India
by the Sub-Commission and the Commission to be followed
perhaps by censure of the Government of India by ECOSOC
should not preclude a discussion of the subject directly by the
U.N. General Assembly.' Unfortunately there will be reluct-
ance in the Assembly to question India's practices, for many
governments are apprehensive lest similar charges be brought
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L. 635 (1975).
141. The study will be presented in September 1976.
142. See, e.g., L. KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS (1962); THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM: A SYMPOSIUM ON WORLD HABEAS CORPUS (L. Kutner, ed. 1970);
and Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: The Legal Ultimate for the Unity of Mankind, 40
NOTRE DAME LAW. 570 (1965). For a commentary on Kutner's work, see Katin, The
Advocate as Lawmaker: Luis Kutner and the Struggle for Due Process, 23 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 397 (1969), especially at 401 n.8 which lists several law review articles on the
subject written by Luis Kutner and associates. Mr. Kutner also drafted a proposed
treaty on the subject.
143. The World Committee for Human Rights in India is seeking the assistance
of concerned states to raise the issue at the next session of the General Assembly.
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against them. However, the tragic situation in India poses a
challenge to all concerned with the implementation of the U.N.
human rights program and global protection of human rights.
Silence on the part of those who care for individual free-
dom and human dignity is often considered a license by the
oppressor. Thus, the need is timely and urgent, and calls for
international pressure-by individuals, NGOs, states and in-
ternational organizations-on Indira Gandhi's government to
relent, to halt and even reverse the current use of repressive
policies.
The Rising Utility of the Public International
Corporation
BRUCE ZAGARIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent international economic problems call for new and
imaginative mechanisms for interstate relations. The ascent in
the post-World War II era of positivist forces for cooperative
uses of international law, as contradistinguished from the in-
ternational law of coexistence in which law was employed
mostly as a sanction, leads to increasing-use of the public inter-
national corporate device.' The corporate mechanism empha-
sizes the functional approach in international law. By perceiv-
ing the diverse and quickly fluctuating character of interna-
tional society, the functional approach mandates many kinds
of legal and institutional patterns.' The late Professor Wolf-
gang Friedmann, the eminent spokesman of both the positive
and functional schools, described the new types of transna-
tional law and the growing roles of the public international
corporation.3
In today's world both theoreticians and international pol-
itical leaders are urging a rearrangement of the international
system in order to accomplish a more equitable distribution of
the world's resources, thereby reducing world tension.4 In the
interim period, the coalescence of functionalism and regional-
ism represents a trend for overcoming the antiquated statist
* B.A., 1969, J.D., 1972, LL.M., 1973, George Washington University; Diploma,
1975, University of Stockholm; Diploma, 1976, Free University, Brussels; attorney,
Nordic Law Consultants, Brussels.
1. Friedmann, Droit de Coexistence et Droit de Cooperation: Quelques Observa-
tions sur la Structure Changeant du Droit International, 6 REVUE BELGE DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 9 (1970); see also McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A
Contemporary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137 (1953); and J. BEGUIN, LES EN-
TERPRISES CONJOINTES INTERNATIONALES DANS LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT 249
(1972).
2. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-77 (1964).
3. Id. at 230.
4. Friedmann, Governmental (Public) Enterprise, XIII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 24-27 (1972); Friedmann, Government Enterprise: A Com-
parative Analysis, in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 333-36 (W.
Friedmann & J. Garner eds. 1970); and W. FRIEDMANN, THE PUBLIC CORPORATION
passim (1954).
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system.5 International lawyers can help governments become
leaders in directing their authority in positive ways, rather
than in divergent and competitive directions. In addition, the
proper formation of transnational sources of power, which can
become important actors themselves, aids the transformation
of the international order. This article describes the role of the
public international corporation as a valuable and creative
mechanism for achieving positive cooperation between interna-
tional actors to attain a more equitable distribution of the
world's resources.
The public international corporation offers an excellent
tool for solving three related problems in international econom-
ics and politics: (1) the problem of regional interstate develop-
ment and economic integration; (2) the problem of distribution
of aid to developing countries; and most importantly, (3) the
reduction of tension in the relations between multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) and host developing countries. The use of
the corporate mechanism to accomplish these objectives has
been proposed by Professor Zacharias Sundstr6m.1 In addition
to extending and updating these ideas, this article discusses
new areas of application in commercial endeavors and the evo-
lution of the multinational corporation.
Some brief remarks on the current roles of states in the
international economy are important background for this anal-
ysis. Nation-state governments have increasingly intervened in
both the public and private sectors of the national economy as
well as the international economy in an attempt to further
national interests.7 The growing government role in the na-
tional economy can be seen partly as a function of the increas-
ingly strong element of public law in international trade and
the degree to which domestic economies interact and depend
upon world trade.' These trends combine with ideological fac-
5. R. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS 189-90 (1975).
6. See generally, Sundstrom, The Legal Procedures and Techniques of Economic
Co-operation, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L. 229-43 (1972). Since several of Professor Sundstrom's
works are cited, to avoid confusion, abbreviated footnote form will be utilized.
7. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 341-61.
8. Sundstrom, Comparative Law in the Development of the Law of International
Corporations, XIV ACTA INSTITUTI UPSALIENSIS JURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAR 238-39
(1972); J. BEHRMAN, CONFLICTING CONSTRAINTS ON THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: PO-
TENTIAL FOR RESOLUTION 1-38 (1973); Bergstedt, Coming Investment Wars, 53 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 135 (1974).
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tors to remove many elements of economic life from private
hands to the public sector, often by means of public corpora-
tions.' Similarly, international trade has become inextricably
connected with government policy (tariffs, customs, regional
trade arrangements, and bilateral agreements)." The evolution
of "international transactional law" has blurred distinctions
between public and private international law." The use of the
public international corporation reflects both the new trends in
trade law and the changing character of international law.
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Before setting forth examples of current uses of and projec-
tions for the public international corporation, some basic defi-
nitions of the concept, and its unique organizational structures
and advantages serve as background.
The public international corporation is best defined as an
organism with a particular function, subject to an international
or community regime, possessing autonomous powers and de-
vices, and designed either to make disbursements to individu-
als or to regulate their use of the public domain under state or
interstate control. 2 Presently, various public international cor-
porate organisms exist. They usually have as a common de-
nominator an international agreement, which often also con-
tains the fundamental legal regime of the corporation. 3
Since the public international corporation embraces many
distinct types, the term can be best understood as only a ge-
neric concept. On the one hand, certain public international
9. Sundstrom, Comparative Law in the Development of the Law of International
Corporations, XIV ACTA INSTITUTI UPSALIENSIS JURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATIVAE 238-39
(1972); Ghai, Current Problems of Economic Integration among Developing Countries,
UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/B/436 (1973).
10. Bergstedt, supra note 8, at 135.
11. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 221-31.
12. 1 H. ADAM, LES ORGANISMES INTERNATIONAUX SPECIALISES 9-35 (1965).
13. Examples of various types include: the Inter-American Development Bank,
the International Finance Corporation, the International Moselle Company, the Euro-
pean Investment Bank, Air Afrique, the European Company for the Financing of
Railway Equipment (EUROFIRMA), the Central African Power Corporation, and the
Interim Telecommunications Satellite Committee (INTELSAT). Z. SUNDSTROM, PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL UTILITY CORPORATIONS: CASE STUDIES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL INSTI-
TUTIONS IN CORPORATE FORM 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES]. Also, for examples from an earlier work, see C. FLIGLER, THE MULTINATIONAL
PUBLIC ENTERPRISE passim (1967).
14. H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 34. Professor Louis Sohn in his description of
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corporations have close structural similarities to the domestic
public corporation, for example where one constituent state
occupies a dominant position in the corporate relationship, and
can thus impose its own will."1 On the other hand, public inter-
national corporations exist which functionally emulate an in-
ternational organization, with a high degree of member auton-
omy and limited independent decision-making power in the
organization itself."
Since the types, objectives and scope of activities of a pub-
lic international corporation vary widely, the best classification
criterion is derived from a functional test based on the original
purposes of the corporation, the scope of its activities, and the
resulting structure. 7 Using this test, five types of public inter-
national corporations have been distinguished:
1. the public international utility corporation;
2. the public international commercial corporation;
3. the public international financing corporation;
4. the public international development corporation;
5. the public international research and training center.
Some public international enterprises possess, of course, ele-
ments of more than one type. 8
The procedures for decision-making that different types of
international organizations possess indicate an interaction be-
tween the objectives of the organization and the powers ac-
African organizations does not classify river basin organizations as public international
corporations although he discusses the difficulty of distinguishing between technical
categories. Sohn, The Organization of Economic Co-operation in Africa, 16 J. OF AFRI-
CAN L. 215-16 (1972). The emphasis of this work is on the concept of the public interna-
tional corporation as it relates to its functional and positive roles in international law.
Many authorities would probably disagree on the technical terminology.
15. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 9. The best example of the
public international corporation of this type is the Basel-Mulhouse Airport in which
France has the dominant role. See the text in 2 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 223; see
also Z. SUNDSTROM, THE PUBuC INTERNATIONAL UTILITY CORPORATION: CORPORATE LAW
AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 216 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY]; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC
CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 84 et seq.
16. The Central African Power Corporation and the Scandanavian Airlines Sys-
tem are the best examples. They are described in SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 63 et seq., and 100 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES, supra note 13, at 177 et seq., and 275 et seq.
17. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 9; Glaser, A Functional
Approach to the International Finance Corporation, 57 COL. L. REV. 1089 (1957).
18. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note 13, at 9.
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corded to it.'" A distinction must be made between the two
elements which together gauge the functional ability of an in-
ternational organization. In order to act decisively, an organi-
zation needs adequate constitutional powers and independence
from the special interests of its members. 0
The public international corporation has two chief advan-
tages. First, its decision-making capabilities are more efficient
than those of its counterpart, the traditional international or-
ganization. Unlike the structure of the traditional type of inter-
national organization in which most powers of decision are
vested in the assembly with little in the secretariat, the public
international corporation acts through its executive, and thus
has a personality distinct from the individuality of its share-
holders.2' It also has autonomy in financial and other essential
decision-making. 22 Hence, a strong and independent executive
can save an organization which would otherwise collapse dur-
ing political crises. This will be illustrated below. 23 Secondly,
the integration effects of the public international corporation
offer benefits which its counterparts, the MNC and the state
enterprise, cannot provide. 24
Before considering applications of the public international
corporation, reference is made to numerous legal issues per-
taining to this mechanism. They include their connection to
public international organizations,2 5 the trend toward an inter-
national regime of the public international corporation,"8 their
formation, 7 composition," decision-making,2 privileges and
immunities, 0 conflict-solving mechanisms, 31 and residuary
19. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 231. See also 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at
83-85, 152-74.
20. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 231.
21. 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 27-34.
22. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AF~icAN L., at 233-35; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 50-54.
23. Id. at 56-80, 345-48.
24. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 236.
25. 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 83-87.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 104-31; SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 348-
51.
28. 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 132-37.
29. Id. at 138-51.
30. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDIES, supra note 15, at 369-71.
31. See case examples in id. at 137-3o, 166-69, 206-07, 236-38, 302-03, 332-34.
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law.3" All these and other legal issues are important, but be-
yond the scope of this article.
III. INTEGRATION PROBLEMS AMONG DEVELOPING STATES AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Traditional regional interstate integration schemes have,
especially in developing countries, failed to attain their objec-
tives. Although several factors can be cited as causes, the lack
of proper institutional structures and the failure of govern-
ments to surrender sovereignty to intergovernmental organs
have prevented the establishment and efficient functioning of
organizations capable of achieving regional integration.3 The
public international corporation, however, has demonstrated
that it can be effectively used as a complement or alternative
to integration schemes. This section highlights organizational
problems in regional integration schemes among developing
countries and the solutions offered by the public international
corporation.
An overview of the major regional integration schemes of
developing countries illustrates some common trends. Recent
examples of integration schemes are:
1. the East African Economic Community (EAEC)-Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania;
2. the Central African Customs and Economic Union
(UDEAC)-Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Cameroon and the Cen-
tral African Republic (Chad left the Union in 1968);
3. the Maghreb Common Market (Maghreb)-Algeria, Tunisia,
Morocco and Libya;
4. the Central American Common Market (CACM)-Guate-
mala, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica;
5. the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA)-all the South
American republics plus Mexico;
6. the Andean Group-Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Equador, Peru
and Venezuela;
7. the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARI-
COM)-Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago;
8. the West African Economic Community (CEAC)-Dahomey,
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta;
32. Id. at 268-70, and especially the peculiar case of the Franco-Ethiopian Railway
Co., which uses a draft code, id. at 142-44.
33. Stoutjesdijk, LDC Regional Markets: Do They Work?, 5 COL. J. OF WORLD
Bus. 53 (1970); Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 229. Also, for historical background
regarding African balkanization, see H. GREEN & A. SEIDMAN, UNITY OR POVERTY? THE
ECONOMICS OF PAN-AFRICANISM 11-17, 33-37 (1968).
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9. the Economic Community of West African States (ECO-
WAS)-Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Togo, and Upper Volta.'
The above schemes have similar basic institutional struc-
tures. The policy-making authority consists of either the Heads
of State or Ministers with an executive committee preparing
the recommendations approved by the authority. The commit-
tee is usually assisted by a varying number of commissions and
subcommissions as well as by a secretary general with a perma-
nent secretariat. In no case, however, have the cooperating
countries been prepared to delegate any meaningful decision-
making power to a supranational authority. This factor and the
lack of sufficiently qualified personnel to prepare good regional
studies have generally hampered progress toward a regionally
integrated economy. Capital, technical skills and managerial
ability also pose important constraints on economic growth.35
The corporate device now enhances integration possibilities
within and, in some cases, between these regional groups.
The emergence of the public international corporation, in
which executive decision-making is a normal, indispensable
aspect, has introduced increased autonomy and a corporate-
type, executive decision-making into interstate relations.3 The
combination of efficient decision-making and the insulation of
the organisms from political decision-making within regional
integration schemes provides a firm solidarity and prevents
disintegration over national political issues.37 In this respect
the public international corporation has provided an important
contribution to regional integration schemes. Two areas of ac-
tivity are particularly amenable to the public international cor-
poration framework: financial-development activities and
basic infrastructure activities, such as transport and communi-
cations.
34. For a more complete listing, see Sidjanski, Current Problems of Economic
Integration-The Role of Institutions in Regional Integration among Developing
Countries, UNCTAD, U.N. Doc. TD/B/H22 (1974). The individual texts may be ob-
tained by consulting the U.N. Treaty Series, International Legal Materials or the
Secretariat of these organizations.
35. Stoutjesdijk, supra note 33, at 5.
36. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 231.
37. Id. at 233; SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 29.
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Most integration schemes have. established an integration
bank (the European Investment Bank and European Develop-
ment Bank in the EEC, 8 the Bank for Economic Integration
in the CACM),39 a development bank (the East African Devel-
opment Bank in the EACI° and the Caribbean Development
Bank in CARICOM), 4 or a development corporation (the An-
dean Development Corporation (ADC) in the Andean Group) .4
These are constituted within the public international corpora-
tion framework, and are created to stimulate new regional eco-
nomic activities and to correct certain existing imbalances.
The autonomy of these organisms facilitates participation by
states which are otherwise not members of the scheme, such as
Venezuela's initial participation in the Development Corpora-
tion,43 and Colombia's and Venezuela's participation in the
Caribbean Development Bank." The advantages of autonomy
for these financial institutions was recently demonstrated in
the case of the CACM, in which the Monetary Council, the
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), and the Clearing
House are examples of public international corporations. These
institutions continued to function normally during, and since,
the 1969 "soccer war" crisis, which caused the closing of the
frontier between El Salvador and Honduras, impeding the flow
of goods between the two countries. 5
The use of the public international corporation for com-
mon services represents the second main area of use for this
framework. In the EAC, in addition to the numerous special-
ized institutions and organs (i.e., centers for industrial, agron-
omic, forestry, fishery and meteorological research), other im-
portant activities in the Community are performed by the four
38. Treaty of Rome, art. 129 and Protocol No. 1 annexed to the Act of Accession,
modified by art. 35 of the Adaptation Decision for the European Investment Bank; and
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (1973).
39. Sidjanski, supra note 34, at 65; Avery & Cochrane, Subregional Integration
in Latin America, the Andean Common Market, 1972 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUD. 98.
40. Treaty for East African Cooperation, art. 21 and Charter of the East African
Development Bank, annex VI to the Treaty.
41. Uchegbu, The Caribbean Development Bank: Implications for Integration, 7
J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 568 (1973), and text in DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
IN THE CARIBBEAN 412-17 (R. Preiswerk ed. 1970).
42. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 98.
43. Id. at 98-100.
44. Uchegbu, supra note 41, at 575-77.
45. Sidjanski, supra note 34, at 166.
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major corporations for railways, aviation, ports, and post and
telegraphs. 6 These organisms have helped to offset the eco-
nomic and commercial advantages enjoyed by Kenya, and to
insulate the integration activities from the political and ideo-
logical problems and, more recently, financial difficulties.47
Similarly, in the CACM, the specialized autonomous organs
within the public international corporation framework, such as
the Central American Institute of Public Administration
(ICAP), the Central American Institute of Industrial Research
and Technology (ICAITI), and the Central American Air Serv-
ices Corporation (COCESNA), have continued to function nor-
mally since the 1969 crisis. The effectiveness of this institu-
tional structure has led to its implementation in other groups
such as the Maghreb Group, the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN), and CARICOM.49
The utility of the public international corporation in inte-
gration schemes can be seen not only in the areas of financing
institutions and common services, but also in the more exten-
sive use of the framework and the granting of special privileges
to these enterprises within regional integration schemes. The
European Economic Community has facilitated the growth of
the public international corporation by allowing cumulative
rules of origin. The Latin American Economic System repre-
sents the latest and perhaps most significant attempt to foster
the use of the corporate framework.
In West Africa, use of the corporate device is increasing in
integration schemes. A recent UNIDO advisory report recom-
mended the use of the framework to the Mano River Union,
which has recently been formed between Sierra Leone and Lib-
eria.5 0 As a complement to the initiation of a customs union and
harmonization of investment incentives between the two
states, a public international corporation has been proposed for
46. Treaty for East African Co-operation, Chapter XIX, Corporations within the
Community. R. HAZELWOOD, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 96-
104 (1975).
47. Pomonti, La Communaute de I'Afrique de 'est est menacee d'eclatement, Le
Monde, Oct. 17, 1975, at 6, col. 3. Kiapi, Distributing the Gains from Integration in
East Africa, 7 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 328 (1973).
48. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 98-100.
49. Sidjanski, supra note 34, at 150-51.
50. Mano River Declaration, signed in Malema, Oct. 3, 1973, and Protocols to the
Declaration, signed in Bo, Oct. 3, 1974.
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the production of power from the Mano River. The device can
then, if desired, be employed subsequently for development of
the river's basin and even for telecommunications." Other pub-
lic international corporations have been proposed for certain
research and training boards and for the training of technical
personnel for telecommunications." Some of these devices can
be structured so as to permit participation by other states, such
as members of the recently signed Treaty on the Economic
Community of West African States.53 For instance, a public
international corporation framework has been proposed for the
creation of a regional maritime institute to include students
from Ghana, Gambia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and includes par-
ticipation by international aid donors. This arrangement is dis-
cussed below in Section IV. 51
A significant recent development in economic integration
has been the establishment of a regional legal framework grant-
ing new regional companies special status and privileges con-
nected with the aims of the integration scheme.5 Although the
EEC has considered enacting uniform company laws,5" and the
Central American States have created a special regime for "in-
tegration industries" prior to the formation of the CACM,57 the
51. Sundstrom, Legislative Measures, Mano River Union I, TS/RAF/74/002, Ter-
minal Report, prepared for the Mano River Union Secretariat, March 31, 1975, Appen-
dix II, Draft Protocol Concerning the Establishment of a Union Training and Research
Board, a Union Training Levy Fund and other Facilities (restricted document).
52. Sundstrom, Legislative Measures, Mano River Union II, IS/RAF/74/092/11-
01/10 Preliminary Report prepared for Mano River Union Secretariat, July 31, 1975
(restricted document).
53. Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
signed May 28, 1975, Lagos, Nigeria, -U.N.T.S. _. See also Penouil, Le Traite
de Lagos Efface ta Chivage Entre Pays Francophone et Anglophone, Le Monde Di-
plomatique, Oct. 1975, at 24; and Spotlight on ECOWAS-Historical Evolution,
AFRICA, Dec. 1975, at 45-49.
54. Draft Agreement for the Establishment of a West African Regional Maritime
Institute, undated, Secretariat, Mano River Union, Freetown, Sierra Leone.
55. Pazoc, Regional Integration of Trade among Developing Countries, in TRADE
STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT (P. Streeten ed. 1973); Behrman, International Sectoral
Integration, 6 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 269-72 (1972).
56. Treaty of Rome, art. 149, and Proposition d'un reglement du Conseil portant
Statut de societies anonymes europeennes, BULLETIN DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES,
May 13, 1975.
57. Convenio sobre el Regimen de Industrias Centroamericanos de Integracion,
signed on June 10, 1958, by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa
Rica, and the Protocol to this Convention, signed on Jan. 29, 1963, in INSTITUTO INTERA-
MERICANO DE ESTUDION JURIDICOS INTERNACIONALES, INSTRUMENTOS RELATIVOS A LA INTE-
GRACION ECONOMICA LATINA 57 (1964).
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first comprehensive legislation has arisen in the Andean Com-
mon Market. This legislation will facilitate regional transna-
tional corporations and sectoral programming.
According to the Cartagena Agreement establishing the
Andean Common Market, the signatory countries have pledged
themselves to "balanced and harmonious development" and
"acceleration of growth rates."58 In addition to these familiar
objectives, the Andean countries have aimed to facilitate the
participation of their member-states in LAFTA. In addition,
the signatories have agreed to joint programming and coordina-
tion of policies in various fields. Joint industrial and agricul-
tural planning is complemented by coordination of exchange,
financial and fiscal policies, as well as national economic and
social plans. Common treatment of foreign capital is also pro-
vided."'
The adoption of Decision 24 sets forth precise rules for
common treatment of foreign capital, and prohibits the estab-
lishment of foreign companies in some fields, and limits their
establishment in other fields. Decision 24 also restricts trade
liberalization within the regional market to domestic corpora-
tions (containing at least 80 percent local capital participation
or ownership) and mixed or joint corporations (those with at
least 51 percent regional domestic ownership). Foreign corpora-
tions (those with less than 51 percent regional ownership) can-
not participate in this scheme. 0 The recent decision of the
presidents of the national airline companies to create the Asso-
ciation of Andean Airlines (A.A.L.A.) in order to coordinate
their services provides an example of the type of cooperative
projects which are occurring in the Andean Group.' Potential
now exists in economic activities such as petrochemicals for
existing state enterprises to join multinational corporations (as
managers) in commercial endeavors. Other potential economic
areas for such a framework include transport (i.e., airlines,
shipping and railways) and communications. 2
58. For background on economic and public policy, see M. MORAWITZ, THE AN-
DEAN GROUP: A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1974).
59. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 89-90.
60. Id. at 90.
61. Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec. 1975, at 38, col. 2.
62. Avery & Cochrane, supra note 39, at 90-91.
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The Lom6 Convention, entered into by the European Eco-
nomic Community and the signatory African, Caribbean and
Pacific states, provides many opportunities for the public in-
ternational corporation mechanism. 3 The Convention departs
from the usual practice of restricting the rules of origin in the
determination of the application of tariffs, and allows the de-
veloping A.C.P. states to combine all of their member countries
in the calculation of the rules of origin for products exported
to the EEC. 4 These provisions facilitate regional integration
and combinations between states and their own corporations as
well as between states and MNCs.15 For instance, two A.C.P.
states in the Caribbean could take raw materials within their
own borders, transport them for processing in a nearby place
such as Puerto Rico (which is a tax haven for manufacturing
and for U.S. corporations)," and then ship finished goods to the
EEC. As long as 51 percent of the value can be attributed to
activities within the Caribbean state, the goods would reach
the European markets with trade preferences." Since the
A.C.P. states have recently engaged in a series of integration
projects among themselves and with adjacent states and
groups (i.e., CARICOM with CACM and Andean Pact and the
West African integration agreements referred to above), the
public international corporation mechanism assumes import-
ance for commercial and development undertakings."
Subsequent to the Lom6 Convention, the EEC has agreed
to follow, as part of its system of generalized preferences for
developing countries, the principle of cumulative rules of origin
for products from states belonging to particular integration
63. Convention of Lom6 Between the European Economic Community and Afri-
can, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, done at Lom6, Togo, Feb. 28, 1975, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MAT. 595 (1975) [hereinafter Lom6 Convention].
64. Rules of origin are contained in a protocol which is a part of the Lom6 Con-
vention. See title I, art. 1; see also note 67 infra.
65. Lom6 Convention, title IV, art. 3, and the application of Protocol 2 on Finan-
cial and Technical Cooperation, Chapter 4.
66. Woods, Business Operations in Puerto Rico, TAX MANAGEMENT (FOREIGN
INCOME) 139-2d, A-7-A-13, A-23-A-28 (1972); and Francis, Foreign Corporations Doing
Business in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 26 REV. JR. U.P.R. 347 (1957).
67. Protocol No. 1 Concerning the Definition of the Concept of Originating Prod-
ucts and Methods of Administrative Cooperation, art. 3, describing processing and List
A which itemizes 290 tariff items in which the value added, when specified in percen-
tage terms, is 50 percent.
68. See discussion of SELA in text accompanying notes 83-88, infra.
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schemes: Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN),
CACM, the Andean Group,69 and the Maghreb Group.70 These
states, who were not signatories of the Lom6 Convention, now
have incentives to accelerate regional integration. The example
of the EEC should be adopted by more developed countries.
Professor Sundstr6m has noted that the public interna-
tional corporation has had considerable success, not available
to the multinational corporation or the state enterprise, in
achieving a type of "limited integration" among nation-
states.7 "Limited integration" means such cooperation as is a
result of a specified project, such as the undertaking of a service
jointly by two or more states (e.g., the Basel-Musel Airport) ,72
the construction and operation of a multinational waterway
(e.g., the International Moselle Company), 3 or the regional
development of natural resources (e.g., the utilization of the
water resources of the Zambezi River in the Kariba Dam pro-
ject-the Central African Power Corporation)." All these ex-
amples illustrate "limited integration" on a geographically
local level. Due to the coordination of national policies neces-
sary to ensure the success of a project, "limited integration"
occurs.75
Concrete examples of limited integration can be set forth.
In the case of the Central African Power Corporation, to make
the Kariba Dam an economic proposition, Rhodesia and Zam-
bia must coordinate their policies on power generation to a
substantial degree.7" In a similar fashion in order to make the
69. Europe Agence International d'Information Pour la Presse, Release, at 8 (Dec.
20, 1975).
70. Europe Agence International d'Information Pour la Presse, Release, at 4 (Dec.
29-30, 1975).
71. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 236; SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 56-80.
72. See description of Basel-Mulhouse Airport in SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 216 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE STUDIES, supra note
13, at 40 et seq.
73. See description of the International Moselle Company in SUNDSTROM, PIUC:
COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 145 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES, supra note 13, at 40 et seq.
74. See descriptions of the Central African Power Corporation in SUNDSTROM,
PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 177 et seq.; and SUNDSTROM, PIUC: CASE
STUDIES, supra note 13, at 63 et seq.
75. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 238; also SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 69.
76. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239; also SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 69.
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most efficient use of the Moselle Canal, Luxembourg, Germany
and France must coordinate their transport policies.7 In these
two projects integrated decisions are made on issues concerning
all constituent states in the limited subject matter area. Com-
bining this with the concept of the "limited integration effect,"
i.e., the theory that any amount of integration will always re-
sult in a progressive degree of coordination, one logically views
these limited projects as instruments of integration, though
their effect on the total economy and the total political and
legal institutions of the constituent countries may vary. To this
extent, the public international corporation can act as a substi-
tute for the traditional international organizations of a regional
integration scheme.7
When the "limited integration" effect is cumulative, an
acceleration of interaction is achieved. This is noticeable in the
Latin American- Caribbean-Central American region, where
functional interstate cooperation via the corporate device has
been often discussed and attempted. The CACM has a policy
for regional enterprises;"' the Andean Group has a scheme for
sectoral integration through creating special benefits for re-
gional companies;8' the Caribbean Community has as an objec-
tive unspecified functional cooperation in common services and
sixteen designated areas.82 Recent creations of new forms of
institutional cooperation among these groups represent the
''cumulative result" of the "limited effect."
A new integration activity among Caribbean, Latin Ameri-
can and Central American countries portends dynamic
achievements for functional cooperation on a regional scale via
the public corporate device. On October 18, 1975, 23 countries
77. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239; also SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE
STUDY, supra note 15, at 69.
78. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 69-75.
79. C. FLIGLER, supra note 13, at 4, 12-13.
80. Rosenstein-Rodan, The Consortia Technique, in FOREIGN AID 226 (J. Bhagwati
& R. Eckaus eds. 1970).
81. Bergstedt, supra note 8, passim; Behrman, Governmental Policy Alternatives
and the Problems of Institutional Sharing, in THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 289-303
(J. Dunning ed. 1970); and Penrose, The State and the Multinational Corporation in
the Less Developed Countries, in id., at 221-40.
82. Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 1033 (1973), arts. 4, 18, and Schedule entitled "Areas of Functional
Cooperation."
VOL. 6:43
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
signed a treaty creating the Latin American Economic System
(SELA).13 SELA will coordinate existing regional integration
mechanisms. (i.e., LAFTA, CACM, CARICOM, and the An-
dean Group), and has a fundamental objective of fostering the
efficient exploitation of regional resources through the creation
and support of multinational Latin American enterprises. The
equity of these enterprises will consist of state and public
shares, all of whose national shares will be guaranteed by the
respective constituent states. 4 The SELA consists of three
major institutions: a Council of Ministers or their designees;
Action Committees; and a Permanent Secretariat. 5 The Coun-
cil exercises political supervision and final authority over im-
portant decisions." The Action Committees which can be cre-
ated either by the Council or merely by interested constituent
States, will last as long as specific projects warrant. Financing
of Action Committees will be by assessments on the participat-
ing States. 7 SELA represents the quintessence of the institu-
tional mechanism with a large potential for coordinating ad hoc
projects on a regional level. The recent announcement of the
formation of NAMUCAR, a Caribbean multinational shipping
company, with a starting capital of $30 million and an initial
capacity of one million tons, is an example of the forms of
integration which are occurring in Latin America."8
Other institutional advances to coordinate integration
schemes in Latin America have occurred recently. On August
25, 1975, an extraordinary meeting of the LAFTA permanent
83. Convenio de Panama Constitutivo del Sistema, Economico Latinamerican
(SELA), based on the agreement reached in the Conference of Panama of July 31-Aug.
2, 1975. Treaty was obtained from the Venezuelan Mission to the European Commis-
sion in Brussels. Labreveus, Vingt-trois pays ont signe a Panama le traite instituant
le systeme economique latino-americain, Le Monde, Oct. 21, 1975, at 2. For back-
ground, see Agor, Latin American Inter-State Politics, INTER-AMER. AFF., Autumn
1972, at 25-26; and Roett, The Changing Nature of Latin American International
Relations: Geopolitical Realities, in THE AMERICAS IN A CHANGING WORLD: A REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 95-111 (1975).
84. Convenio de Panama, Ch. 2, art. 5, 1(a).
85. Id. at Ch. 4, art. 8.
86. Id. at Ch. 4, arts. 9-19.
87. Id. at Ch. 4, arts. 20-26.
88. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information Pour la Presse, Release, at 14
(Dec. 8-9, 1975); also mentioned in Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec. 1975, at 38, col. 3.
For background on attempts by developing countries to alter shipping arrangements,
see Zamora, UNCTAD ll-The Question of Shipping, 7 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 91-99
(1973).
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executive committee accorded Costa Rica, Honduras, Guate-
mala and Nicaragua observer status. Although a coordinating
commission had been formed between CACM and LAFTA in
1967, it has met only once since that date."9
Potential stimulus for increased South-South relations
between the states benefiting from the cumulative rules of ori-
gin and, in the case of the Lom6 Convention substantial inte-
gration assistance, exists even outside regional schemes. An
example is in the sphere of Afro-Caribbean relations. Cultural
communication and transportation ties are likely to be the ini-
tial areas of cooperation. 0 The Festival of Black Arts in Nigeria
has already precipitated the initiation of flights from Lagos to
the Caribbean at reduced rates." A primary aim of increased
Afro-Caribbean relations will be to eliminate middlemen prof-
its of multinational corporations as when a West African nation
buys sugar from the United Kingdom. In this example, the raw
sugar often originates in the West Indies, but is transported by
a multinational shipping company to the U.K., where it is
processed, and then shipped again by a multinational shipping
company to West Africa. 2 With the signing of the Lom6 Con-
vention, the West Indies has an incentive to process raw sugar,
and use its new merchant fleet (NAMUCAR) to ship sugar to
West Africa and Europe. Joint training programs should pro-
mote the acquisition of common skills, such as tourist promo-
tion, training of nautical and customs personnel, and so forth.
Accelerated programs and activities will occur among other
states and regional groups, which can take advantage of the
principle of cumulative rules of origin in trade with the EEC
and other developed countries following this principle.
In assessing the recent developments within and among
integration schemes, the corporate device represents an invalu-
able vehicle to accomplish varied objectives. Although the his-
torical perspective is not developed sufficiently to assess the
overall impact on the international order of the different pro-
89. Le Monde Diplomatique, Oct. 1975, at 26, col. 2.
90. Note, Afro-Caribbean Links, 50 AFRICA OVERSEAS 59 (1975). Also see generally,
Rosenbaum & Tyler, South-South Relations: The Economic and Political Contents of
Interaction Among Developing Countries, 29 INT'L ORG. 243 (1975).
91. Id.
92. Id.
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jects being undertaken, the initial impression is favorable, es-
pecially if the projects' cumulative impact is considered.
IV. AID DISTRIBUTION
The public international corporation can be utilized by
states in coordinating and managing traditional frameworks of
distributing aid; therefore, the corporate mechanism may help
overcome current political, geographical and institutional bar-
riers. 3 Current attempts at coordinating aid distribution will
provide alternatives against which the corporate mechanism
can be measured. New objectives and concrete legal devices for
their implementation will be examined.
Six types of coordination efforts between donors and do-
nees have been identified:
1. coordination of aid by recipient country;
2. coordination through an international finance agency;
3. coordination of aid from several sources to a particular inte-
gration group;
4. coordination of bilateral aid policies in general among several
donors;
5. coordination of aid from several donors for particularly large
projects;
6. coordination of aid on a regional basis by several donors and
several recipients.
These types of aid coordination can be combined. Different
institutional mechanisms can provide the means for coordina-
tion .
Existing political and institutional arrangements impede
international cooperation in aid distribution: donors, such as
states and international institutions, often divide their efforts
by functions, resulting in competition and overlap rather than
cooperation and often without regard to effectiveness of total
aid efforts;95 efforts among recipients are fragmented by na-
tional boundaries which cut across and prevent rational subre-
gional development planning."
93. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 381-82.
94. Hoffman, Aid Coordination, paper presented at the Ditchley Conference on
Improving the Effectiveness of Aid for Overseas Development, at 5, Ditchley Park,
England, June 3, 1966; see also Frank & Baird, Foreign Aid: Its Speckled Past and
Future Prospects, 29 INT'L ORG. 133-68 (1975).
95. P. STREETEN, AID TO AFRICA: POLICY OUTLINE FOR THE 1970s 125 (1972).
96. Id.
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Despite many academic discussions on the necessity to
coordinate aid, donors have largely failed in this endeavor. Bi-
lateral donors have achieved a measure of cooperation among
themselves, but are still in many respects competing with one
another, rather than cooperating in achieving maximum aid
efficiency." Multilateral agencies, such as the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) are designed
not to overcome obstacles in bilateral competition, but rather
for division by function-education, agriculture, health, indus-
tries, etc."
Development can be best accomplished by recognizing
developing societies as social systems. By not isolating indus-
trialization, nutrition, agriculture and education, but by deal-
ing with them as a complex of interrelated problems, policies
could then assume the form of a concerted and appropriately
phased attack on several fronts." In spite of progress towards
an integrated approach to aid, individual and multilateral do-
nors still facilitate fragmentation, separation and autonomy,
with donors stressing the technical aspects of their contribu-
tions instead of the social, cultural, political and economic set-
tings in which these measures are to occur. 00
Fragmentation on the part of the recipients constitutes
another major impediment to effective aid coordination. The
recipients are grouped by historical, political and administra-
tive functions, and not by economic principles. National sepa-
ration has been promoted by the World Bank's requirements
of national development plans, which do not embrace the plans
of other countries. 10
The corporate device can be employed by states and multi-
lateral organizations to coordinate and manage the framework
of distributing and receiving aid. The consortium and consulta-
tive (advisory) groups should be distinguished: in a consor-
97. Id.
98. Id. See also Sewell, Functional Agencies, in THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 480-523 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
99. P. STREETEN, supra note 95, at 126. See also Hoffman, supra note 94, at 22-
28.
100. P. STREETEN, supra note 95, at 126-27. See also Hoffman, supra note 94, at
22-28.
101. P. STREETEN, supra note 95, at 126-27.
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tium, member governments undertake to attend sessions in
which specific pledges are made;'"' in the consultative group,
bilateral aid-only is given, and member states meet to discuss
possibilities for coordination.0 3 New ways of using the corpo-
rate device for coordination of aid now interact with the estab-
lished coordinating mechanisms. Most promising are new ways
to simultaneously coordinate donors and donees.
On the level of multilateral aid the consortia established
under the auspices of the World Bank, as in the Aid India
Consortium and the OECD Consortium for Turkey, provide
useful models. 04 The disappointment of the Aid India Consor-
tium can be attributed not to the structure, but partly to the
failure to include India, the state primarily involved, in the
Consortium, and to the lack of coordination of policies between
the donor states.0 5 More promising has been the World Bank's
attempts to combine several donor countries in advisory groups
for a single or a group of countries, thereby achieving a certain
measure of coordination of aid. 6 Another consultative group
has been the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
OECD, which facilitated discussions and criteria-setting for
aid coordination.0 7 On a regional level the European Develop-
ment Bank offers an example of a body, autonomous of its
Member-states, and under the direction of the Commission of
the European Communities, which distributes aid to the asso-
ciated countries on a non-political basis. The concept is ex-
tended by the Lom6 Convention, which is discussed further
below. 0"
The consultative group technique has been used on the
regional level with varying degrees of success. The Alliance for
Progress in Latin America, the Nordic Cooperation group, and
102. Hoffman, supra note 94, at 9-15.
103. Id.
104. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 379-81. For descrip-
tions of the Aid India Consortium, see W. FRIEDMANN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AID
137-40 (1966); for descriptions of the OECD Consortium for Turkey, see id. at 142. For
a general description of consortia, see J. WHITE, PLEDGED TO DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIA AND THE STRATEGY OF Am (1967).
105. W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 104, at 137-42; see also Rosenstein-Rodan, supra
note 80, at 223.
106. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 241.
107. Rosenstein-Rodan, supra note 80, at 225.
108. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
(1973).
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the European Economic Community cooperative efforts merit
attention.
The advisory group technique employed in the Alliance for
Progress in Latin America has served as a model for years. The
Committee of Nine, an impartial and objective body composed
of members from the constituent States, performs the service
of evaluating development programs of applying nations and
making recommendations. The Inter-America Committee on
the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) acts as a consulting and coor-
dinating agency, which acts upon the recommendations of the
Committee of Nine both with the contributing and the devel-
oping countries. The CIAP coordinates its relations not only
with contributing countries in the Alliance for Progress, but
also with other countries and international aid and distributing
organizations. 9
The Nordic countries have employed both consortia and
consultative groups in order to coordinate assistance from all
sources to countries of primary interest in their bilateral pro-
grams."10 By virtue of an agreement, signed in 1968, Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden have combined resources for fi-
nancing several technical assistance projects in Africa. The
projects are administered by a Nordic intergovernmental board
which in turn usually delegates the administration to one of the
Nordic national aid administrations.'
In the European Economic Community, the Community
Council has been meeting to try to coordinate aid efforts for
situations not covered under their associated agreements' ar-
rangement (see statements above concerning the European
Development Fund). Recently, a debate has concerned issues
such as aid to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which are not
associated members, but still have close ties to the U.K., an
109. Rosenstein-Rodan, supra note 80, at 227; 1 H. ADAM, supra note 12, at 33-
34; Hoffman, supra note 94, at 24; see also comments on the use of a consortium to
facilitate university institutions to assist in research and operational programs in de-
veloping countries in R. POATS, TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPING NATIONS 241 (1972).
110. Westring, Swedish Aid to Developing Countries, 4 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 271
(1970).
111. Agreement between Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway concerning the
Administration of Common Assistance Projects in the Developing Countries, dated
July 16, 1968.
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EEC member."' Other important issues have included: policy
positions and representation in the North-South dialogue in
Paris in December 1975; the Commission's request for funds so
that it can collaborate with non-governmental bodies in pro-
viding aid to the Third World; participation in the Interna-
tional Agricultural Development Fund (IDAF); and overall
coordination of national aid programs."3
Three main schools of thought have arisen in the EEC
concerning coordination of national aid programs. The first
school of thought is that a specific program should be adopted.
The second school of thought is that the current approach
should be continued: discussions should be held, and coordina-
tion should occur according to circumstances, i.e., aid to Portu-
gal, food aid, special emergency aid (the Cheysson Fund), and
aid to Palestine refugees. The third and intermediate approach
is that the Community should periodically (i.e., annually) allo-
cate a ceiling for non-contractual aid, and then allocate the
funds according to established criteria, which would not men-
tion exactly the recipients or the means of aid."4 The overall
approach to aid in the EEC will not be resolved for some time.
However, the common discussions have forged many common
programs towards aid."'
The flexibility of the public international corporate device
in coordinating aid by recipients can be seen in a recent inter-
national agreement establishing the West Africa Maritime In-
stitute (WAMI), and entered into by Gambia, Ghana, Liberia
and Sierra Leone. The institute provides for expansion of the
Ghana Nautical College."' This institute is run by a director
with the assistance of a Technical Committee, and under the
policy guidance of a Council of Regents. "7 In order to maintain
112. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information, Release at 10 (Oct. 9, 1975); at
4 (Oct. 15, 1975).
113. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information, Release at 10 (Oct. 9, 1975); at
4 (Oct. 15, 1975).
114. Europe Agence Internationale d'Information, Release at 10 (Oct. 9, 1975).
115. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE COMMUNITIES' CONTRIBU-
TION TO THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1975); COMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcrIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 226-44 (1975); 2 BULL. OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 50-52 (1975).
116. Secretariat, Mano River Union, Draft Agreement for the Establishment of a
West Africa Maritime Institute (undated).
117. Id.
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aid from international sources, and enable them to effectively
participate in decision-making, the international aid agencies
may have associate, non-voting membership in the Council of
Regents."'
The use of the corporate device to give multilateral aid on
a regional level can be illustrated by analyzing the Venezuela
Trust Fund (Fondo de Inversiones). The grantor of the trust is
Venezuela and the trustee is the Inter-American Development
Bank. On February 27, 1975, a trust agreement set forth the
terms of the aid arrangement." 9
The funds of the trust are to be used to finance programs
or projects which have a significant effect on the development
of those member countries of the Bank which are relatively less
developed or of limited market size or of intermediate size.' 20
The funds are to be used specifically to promote better use of
the natural resources and of the industry and agro-industry of
the beneficiary countries.'"' Financing includes equity financ-
ing in the form of share subscriptions or bond purchases. 22
In the administration of the fund, the trustee must use the
criteria of security and profitability of its investments.'23 Fi-
nancing activities of private corporations are limited to those
corporations in which at least 80 percent of the ownership
comes from the developing countries of the region who are
members of the Bank.' 24
The impact of this regional multilateral aid is reflected in
the initial investments of the funds, such as the recent agree-
ment to finance $10 million of debt obligations of the CACM.' 25
This type of aid illustrates the use of a corporate mechanism
to cooperate in aid distribution, both on the part of the donors
and the donees.
The recently signed Lom6 Convention provides a concrete
118. Id.
119. Trust Agreement between the Venezuelan Investment Fund and the Inter-
American Development Bank, done at Washington, D.C., Feb. 27, 1975.14 INT'L LEGAL
MAT. 316 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Trust Agreement].
120. Trust Agreement, art. I, § 2.
121. Id.
122. Trust Agreement, art. II, § 3.
123. Trust Agreement, art. IV, § 10(a).
124. Trust Agreement, art. IV, § 11.
125. Le Monde Diplomatique, Dec. 1975, at 38, col. 2.
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example of how many of the principles of coordinating aid can
be facilitated within a legal framework. The aid provided for
in the Lom6 Convention gives the recipient A.C.P. countries
the right to participate in the selection of management and
execution of projects and programs.126 In addition, eligible re-
cipients are not limited only to individual countries, local au-
thorities, and public or semi-public development agencies, but
include regional interstate bodies to which A.C.P. states be-
long.'27 Projects eligible for aid may involve developed coun-
tries other than the A.C.P. states.' 21 Specific mention is made
of assistance which will promote regional and interregional eco-
nomic integration. Provision is made for aid projects to con-
sider, where feasible, operation with other A.C.P. states.' 29
Of paramount importance, the Lom6 Convention repre-
sents a step towards further integration of relations between
North and South. Hence, the Convention deals with trade is-
sues, not as separate items, but as integrated into a complex
system of cooperation, covering several fields, including eco-
nomic and technical assistance, transfer of technology, pay-
ments arrangements and the creation of a link between the
plans and programs of developing and developed countries so
as to lend assurance on both sides. The attempt at a more
comprehensive linkage in international relations can also be
seen in the decision, taken in the second meeting between the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
the oil consuming nations to include not only energy, but also
raw materials, development and financial affairs in the sub-
stantive negotiations.' 0
In designing aid policies, the consortia and consultative
(advisory) group techniques, use of a corporate framework to
combine donors and donees, the trust mechanism, and the
comprehensive approach of the Lom6 Convention provide good
examples combining donors and recipients within frameworks
which transcend both national and unifunctional categories.
126. Convention of Lom, title IV, art. 50.
127. Convention of Lom , title IV, art. 49.
128. Convention of Lom, title IV, art. 56.
129. Convention of Lom , title IV, art. 50.
130. Final Declaration on the Preparatory Meeting of the Conference on Interna-
tional Economic Cooperation and Annexed Documents, Europe Agence Internationale
D'Information (Special Release No. 866, Oct. 20, 1975).
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These legal instruments and principles offer nations and inter-
national organizations many new concrete possibilities for co-
ordinating aid effectively.
V. SOME PROJECTIONS
The public international corporation framework can be
used advantageously in some new areas where relations among
principal international actors are still fluid. Although aca-
demic ordering of these areas is arbitrary, especially in view of
the trend of nations to perceive relations more comprehen-
sively, four principal areas are set forth: natural resource and
development programs; new commercial endeavors with politi-
cal implications; dealing with multinational corporations; and
the evolution of the multinational corporation.
A. Natural Resource and Development Programs
An area in which the corporate device can be effectively
implemented is development programs or projects in which
high capital costs are a major factor. This area embraces rela-
tionships which fall within traditional development of natural
resources which lie in a region, but transcend state boundaries.
More recently, such programs and projects focus on critical
sectors such as energy development or ocean resource develop-
ment. A separate section is provided for this discussion since
the programs and projects being devised or pondered transcend
normal integration schemes. Although this discussion will
focus primarily on river basin development in the troubled
Sahel area of Africa, many other examples could be used.
Prerequisites of national and regional development now
make interstate cooperation imperative throughout the world
and especially the developing countries. National boundaries
often do not coincide with natural resources.13' Many develop-
ment programs require assistance from international sources;
technical assistance and international funding may both be
most easily secured through pooling. 131 Interstate cooperation is
also often essential for combining markets and in establishing
infrastructure improvements, both of which are prerequisites
for development schemes. For instance, power and river basin
development, railways, canals and various transport works
131. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 21-25; C. FLIGLER,
supra note 13, at 1.
132. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 21-25.
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often transcend national boundaries.'33 Since traditional inter-
governmental organizations can no longer provide the required
efficiency and flexibility, and since multinational corporations
cannot always be allowed for various economic, ideological and
political reasons to reap the profits of such projects, new means
must be found to execute these vital projects. The amount of
capital required and the low profitability of these projects often
make assumption of them by some, especially small govern-
ments, impossible. 3
River basin development is an area in which the corporate
device has been essential in promoting interstate cooperation.
International agreements establishing a corporate mechanism
of river basin development have involved the Lower Mekong,
La Plata, the Niger, the Senegal, and the Chad.' 35 The corpo-
rate device has been used to provide a permanent body with
technical capability, access to international aid, the capability
of coordinated and sometimes quick action. This is an accepta-
ble way to limit sovereignty.' 6
Important examples of river basin development are found
in the Sahel region of West Africa. In this zone between the
Sahara Desert and the River Niger, a severe, protracted
drought has caused calorie insufficiency and starvation to be-
come constant problems, affecting at least one-third of the re-
gion's population.' 37 Several corporate devices for river basin
development-the Organization for the Development of the
Senegal River (Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal-OMVS),
the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Niger River Commis-
sion, and the Permanent Drought Control Committee for the
Sahel (CILSS)-offer the best hope for a long-term solution by
achieving agricultural self-sufficiency.' 31
The OMVS, of which Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal are
members, was created in 1972, along with a Convention con-
133. C. FLIGLER, supra note 13, at 5; Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFMcAN L., at 234.
134. Id.
135. Menon, Water Resource Development of International Rivers with Special
Reference to the Developing World, 9 INT'L LAW. 441, 456 (1975).
136. See Legal Aspects of Hydroelectric Development of Rivers and Lakes of
Common Interest, U.N. Doc. E/ECE/136, at 181-92, 251-61 (1952).
137. Dow, Famine in the Sahel: A Dilemma for United States Aid, 68 CURRENT
HISTORY 197-98 (1975).
138. Id. at 201.
1976
68 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
cerning the Senegal River. The essential aims of the OMVS are
as follows: (1) to promote cooperation and the economic devel-
opment of the river basin and its resources; and (2) to support
the efforts of the Member-states in accomplishing the objec-
tives of the adjoining Convention.'39
The structure of the OMVS gives it organizational flexibil-
ity. The Conference of the Heads of State is the chief organ,
making decisions on general political matters of importance
with unanimity required for action. The Council of Ministers,
which meets once a year, sets forth priorities with regard to the
management of the basin and development of resources as well
as establishing the budget. The most important organ of the
OMVS is the executive-the Secretariat. The Secretary-
General directs the Secretariat, and is appointed by the Heads
of State for a three year term. The Secretariat encompasses a
Technical Branch including Energy, Transport, Agriculture,
Hydroagricultural Programs, Financial and Administrative
Services, and a Documentation Center. 4 " Each of these divi-
sions is engaged in a series of short- and long-term programs.'
The Lake Chad River Basin, consisting of the four riparian
states of Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Chad, was formed in
May 1964. Its objectives are to intensify Member-states' coop-
erative efforts in the economic development of the river basin,
especially surface and ground water utilization, agriculture,
livestock, minerals, industry, transportation and telecommuni-
cations development.4 2
The Commission is composed of two Commissioners from
each state and, along with five permanent subcommissions,
meets twice annually in plenary sessions. The Secretariat is
directed by an Executive Secretary who is appointed for three
years, subject to extension. He is assisted by a small adminis-
trative and technical staff (10 in 1972), a number of foreign
technical experts, and miscellaneous other local personnel.,
The Secretary-General coordinates the work of the Sub-
139. Amar, L'Organisation Pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal, 16 J. OF
AF-ICAN L. 299 (1972).
140. Id. at 300.
141. Id. at 301-02.
142. Towne, Lake Chad Basin Commission, 16 J. OF AFsxcAN L. 343 (1972).
143. Id.
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commissions and regional infrastructure projects, such as tele-
communications, road building, bridge construction, tsetse fly
eradication, livestock development, and an agricultural experi-
mental station.44
The Niger River Commission created by Nigeria, Niger
and Mali provides another example of the use of a corporate
organism for river basin development. Its objectives are to
maintain liaison between the riparian states for the most effec-
tive use of the basin resources; to conduct studies and recom-
mend to the Member-states joint projects for utilization of the
basin; and to examine complaints and settle disputes. 4 1
The organization of the Commission is unique. The high-
est organ consists of nine Commissioners, one from each ri-
parian state, but not necessarily the Heads of State or even
Ministers. They meet once a year, and decision-making is by
two-thirds vote of a quorum.'"6 The executive, called the Ad-
ministrative Secretary, is appointed by the Commission for a
term of three years. His duties are determined by the Commis-
sion. 47 Since the Administrative Secretary's duties, term, and
even staff are substantially constrained by the Commission,
the authority required by the executive of a public interna-
tional corporation is circumscribed, and the autonomy of the
organism is thus limited.
As a result of the severe drought in the Sahel in 1973,
another corporate device was formed. On September 12, 1973,
the states of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and
Upper Volta entered into a Convention establishing a Perma-
nent Interstate Drought Control Committee for the Sahel
(CILSS).'4 Its functions are to coordinate all action to combat
the drought by seeking financial and technical assistance for
Member-states. '4
144. Id. at 344.
145. Agreement Concerning the River Niger Commission and Navigation and
Transport on the Niger River, done at Niamey, Niger, Nov. 25, 1964, art. 2, 287
U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter cited as Niger River Agreement].
146. Niger River Agreement, arts. 3-5.
147. Niger River Agreement, arts. 6-9.
148. Convention Establishing a Permanent Inter-State Drought Control Commit-
tee for the Sahel among Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta,
done at Ouagadougou, Upper Volta, Sept. 12, 1973. 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 537 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Sahel Convention].
149. Sahel Convention, art. 4.
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The organizational structure consists of a Conference of
the Heads of State and another of the Council of Ministers.
50
However, broad power is endowed upon an executive, known
as the Regional Coordinator, who is appointed by the Council
for two years.'' The Regional Coordinator is assisted by a
Technical Secretariat and a staff,'5 2 and is to take all steps
required to fulfill the aims of the Convention.'53 The Commit-
tee may be joined by any African state whose economy is di-
rectly affected by Sahelian conditions.'5 '
The survival of the Sahel region depends on the success of
these and similar mechanisms. Recognition of this fact has led
the various African states to limit their sovereignty to the ex-
tent neceesary to promote cooperative projects.' 5 This is re-
flected in the relative autonomy of the executive in areas such
as river basin management. Through use of a corporate mecha-
nism, in which the Heads of State retain only major political
decision-making, and the executive possesses substantial
power and is charged with coordinating the work of functional
subdivisions or committees, efficiency, technical skills and
continuity can be achieved.
In addition to the river basin projects in the Sahel, other
new natural resource projects will require enormous pooling of
resources, which neither private enterprise nor individual gov-
ernments can afford to make alone. Long-range development
of energy sources is an example of such a program. To be able
to meet their goals, even the industrialized nations are pooling
their financial resources and have proposed, within the Inter-
national Energy Association, the creation of a corporation to
make the requisite investment expenditures.' 56 Recent business
forecasts warn that many high risk, but socially important,
projects will entail investment expenditure so large that only
national governments or interstate schemes will be capable of
150. Sahel Convention, art. 3.
151. Sahel Convention, art. 5.
152. Sahel Convention, art. 8.
153. Sahel Convention, art. 6.
154. Sahel Convention, art. 13.
155. Sohn, The Organization of Economic Co-operation in Africa, 16 J. OF AFRICAN
L. 215, 218 (1972).
156. See, e.g., R. GARDNER, THE WoRLD FOOD AND ENERGY CRISES: THE RoLE OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1974).
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financing and executing such projects.'57 Cooperation in this
field can be achieved efficiently through a corporate device
which facilitates public and private participation.
B. New Commercial Endeavors with Political Implications
Commercial opportunities are arising in the international
arena which have important international political implica-
tions. The success of OPEC is attributed partly to the political
will of the Arab countries. Although decision-making in the
operation of the cartel itself is too important to surrender au-
thority to a public international corporation, the latter can be
effective in investing oil profits. Such an institution might also
provide a method by which OPEC can participate in the Third
Window of the World Bank. Another area for potential use of
the corporate mechanism concerns the exploitation of non-
ferrous nodules in the ocean seabed in the continued absence
of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty.
The issue of reinvesting oil profits-"recycling petrodol-
lars"-has assumed international importance. Use of the pub-
lic international corporation mechanism can enable OPEC
countries to employ mutual funds or investment trusts to chan-
nel oil profits into economically sound projects while retaining
their political and negotiating strength. Establishment of spe-
cial funds or banks for the financing of development projects
which are not necessarily connected with the increased cost of
oil has been employed as a substitute for the proposed all-
OPEC development fund.' Such investment mechanisms can
also accomodate other cartels as well.'59
The likely structure of such funds or trusts and their oper-
ations will be described. (These ideas have been set forth, with
emphasis on the political context, in an article by Khodadad
Farmanfarmaian and others in Foreign Affairs in 1975.110) As
is normal in public international corporations, participating
states will be represented on a supervisory board by Ministers
157. L. TURNER, MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD 263-69 (1972).
158. Williams, The Aid Programs of the OPEC Countries, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 308,
315 (1976).
159. See, e.g., R. GARDNER, A TURNING POINT IN NoaTH-SouTH ECONOMIC
RELATIONS (1975); and R. GARDNER, OPEC, THE TRILATERAL WORLD, AND THE DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES: NEw ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION, 1976-1980 at 9-16 (1975).
160. Farmanfarmaian, Gutowski, Ohita, Roosa, & Wilson, How Can the World
Afford OPEC Oil?, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 201 (1975).
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or designated representatives who will provide the necessary
political supervision of such mutual funds or trusts. Any mu-
tual funds or trusts that may be created would be autonomous
juridical persons with a board of directors responsible for all
operational decisions. The decision to commit new funds and
certain other specific decisions of importance would be made
by the Member-states through the supervisory board. The
directors would be selected by the Member-states on the basis
of their investment management abilities. A manager would be
responsible for daily management of the funds subject to direc-
tives of the board of directors. The expertise of international
investment firms and trust managers of the highest compe-
tence and integrity could be employed if the board were al-
lowed (with the possibility of veto by the supervisory author-
ity), to select such firms to act as technical advisors to the
manager or by making them directors."'
The funds and trusts could channel investments into a
variety of areas. Diversification of investment among firms,
industries and countries would provide safeguards to OPEC
investors that their equity and earnings would be maintained.
To raise more capital, the funds and trusts could allow differ-
ent types of private participation. " The chief advantages
accruing from the trust or fund approach via a corporate man-
agement device is that it would serve as a buffer between inves-
tor and direct foreign holdings of stock. Moreover, the funds or
trusts would be able to utilize the best international manage-
ment acting on non-political, economic criteria." 3 The pooling
of capital and the public nature of the corporate structure
would enhance the negotiating strength of the funds."4
A dynamic stability in the funds could be achieved within
the public corporate model in a number of ways. For diversifi-
cation, percentage limits within the total of a specific trust or
fund might be set for holdings in a given country, currency area
or individual company. Several trusts or funds could be created
for different objectives, such as capital or income. Individual
trusts could be open-end or closed-end. Shares of any trust
161. Id. at 218-22.
162. Id. at 219.
163. Id. at 221.
164. Id. at 219-20.
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could be limited to a relatively small number of countries while
other trusts could be partly open to outside participation. To
ensure repatriation of earnings, trust shares would be made
redeemable according to terms connected to the kinds of assets
held by a particular trust. Guarantees against nationalization
and tax benefits could be negotiated on a project-by-project
basis. Minimization of the consequences of changing rates of
foreign exchange would be realized both through diversification
and through specific guidelines set forth in the trust agree-
ment.'
6 5
By channeling petrodollars into funds and trusts in the
framework of the public international corporate device de-
scribed above, OPEC countries can solidify their economic and
political strength. Recent discussions on cooperation between
the OPEC and the "Trilateral Countries" (U.S., Japan, and
the EEC) in order to recycle petrodollars has focused on the
creation of a "Third Window" in the World Bank to borrow
money from OPEC countries, and lend it to low-income coun-
tries at subsidized interest rates. Although an initial barrier
was the low proportion of representation of OPEC in the cur-
rent structure of the World Bank, an agreeable compromise has
been put forth by the Shah of Iran. He has proposed the estab-
lishment of a special fund associated with, but autonomous
from, the World Bank, with a tripartite directorate, and the
administration and lending activities performed by a profes-
sional staff. This ad hoc, functional approach provides an alter-
native to proceeding through established international law
channels. '
As the Third Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva and
New York has so far failed to produce a treaty, individual coun-
tries are increasingly discussing and taking unilateral and mul-
tilateral action.' 7 In this regard, a multilateral agreement
165. Id. at 219-22.
166. R. GARDNER, OPEC, THE TRILATERAL WORLD, AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
NEW ARRANGEMENTS FOR COOPERATION, 1976-1980 at 19-20 (1975). But see Erb,
Petrodollars and Multilateral Development Financing, in THE U.S. AND WORLD DEVEL-
OPMENT: AGENDA FOR ACTION 1975 at 112-113 (J. Howe ed. 1975).
167. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: the 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1975); Stevenson & Oxman,
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1975 Geneva Session,
69 AM J. INT'L L. 763 (1975). For United States threat to unilaterally pursue deep-sea
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among the industrialized nations to mine the ferro-manganese
deposits on the ocean floor is a real possibility. Such a plan
may involve, for instance, Japan, the United States, the EEC
and the Soviet Union.' The structure of such cooperation
would best be executed via a supervisory authority of partici-
pating states, a board of directors charged with awarding con-
tracts and investing profits, and a director, assisted by techni-
cal groups for implementation. A large proportion of the profits
could be channeled into aid institutions and projects as the
four above-mentioned powers have already agreed at the ses-
sion of the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva. Although
such a scheme would be inferior to a universal solution (i.e., a
U.N. sponsored convention), it would be better than unilateral
action for which pressure is currently being exerted." 9
The potential for interaction between major international
blocs increases when corporate and similar devices insulate
decisions from political considerations. A look at some poten-
tial combinations in the areas of energy and ocean mining will
serve as illustration. As discussions of cooperation increase
among these four groups in solving energy problems, the poten-
tial increases for the employment of profits from mining man-
ganese deposits for development of long-term energy sources.
And with the commercial application of some new energy
sources twenty years away, even OPEC could wisely invest
some profits of a trust scheme in energy investments in indus-
trialized countries, since the maturation of new sources is ex-
pected to coincide with the depletion of oil as a primary energy
source.7 0
C. Dealing with Multinational Corporations
A vital and much discussed contemporary problem has
been the inability of national or world organizations to satisfac-
mining, see speech by Secretary of State Kissinger in 122 CONG. REC. 5223, 5225 (daily
ed. Apr. 8, 1975).
168. Knight, Alternatives to a Law of the Sea Treaty, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: U.S.
INTERESTS AND ALTERNATIVES (R. Amacher & R. Sweeney eds. 1976).
169. For example, Deepsea Ventures Inc.-a consortium of Belgian, Japanese and
American companies-filed a claim of exclusive rights of exploitation in a 60,000
square kilometer area in the northeast Pacific with the United States Department of
State, in Nov. 1974. 10 COL. J. WORLD Bus. 10 (1975).
170. The Ford Administration has reportedly requested the Saudi Arabian gov-
ernment to invest up to $1 billion in U.S. electric utilities. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1976,
at 24, col. 1.
VOL. 6:43
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
torily control the enormous power and activities of the multina-
tional corporation.'7 ' States have increased their regulations
and/or incentives to simultaneously attract and control the
MNC.'72 The increased role of the states in their relations with
the MNC coincides with the Widespread assumption of respon-
sibility by states in the national economy. 73 Until international
law can deal comprehensively with the problem of MNCs, the
public international corporation can promote better interac-
tion because two or more nation-states can combine their re-
sources to regulate the MNC. A sketch of current trends be-
tween MNCs and host countries serves as background.
In dealing with the MNC, states have identified four broad
categories of productive factors and functions which are
thought to be desirable contributions to the host country: (1)
capital formation, especially risk capital required for explora-
tion of natural resources, creating necessary infrastructure,
etc.; (2) technical skills possessed by a multinational firm with
long experience; (3) managerial ability, including the accumu-
lated experience of the multinational firm; and (4) marketing
skills and arrangements, including those arising from inte-
grated operations contracts with consumers.'
States, in dealing with and effectively controlling the
MNC, have separated ownership and management, with the
state assuming immediate partial or total ownership.' For
purposes of our discussion, state participation in the multina-
tional corporate venture will be separated into two catego-
ries-joint ventures and management contracts-although the
concepts are not always distinguishable.' 6
171. Comprehensive treatment of this subject is found in Multinational Corpora-
tions in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973); R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY
AT BAY (1971); and other works in the Harvard Multinational Enterprise Project.
172. Bergstedt, supra note 8, passim; Bergstedt, Keohane, & Nye, International
Economics and International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 29 INT'L ORG. 3
(1975).
173. Id.
174. Mikesell, The Contribution of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to Eco-
nomic Development, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM AND MINERAL RE-
SOURCES INDUSTRY 3, 26 (R. Mikesell ed. 1973); see also J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at
68-77; and R. VERNON, supra note 171, at 151-88.
175. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 436-38; J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 92-102; and
R. VERNON, supra note 171, at 151-88.
176. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 436.
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The joint venture is advantageous to the host country in
satisfying the nationalistic, ideological demands of a develop-
ing country as well as increasing the share of the government
in resource revenues. Since many host governments currently
impose diverse controls such as export, price and other market-
ing controls over foreign-owned enterprises, the increased de
jure control afforded by joint ventures may not change substan-
tially the degree of de facto control by the government.'77
In situations where the host government wants to assume
full ownership but cannot yet perform complex technical tasks,
such as management and marketing, the trend has been to
execute service or management contracts, whereby the multi-
national corporation agrees to perform specified services.,7
The compensation received by MNCs for their services range
from straight payments to fees representing a percentage of
profits. Since the assumption of risk together with the re-
sponsibility for marketing the products often remain a part of
the services contract for natural resource development, the
contracts do not substantially alter what were formally called
concessions contracts."'
Unless the host government can provide requisite techni-
cal skills, the joint venture, in which the risk and marketing
function is either shared or taken primarily by the multina-
tional firm, stands out as the preferable scheme for the host
government. Assuming that the multinational firm is usually
more efficient as risk-taker, producer and marketer than is the
host country, the host country can maximize its objectives by
refraining from assuming those functions, at least until it de-
velops the requisite capabilities. 0
Regardless of whether the joint venture or service-
management contract is chosen as the method to combine a
MNC with a host country, the public international corporation
provides a means to combine the participation of two or more
177. Id. at 437; J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 92-102; R. VERNON, supra note 171,
at 140-44.
178. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 437; J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 94-98.
179. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 438.
180. Id. See also Drucker, Multinationals and Developing Countries: Myths and
Realities, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 121 (1974). Governments are more likely to take complete
ownership of service sectors while industrial and especially extractive sectors necessi-
tate a transitional learning period. J. BEHRMAN, supra note 8, at 94-95.
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states with MNCs. Either a private or public firm can serve
effectively as general manager of a large venture in the frame-
work of a public international corporation.
An example of a national public corporation serving as
general manager is provided by the Interim Telecommuni-
cations Satellite Committee (INTELSAT), which is controlled
by a committee made up of the various interested governments
who are simultaneously shareholders in the enterprise and one
General Manager. In this case the General Manager is the
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), which is a
private corporation with public participation, and partial pub-
lic control through publicly appointed directors of the board.''
Many examples exist where a private company serves as
the General Manager. For instance, the Liberian-American-
Swedish Mining Company (LAMCO), which extracts iron ore
in Liberia, uses the mechanism. LAMCO has, as its constitu-
ents, a group of international steel industry interests including
Bethlehem Steel Company of the United States and a major
mining concern in Sweden. Financing is provided by German
and United States banks. The General Manager in this group
is the Swedish Grangesberg Corporation, which is at the same
time a major shareholder of the enterprise. 182
Although the structure is similar in the two examples, the
participation in the first example is largely public while in the
latter it is 50 percent private and 50 percent by the Liberian
Government. The ownership by the Liberian Government
amounts to only a revenue and safeguard device. The Liberian
Government receives dividends on its shares in lieu of taxing
the enterprise. However, the ownership of shares by the Gov-
ernment, combined with diversified private ownership, inhibits
the Government from nationalizing the corporation, or taking
action to reduce the value of its holdings in the company.183
181. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 311-37.
182. R. STORETrE, THE POLITICS OF INTEGRATED SOCIAL INVESTMENT (1971) sets forth
the historical and structural data for the LAMCO operation. See also T. CARDLUND,
LAMCO IN LIBERIA (1969).
183. Sundstrom, Comparative Law in the Development of the Law of Interna-
tional Corporations, 24 ACrA INSTITUTI UPSALIENSIS JURISPRUDENTIAE COMPARATiVAE 238-
39 (1972). For criticism of this arrangement due to negative aspects for Liberia, see
Smith & Wells, Mineral Agreements in Developing Countries: Structures and
Substances, 69 AM J. INT'L L. 560, 574 (1975).
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Other arrangements, such as government ownership as a sup-
plement to, and not in lieu of, taxation, are possible." 4
Variations are also possible in the ownership structure of
the corporate body. If ownership is based on the possession of
shares, as is usual, the shares may be held by governments only
or by governments and non-governmental interests in varying
proportions. Arrangements can differ in the constituent states
according to whether the activity pursued by the public inter-
national corporation is domestically entrusted to the private or
the public sector.'85 A possible arrangement would be to have
as shareholders not only governments of the constituent mem-
bers and of public enterprises, but also of public, mixed
private-public, and private corporations, as is the case with
Eurochemic. 188 Another alternative is the ownership of the pub-
lic international corporation by a holding company, as is the
case of the Scandanavian Airlines System, or directly by its
shareholders, as is usually the case." 7
The clearest advantage of a joint venture or a management
contract within the framework of a public international corpo-
ration is that it furnishes an institutional basis for the exercise
of governmental control over the corporation. The difficulty
and time consumed in dealing with a plethora of ministries and
commissions and in obtaining prompt favorable decisions on
export policies necessary to adapt to changes in world competi-
tion can be reduced greatly if the government member of the
board of directors or shareholders of a public international cor-
poration also represent the principal ministries of government
concerned with resource policies. 18 1
D. The Evolution of the Multinational Corporation
In predicting the evolution of the MNC, there seems to be
a growing consensus on the structure of new forms. The princi-
pal theory can be described as the geocentric imperative. With
Howard Perlmutter as its principal proponent, the geocentric
imperative views the multinational corporation as evolving in
stages from its current policy of ethnocentrism to polycentr-
184. Id. at 575.
185. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239-40.
186. W. FRIEDMANN, GOVERNMENTAL (PUBLIC) ENTERPRISE, supra note 4, at 26.
187. Sundstrom, 16 J. OF AFRICAN L., at 239-40.
188. Mikesell, supra note 174, at 437.
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ism.' s5 The importance of this theory, which will be related in
this section, is that new roles and interactions are forecast in
the international arena. As MNCs, states, and international
organizations struggle against one another on a number of
fronts, the public international corporation mechanism offers
one of many different frameworks in which actors can come
together in the international arena.
Perlmutter describes a three-decade view of a global in-
dustrial system. His theory can be best set forth as follows:
1. Stage One (the 1970s) is a time in which the principal identifi-
cation of the MNC is home country-oriented, or "ethnocentric."
During this decade the public policy milieu of the MNC will vary
widely from ethnocentric-protectionist to geocentric-laissez-
faire.1 0
2. Stage Two (the 1980s) is a time when the mounting pressure
of restrictive legislation by host countries will gradually lead to
disintegration of fully-owned subsidiaries, which will be replaced
by joint ventures, co-production agreements and service con-
tracts.'' In this decade binational and trinational MNCs and
rising state and interstate enterprises in developing and socialist
countries (including transideological enterprises) will take form
("polycentrism"). Public policies are likely to range from
regiocentric-protectionist (i.e., current Andean Code on Foreign
Investment) to geocentric-laissez-faire.1' 2
3. Stage Three (the 1990s) is a time in which many institutions
have found that they must be more "geocentric" than regiocen-
tric or ethnocentric.1 1 3 Hence, the MNC will become an organiza-
tion without any specific country-orientation.'"I The MNCs will
be regulated by various kinds of intergovernmental and global
institutions."' During this era the most successful firms will be
the super-giants or megafirms and the little fishes. Super-giants
will be the huge companies that will be the great manufacturers
worldwide. The little fishes will be some firms (including transi-
189. See Perlmutter, Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, 5 COL.
J. WORLD Bus. 160 (1969).
190. Perlmutter, A View of the Future, in TE NEW SOVEREIGN: A VIEW OF THE
FUTURE 168 (A. Said & L. Simmons eds. 1975).
191. Venn, The Multinationals and Developing Societies: A Profile of the Future,
6 F TUREs 133, 137-38 (1974). See also the discussion and table of possible ownership-
control arrangements in Behrman, Taxation of Extractive Industries in Latin America
and the Impact of Foreign Investors, in R. MIKESELL, supra note 174, at 73-74.
192. Perlmutter, supra note 189, at 168.
193. Id. at 169-70.
194. R. VERNON, supra note 171, at 260-72.
195. Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190
at 80-95 (1973).
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deological firms from developing states, regional and socialist
owned enterprises) who will possess the advantages of specializa-
tion, fast decision-making, and adaptability because of their size
and closeness to customer needs."'
The significance of the Perlmutter theory is found primar-
ily in the vast new combinations which are forecast among
international legal persons. In the not too distant future the
existence of the "genuinely international company," which the
late Professor Wolfgang Friedmann has discussed, will be com-
mon. 197 As socialist and developing state enterprises accelerate
their entrances into the multinational sphere, the use of the
public international corporation becomes instrumental. The
beginning of this can be seen, for example, in the recent an-
nouncement of a plan to combine Brazilian iron ore with Ger-
man know-how and Japanese financing to serve Egyptian
needs through shipping iron ore from Brazil to a sponge-iron
plant in Alexandria, which is jointly owned by Brazil's Com-
panhia Vale do Rio Doce (CRDV), West Germany's Korf In-
dustries and Handel, Japan's C. Itoh, and Egypt's state-owned
General Organization for Industry. Interestingly enough, the
project marks the first time that the Brazilian-owned com-
pany, the world's newest mining giant, has taken a multina-
tional role.'98 As states necessarily enter into ownership or en-
terprises to accomplish the accelerating responsibilities to their
citizens, the existence of the public international corporation
as a framework will become indispensable.
In the end, international law and geocentric organizations
such as the United Nations are the only capable devices to
order and regulate the changing combinations between corpo-
rations and states.'99 Meanwhile, the corporate body, whether
public or private, can be brought into harmony with nation-
states. To achieve their beneficial use as a form of extra-
governmental force internationally and nationally the private
and public corporations must be brought together, not only
196. Perlmutter, supra note 188; see also L. TURNER, supra note 157, at 263.
197. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 181-84
(1964).
198. BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 3, 1975, at 30.
199. Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190
at 80-95 (1973).
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functionally and operationally, but also administratively.200
Until international legislation to effectively control the MNC
is enacted, the principal actors in the international arena,
namely the nation-state and the MNC, can reap dividends by
using flexible devices in the context of the public international
corporation to steer themselves through the maze of imperman-
ence in today's international economic order.
200. SUNDSTROM, PIUC: COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 15, at 385.

FACULTY COMMENT
Sowing the Wind: Rebellion and Violence in
Theory and Practice*
ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER**
For they have sown the wind, and
they shall reap the whirlwind ....
Hosea 8:7
"I have had it with terrorism."' This recent statement by
President Gerald R. Ford, quintessentially reflects the constant
concern, the omnipresent fear, and the intense frustration of
both governments and private citizens over the continuing
threat of global terror-violence. Not only democracy, but the
very concept of the state itself as the administrative custodian
of political power is presently under attack in all areas of the
world.2 Public protest by bomb and by bullet rather than by
ballot and by peaceful demonstration has become an all-too
familiar symbol of the last decade. A very real spectre haunting
the corridors of power in this age of nuclear stalemate is the
feeling that "terrorism will become more than a sporadic dis-
ruption to law and order; it will menace the very survival of
civilization itself."'3
Terrorism, either national or international, is primarily "a
weapon of the weak." 4 It is the strategy by which dissident
political groups, unable to achieve power or to influence gov-
* CROZIER, B., A THEORY OF CONFLICT, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY
10017 (1974), xvii, 245 p.; BASSIOUNI, M.C. (Editor), INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
POLITICAl. CRIMES, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, IL 62703 (1975), xxvi, 594 p.;
ALEXANDER. Y. (Editor), INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES. Praeger Special Studies, Praeger Publishers Inc., New York, NY 10003
(1976), xx, 390 p.
** Associate Professor of International Law, Lewis University College of Law;
Member, International Committee on Terrorism, World Association of Lawyers.
1. Speech before the South Florida Chapter, Federal Bar Association, reported in
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 15, 1976, at 3, col. 4.
2. B. CROZIER, A THEORY OF CONFLICT 3-12 (1974) [hereinafter cited as CROZIER].
3. Alexander, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM xvii (Y. Alexander ed.
1976) [hereinafter cited as ALEXANDERI. This feeling was shared by many of the
participants at the Department of State Conference on International Terrorism, Wash-
ington, D.C., Feb. 25-26, 1976.
4. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 129.
84 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
ernmental policy through legitimate means, can coerce govern-
ments, overturn established regimes, and intimidate entire
peoples. Although a precise legal definition has yet to be formu-
lated, international terrorism may be said to be that
"[i]ndividual or collective coercive conduct employing strate-
gies of terror-violence which contain an international element
or are directed against an internationally protected target and
whose aim is to produce a power-oriented outcome." 15 It is
above all else a technique "for demolishing a State."'
The underlying issue-and one that may never be re-
solved-is how to divorce terrorism, which is essentially crimi-
nality,' from rebellion or revolution, which are generally recog-
nized remedies in international law.' When is rebellion legally
and morally permissible? Under what conditions can revolu-
tion be legitimized? Can revolutionary violence ever be justi-
fied? Or, to view the other side of the coin, "[w]hen is it wrong
to rebel?"' How does one reconcile America's revolutionary ori-
gins and Thomas Jefferson's injunction that "[tjhe tree of
liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of
patriots and tyrants" with the United States Draft Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of Interna-
tional Terrorism? 0
The answer, if there is an answer, is that although rebel-
lion cannot be separated from conflict, violence must not be
directed at innocent parties. To "endanger, threaten or take
5. Bassiouni et al., Final Document, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
CRIMES xiv (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI]. Cf. Paust, A
Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punish-
ment. and Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 431, 432-35 (1975)
Ihereinafter cited as Paust].
6. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 119.
7. Friedlander, Terrorism, 2 BARRISTER 11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Friedlan-
der]; Murphy, The Role of International Law in the Prevention of Terrorist Kidnap-
ping of Diplomatic Personnel, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 305-09; S. SCHAFER, THE
POLITICAL CRIMINAL: THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY AND CRIME (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SCHAFER1.
8. Cf. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-108 (2d ed. 1973);
.IL. BRIERI, (H. Waldock ed.), THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNA-
rIONAIL LAW OF PEACE 137-61 (6th ed. 1963): THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CIVIL WAR (R.
Falk ed. 1971).
9. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 11.
10. Cf. Kutner, A Philosophical Perspective on Rebellion, and Murphy, United
Nations Proposals on the Control and Repression of Terrorism, in BASSIOUNI, supra
note 5, at 51-61, 493-506; and CROZIER, supra note 2, at 13-31.
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innocent human lives and to jeopardize fundamental free-
doms" of the individual is to disregard public international
law, declarations and resolutions of the United Nations relat-
ing to human rights, and the basic provisions of the United
Nations Charter." If innocent civilian populations are to be
subjected to random or selective terrorist attack, then terror-
violence becomes destructive not only of law and legal systems
but potentially of modern civilization itself.
Nonetheless, terrorism has become inextricably inter-
twined with so-called national liberation movements. On the
one hand, to quote the U.N. Secretariat's study of the origins
and causes of international terrorism, "the legitimacy of a
cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of
violence, especially against the innocent." However, force and,
by implication, violence become legitimate if they are utilized
by national liberation movements asserting the principles of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples." In fact, the
United Nations has consistently and repeatedly supported a
lawful force exception when it involves "the right to self-
determination" and the struggle of "peoples under colonial and
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination."1' 3 The most
pressing problem, which has yet to be resolved, is how to bal-
ance the equities between the U.N.-asserted right to self-
determination on the one hand, and the maintenance of a mini-
mum standard of world public order on the other.
If terrorism "is normally a central feature of revolutionary
war" and a constant element in an ambience of domestic tur-
11. United Nations Secretariat, Measures to Prevent International Terrorism
Which Endangers or Takes Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Free-
doms, and Study of the Underlying Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of
Violence Which Lie in Misery, Frustration, Grievance and Despair and Which Cause
Some People to Sacrifice Human Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect
Radical Changes, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/418, Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in part in BASSIOUNI,
supra note 5, at 5-10.
12. Id., at 6-9.
13. Cf. Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against
Criminal and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103 (1973), reprinted
in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 213-15; Report of the Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619, Dec. 14, 1974. For
a general analysis of this important declaration, see Comment, The United Nations
Definition of Aggression: A Preliminary Analysis, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 171
(1975).
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moil," then what of legality, whether international or domes-
tic? Must one stand aside until the revolutionary process, to
paraphrase Vergniaud, devours everyone? If the cause is anti-
colonial under present international law, are there no legal
norms that can be applied against the slaughter of the inno-
cent? The answer, of course, is that remedies are possible, if
they are equitably applied. Minimum standards of conduct
could be developed which would then determine legal guide-
lines for every member of the world community." Oppressive
regimes need not be assisted, insurrections and rebellions are
distinguishable from civil wars, and external participation in
internal strife can be governed by established principles of in-
ternational law. "The essential task is to determine the divid-
ing line between civil strife which is basically criminal and that
which is an expression of the will of the people."'"
Is an armed revolt prima facie a war of national liberation?
Is a war of national liberation necessarily a civil war? And what
of subversion within the broader rubric of internal war?1 7 Dur-
ing the past fifteen years a common bond linking all domestic
categories of conflict has been that of terror-violence, with the
notable exception of the Biafran secession and Nigerian civil
war. In Biafra, as a matter of strategy and tactics, terrorism
was consciously avoided. Years later, however, a former high
official in the Biafran revolutionary government confided to
this writer that "Biafra made a mistake in not trying terrorism.
We were wrong. If we had terrorized, we would be independent
today. The PLO has shown how effective the use of terror can
be in the international arena."'"
Small wonder, then, that the chief observer of the PLO at
14. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 127-28.
15. See the proposals of Milte, Terrorism and International Order, 8 ANZAS J.
CRIMINOLO( Y 101, 111 (1975), and Paust, supra note 5.
16. Novogrod, Internal Strife, Self-Determination, and World Order, in
BASSIOUNI. supra note 5, at 113. Paust, supra note 5, at 459-62, is especially critical of
those who would link together self-determination and terror-violence. For a more de-
tailed analysis of self-determination, see Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-
Political Inquir,, 1975 DET. COL. L. REV. 71.
17. Cf. Dinstein, Terrorism and War of Liberation: An Israeli Perspective of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 155-59 [hereinafter cited as Din-
steinj; CROZIER, supra note 2, at 199-211.
18. Statement to the author by C.C. Mojekwu, former Minister of State, Govern-
ment of Biafra, Jan. 22, 1976. See also J. DE ST. JORRE, THE BROTHERS' WAR: BIAFRA
AN!) NIGERIA (1972).
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the United Nations claims that "[v]iolence is an essential part
of a liberation movement." 9 The quarrel over who is terrorizing
whom in the Middle East has been inexorable, and is by now
self-defeating. Whether it is a question of two conflicting
claims of right or one of remedying legal (and also moral)
wrongs, the Palestinian-Israeli controversy has become part of
''super-power" politics and ultimately will be resolved by
"super-power" pressures. Arguments can be put forth on both
sides, but two inescapable facts remain. Israel as a national
entity does exist, regardless of the desires of the Arab leaders,
and the April 1976 municipal elections on the West Bank repre-
sent a growing Palestinian national consciousness, however
much the Israeli government may wish otherwise.
Since 1969, with Israel as the catalyst, a Palestinian na-
tional movement has undeniably developed, and the United
Nations General Assembly has gone on record, in more than a
dozen instances, in support of the right of the Palestinian peo-
ple to self-determination. 0 Given the current dynamics of the
international community, terror-violence in the Middle East
has been "the vehicle of organized insurgency," and is, "at its
core, a movement toward national sovereignty." 2' The unre-
solved issue is whether terrorism-largely in the form of kid-
napping and murder-even if for political ends, should be
legitimized as an instrument of nation-building. Is not terror-
ist activity a political maneuver designed to disrupt personal
freedoms and to impair fundamental human rights? If so, then
has not the world community opened a political Pandora's Box,
the effect of which may not be readily understood, especially
by those who prefer short-run advantage over long-term possi-
bilities? In the words of Raymond Aron, "if men do not know
what they can expect from each other, they [can] no longer
live in [civilized] society. '2
19. Kirk, PLO's Mild-Mannered Aggressor, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 4, 1976, § 2,
at 2, col. 4 (interview with Zehdi Labib Terzi).
20. Cf. Dinstein, supra note 17; Mallison & Mallison, An International Law Ap-
praisal of the Juridical Characteristics of the People of Palestine: The Struggle for
Human Rights, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 160-90; Alexander, From Terrorism to
War: The Anatomy of the Birth of Israel, and Weisband & Roguly, Palestinian Terror-
ism: Violence, Verbal Strategy and Legitimacy, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 211-
310.
21. Weisband & Roguly, id., at 259.
22. R. ARON. PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 170 (1966).
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Deprived of mass communications, terrorism becomes a
weapon of the impotent. Terror-violence relies almost exclu-
sively on psychological impact to convey its awful message.2 :1
Modern technology has greatly assisted the "public purpose
terror" of those dissident groups who consider themselves ex-
cluded from the mainstream of their country's political life. 21
Criminal violence is not purposeful in the broad sense, but
rather purposeless-aside from the lure of financial gain or the
inner satisfaction of revenge-and it is often senseless. "Terror-
ism is different from criminal violence in that its purpose is
symbolic, its means psychological, and its ends political. ' ' 2.
The medium is truly the message when terror-violence becomes
linked with mass communications.
The journalistic glorification of the strange saga of the self-
styled Symbionese Liberation Army and of Patty Hearst has
disoriented public opinion to such an extent that the victims
are subordinated to the victimizers. Never a true revolutionary
terrorist movement, the SLA has received a quantum of atten-
tion from the news media that makes them appear to have been
a major urban guerrilla movement.26
Television, especially, has played an important role in con-
fusing the public mind and promoting violence as an accepted
way of life. Does not violence breed violence, and if crime is
taken to be the natural order of things, does not this very view
engender still more criminal attacks? 7 If Western pluralistic
societies are confronted with "a saturation by images of vio-
lence," then does not some sort of regulation or control become
inevitable to ensure survival? The unarticulated premise is
that a political price must, of necessity, be paid for regulation
23. Cf. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 119-32; Hutchinson, The Concept of Revolution-
a Terrorism, 16.J. CONFLICT RES. 383 (1972); E. WALTER, TERROR AND RESISTANCE: A
TUI)Y OF POIITICAL VIOLENCE WITH CASE STUDIES OF SOME PRIMITIVE AFRICAN
COMMUNITIES Chs. 1-3 (1969); R. Moss, THE WAR FOR THE CITIES Chs. 1-2 (1972).
24. The term is taken from Mallison & Mallison, The Concept of Public Purpose
Terror in International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of
Human and Material Values, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 67 [hereinafter cited as
Mallison & Mallisoni.
25. Weisband & Roguly, Palestinian Terrorism: Violence. Verbal Strategy, and
Legitimacy, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 258.
26. Johnpoll, Perspectives on Political Terrorism in the United States, in
AIEXANDER. supra note 3, at 40-41. See also editorial in the Denver Post, Sept. 21, 1975,
at 23, col. 1.
27. Cf. CROZIER. supra note 2, at 27-31, 228-30; Friedlander, supra note 7, at 12.
VOL. 6:83
REBELLION AND TERROR-VIOLENCE
and control. The more effective the restraints placed upon the
communications industry, the greater the reduction of civil
liberties for the individual citizen.
Can individual or group terrorist activity be at all con-
strued to constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or
crimes of aggression?" Or, in the alternative, should there be
a serious effort made by the international community to reduce
the incidence of terrorism by invoking the laws of war and
applying them to guerrillas and organized political dissidents?
Are the laws of war relevant to control of terrorism, both foreign
and domestic? The prevailing view is that "[t]he use of terror-
ist methods by guerrillas deprives the movement of the privi-
leged status which is conferred to guerrilla warfare by the Ge-
neva Convention .. ."I' The countervailing argument is that
the protection afforded by Articles 3 and 4 of the Geneva Con-
vention should be extended to participants in national libera-
tion movements. The terrorist acting as liberationist, these
advocates argue, is entitled to be treated according to the mini-
mum standards for protection of prisoners established by the
Geneva Convention of 1949.30
The answer will inevitably depend upon the focus of the
inquiry. If emphasis is placed upon the causes of violence and
the motive of the actor, then a broadly-based political offense
exception is certainly permissible and, perhaps even desirable.
But, if the emphasis is centered upon the acts of violence and
the resultant social harm, then a different conclusion must be
reached. Terrorism is purposely inhumane; it is fundamentally
the brutalization and the deprivation not only of human rights,
but of life itself. "With the methods used by the IRA against
the English people, or the methods used by the PLO against
Israeli civilians, even foreign travellers in Israel, we reach a
kind of terrorism beyond civilized conception."'"
28. Tran-Tam, Crimes of Terrorism and International Criminal Law, in 1 A TREA-
TISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 499-500 (M.C. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973)
1hereinafter cited as BASSIOUNI & NANDA]. See also CROZIER, supra note 2, at 17, 29-
31, 130; Toman, Terrorism and the Regulation of Armed Conflicts, in BASSIOUNI, supra
note 5, at 143, 146-47, 152.
29. Id., at 145-46.
30. Lahey & Sang, Control of Terrorism Through a Broader Interpretation of
Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, in BASSlOUNI, supra note 5, at 191-
200; Mallison & Mallison, supra note 24, at 79-83.
31. Howe, The Ultimate Price of Random Terror, SKEPTIC, Jan./Feb. 1976, at 15.
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The issue of maintaining a political offense exception to
the established legal maxim, aut dedere aut punire, (extradite
or prosecute), remains a divisive one in international law. For
example, no one as yet has been able to develop a workable
definition of political crimes. Even in the last quarter of the
twentieth century, there are no clear guidelines existing in ex-
tradition law and practice. In fact, the multiplicity of compet-
ing interests and conflicting theories offers a serious impedi-
ment to effective criminal law enforcement and to the stability
of world public order. The very concept of a political crime has
been a two-edged sword from the era of the French Revolution
and the Belgian political offense exception statute of 1833. The
still unresolved question is whether protections offered the
"ideologically motivated offender" will derogate individual
rights and personal freedoms. In other words, does national
self-interest outweigh the need for a universal procedural due
process?"
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has provided a
meaningful standard within the context of Anglo-American
law. Urban terrorists are held to be common criminals. Murder
or the indiscriminate, perpetration of serious bodily harm can-
not be considered acts in furtherance of a political uprising.
Revolutionary activity must not be confused with homicidal
behavior.3 Thus, to grant any excusing condition to political
offenders who have inflicted death and destruction upon inno-
cent third parties is a patent denial of the rule of law, whether
national or international. Even V.I. Lenin, before the Bolshevik
seizure of power in 1917, eschewed terror-violence as a substi-
tute for revolutionary agitation.34
What, then, is being done; and even more important, what
can be done to inhibit the incidence and the increase of terror-
ist activity? Terrorism, whether national, international, or
transnational, 31 is on the rise with a concomitant threat to the
32. BASSIOUNI, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice,
in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 398-447. See also M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRA-
DITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 368-434 (1974).
33. In re State of Wisconsin and Armstrong, [1972] 28 D.L.R.3d 513 (1972); See
also Green, Terrorism: The Canadian Perspective, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 6-
10.
34. V.I. LENIN, WHAT IS TO BE DONE? BURNING QUESTIONS OF OUR MOVEMENT 74-77
(New World Paperback Ed. 1969).
35. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 109, 130, distinguishes transnational from interna-
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maintenance of world public order.3" Creation of an interna-
tional criminal code defining specific acts of terror-violence as
international crimes, 37 establishing an international criminal
court with jurisdiction over international criminal offenders, :",
and proscribing terrorist attacks upon diplomatic personnel, :'
have all been subjects of draft statutes and conventions, but
they have yet to be enacted into an operative international
legal system, and the question of enforcement has inspired con-
tinuing debate and profound disagreement. Whatever else may
be said, making government officials a protected class while
failing to provide for the security of innocent civilians is cer-
tainly not the answer.
Three civil aviation conventions have been concluded:
Tokyo (1963), The Hague (1970), and Montreal (1971). Yet,
there is not at present "any really concerted and energetic in-
ternational control action, as to aerial piracy, that really has
some teeth in it. . .. "0 The contracting state parties have
agreed to place conduct which endangers the safety of aircraft
within their domestic criminal jurisdiction, but there is no spe-
cial protective status provided for the passengers or the crew
by the state to which the aircraft has been illegally diverted.
Likewise, there is no "sanctions convention" directed against
states which grant safe haven to skyjackers, although the
United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom have vigorously proposed such action. The United States
tional terrorism in that the former is the conduct of individuals or disparate groups,
while the latter indicates a world-wide organizational structure, such as the Socialist
or Communist Internationals.
36. A conclusion reached by the Department of State Conference on International
Terrorism, Washington, D.C., Feb. 25-26, 1976. It was almost the only point upon
which the participants could agree.
37. Palmer, Codification of Terrorism as an International Crime, in BASSIOUNI,
supra note 5, at 507-18 (draft statute proposed); Johnston, Problems in the Enforce-
ment of World Criminal Law, 8 ANZAS J. CRIMINOLOGY 87, 96-100 (1975).
38. De Schutter, Problems of Jurisdiction in the International Control and Re-
pression of Terrorism, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 377-90; Kos-Rabcewicz Zub-
kowski, The Creation of an International Criminal Court, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5,
at 519-36.
39. Murphy, The Role of International Law in the Prevention of Terrorist Kidnap-
ping of Diplomatic Personnel, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 285-313. Cf. C.E. BAU-
MANN, THE DIPLOMATIC KIDNAPPINGS: A REVOLUTIONARY TAcrIc OF URBAN TERRORISM
(1973).
40. E. MCWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
116 (1975).
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has set an example in this regard by enacting more stringent
measures than any other country aimed at control of air pi-
racy." It is regrettable that the proposal of the International
Federation of Airline Pilots to suspend all commercial service
to any country providing refuge for skyjackers has not been
implemented, for this would serve notice to all nations that
sheltering such offenders would be a tortious act subject to
international economic sanctions.
At issue throughout this entire discussion is the role of law
and its operative limitations. As long as "what is terrorism to
some is heroism to others," as long as the preservation of mini-
mum world public order is subordinated to the national inter-
est, and as long as there is no international superstructure
which is capable of dealing with international crime, the strate-
gies of terror-violence are certain to increase. The hard fact and
cold reality is that the maintenance and preservation of inter-
national law and order can only be achieved through a volun-
tary reduction of national sovereignty.42
Liberal democracy also faces some hard choices. In order
for pluralistic societies to deal with the challenge of rebellion
and terror-violence in the last quarter of the twentieth century,
the fundamental freedoms which they take so much for granted
will have to be restricted in some measure-and most likely
reduced-if the current attack on the international state sys-
tem is to be brought under control. The cost of waging terror-
ism, for governments and people, is high. Rebellion and terror-
violence are, in effect, war waged against the state. Thus, "the
real problem, for a pluralistic society, is how to contain subver-
sion while maintaining the freedoms and avoiding the alterna-
tive dangers of the authoritative solution or the totalist hor-
ror."
43
41. Cf. Evans, Aircraft Hijacking: What is Being Done, and Lee, International
Suppression of Hijacking, in BASSlOUNI, supra note 5, at 219-56; Sundberg, Piracy and
Terrorism, in 1 BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 28, at 455-90; and Finger, International
Terrorism and the United Nations, in ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 327-46.
42. Bassiouni, Methodological Options for International Legal Control of
Terrorism, in BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 485-92; Friedlander, Power Politics and the
Rule of Law: Professor Schwarzenberger Reconsidered, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 836 (1975).
43. CROZIER, supra note 2, at 205. Cf. Alexander, Introduction, in ALEXANDER,
supra note 3, at xvi-xix. The latter reluctantly concludes: "[aill that can be done is
to make terrorism less inviting and more costly to its precipitators and supporters."
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Political violence will abide no limitations placed upon it.
Though very few political criminals ever "achieve the monu-
mental climax of their efforts," their historical role has been to
act out their fantasies encompassed by an all-consuming
hatred." Those who worship the cult of force ultimately make
force itself the greater truth. Destruction becomes a way of life
and a way of death. In the words of historian E.J. Hobsbawm,
the worst kind of violence "is the violence which gets out of
anyone's control."45 Terrorism throughout the world is getting
out of control. If not restrained in time the end result may leave
humanity a Hobson's choice-either a global Orwellian future,
or none at all.
44. SCHAFER, supra note 7, at 15.
45. E. HOBSBAWM, REvo LUTIONARIES: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 215 (1973).

STUDENT COMMENTS
The March on the Spanish Sahara: A Test of
International Law
On November 6, 1975, 350,000 Moroccan civilians armed
only with the Koran, crossed the border into the Spanish Sa-
hara. The march was halted after only three days and six miles,
but even as the Moroccans returned home, suffering from the
rigors of the unwelcoming desert, the uniqueness and audacity
of King Hassan's venture had taken the world aback, and Mo-
rocco's claim to the Spanish Sahara had been indelibly marked
in history.
The march was not only a political and historical event,
however. It was also a test of, and a challenge to, international
law. After a brief historical and political background, this com-
ment will explore the responses of international legal institu-
tions to the situation, and the applicability of several principles
of international law to the event-among them, self-
determination, aggression, and coercion-and the psychologi-
cal and cultural factors which deeply affect the application of
international law to a situation of this kind. Through this ex-
amination, the strengths and weaknesses of international law
as an ordering of world dynamics may be, to some extent, re-
vealed.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Spanish Sahara, 105,000 square miles of desert in
northwestern Africa, has a total population variously estimated
at 60,000, 70,000 and 75,000. The majority of the population are
nomadic Arab-Berbers, who wander across the borders of Mo-
rocco, Mauritania, and Algeria. There is a small sedentary
group of Black farmers in the northern oases, and a European
population, in 1971, of 16,648.'
The area has been included in Morocco's territorial claims
ever since that country achieved independence in 1956. In fact,
Morocco has, at one time or another, claimed Mauritania, the
1. Enahoro, Imbroglio in the Sahara, AFRICA, Dec. 1975, at 13 [hereinafter cited
as Enahoro].
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Spanish Sahara, parts of Algeria, and the small Spanish terri-
tories of Ceuta, Melitta and Ifni, to be "historically, ethnically,
and politically Moroccan."' The boundaries which developed
as a result of French and Spanish colonization were viewed as
artificially imposed on a homogeneous area. Mauritanian in-
dependence in 1960, a border war with Algeria in 1965, and
the ceding of Ifni to Morocco in 1969 settled some of the
territorial disputes. However, Morocco remained firm in its
claim, as sporadic skirmishes in the area for the past twenty
years indicate, that the territory of the Spanish Sahara should
be restored to Morocco; at the time of the French conquest at
the end of the nineteenth century, the area was ruled by a
Moroccan governor.3
Mauritania's claim to the area, as heir of the Moors who
lost their huge empire in the eighth century, could be viewed
as even stronger than Morocco's.' Since 1936, when Spain
began its occupation of the area, the colonial power has
vacillated in its desire for the territory. The realization, in 1964,
that there was no oil in the area brought Spain to the point of
negotiations with Morocco for a settlement of the dispute.5 But
suddenly, in the next year, no one was willing to give up; the
Spanish Sahara's vast phosphate deposits were discovered.
This economic issue is the main reason for the current
crisis. Morocco is the world's largest exporter of phosphates,
which are used in the manufacture of fertilizer, and the indus-
try constitutes more than half of Morocco's foreign exchange
revenue. A competing industry in the Spanish Sahara would
seriously affect the Moroccan industry. The territory has re-
serves of 1.7 billion tons of high grade ore.' For the same reason,
Spain immediately tightened its grip on the area, and began
exploiting the resource; Mauritania quickly saw an opportunity
to aid its own economy; and Algeria, which has no territorial
claims to the Sahara, strongly voiced its opposition to a Moroc-
can takeover.
2. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1956, at 19, col. 3.
3. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1957, at 26, col. 3.
4. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 10.
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1964, at 74, col. 5.
6. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 9.
VOL. 6:95
SPANISH SAHARA & INT'L LAW
II. THE CURRENT CRISIS
In September of 1970, the leaders of Morocco, Algeria, and
Mauritania applied diplomatic pressure to Spain to vacate the
territory, and to agree to a United Nations-supervised referen-
dum for the people of the territory.7 Since that time, the claims
and counterclaims have intensified. Finally, King Hassan of
Morocco appealed to the United Nations, in 1974, to arrange
the return of the Spanish Sahara to Morocco. The United Na-
tions sent observers to study the situation. Subsequently, Has-
san realized that a referendum might go against Morocco, and
proposed that the dispute be taken to the International Court
of Justice. The Court began deliberations on the question of
whether the Spanish Sahara is a no-man's land, or a legitimate
Moroccan (or Mauritanian) territory.'
Spain requested United Nations observers, reserved the
right for an emergency Security Council session if peace in the
area was threatened, and promised to set a deadline for with-
drawal.' The Security Council met and adopted a unanimous
resolution calling on all concerned "to avoid any unilateral
action which might further increase the tension in the area."
It also requested Mr. Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, to intensify consultations. The Secretary-
General proposed a six-month cooling-off period during which
the United Nations could create a temporary administration in
the area.'0
On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice
announced its decision that neither Morocco nor Mauritania
had any territorial sovereignty over the area. The court did say
that when the territory was colonized by Spain, the rulers of
Morocco and what is now Mauritania had the allegiance of
some of the territory's nomadic tribes." Immediately after the
Court's decision came down, King Hassan announced that he
would lead the march into the Spanish Sahara, saying that "no
tyrant, no matter how faithless, would give orders to fire on
350,000 unarmed persons."'"
7. B. CURRAN & J. SCHROCK, AREA HANDBOOK FOR MAURITANIA 99 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as CURRAN].
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1974, at 4, col. 4.
9. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
10. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 11.
11. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1975, at 8, col. 4.
12. Id.
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The march, superbly orchestrated and enthusiastically
supported by Moroccans, immediately began to pay off for
Morocco, although it was abruptly halted because of a Spanish
force inside the territory and the threat of Spanish minefields.
By November 14, Spain had agreed to abandon the Spanish
Sahara by February 28, 1976, and to share its administration
with Morocco and Mauritania until then, at which time the
two neighboring countries would jointly administer the coun-
try.'" However, Algeria has never accepted this agreement
which also bypassed United Nations efforts to effect a self-
determination referendum. There have been skirmishes be-
tween Algerian regulars, Algerian-backed Saharan guerrillas,
and Moroccan troops since the agreement, culminating in Mo-
rocco and Mauritania breaking off diplomatic ties with Algeria
on March 7, 1976.1' On February 26, two days ahead of sched-
ule, the immediate goal of the march was finally accom-
plished-Spain withdrew from the territory now known as the
Western Sahara.
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Although the legal implications of the Sahara incident are
closely interrelated, they will be separated into four groups for
greater ease of analysis: self-determination; aggression and
coercion; "non-legal" aspects of international law; and interna-
tional organizations.
A. Self-Determination
The history of the principle of self-determination is bound
up with the doctrine of the French Revolution that government
should be based on the will of the people, and if the people are
not content with the form of government they should be able
to change it as they wish. This doctrine "had since the very
beginning the character of a threat to the legitimacy of the
established order."'" As a corollary to popular sovereignty, the
doctrine was also related to peaceful change. Territorial trans-
fers between sovereign nations should be guided and arbitrated
by the people affected by the transfers. As this theory is vague
and imprecise, and particularly because of the revolutionary
13. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
14. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1976, at 7, col. 1.
15. R. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as SUREDA].
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character of popular sovereignty, self-determination has been
considered by some merely a political concept, and not a legal
right.'8
The modern use of the concept became pronounced near
the end of World War I. Although not mentioning the actual
word "self-determination", which was first used in a 1916 Bri-
tish memorandum, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points Ad-
dress of January 18, 1918 gave great impetus to the principle.
The Allies themselves, however, "accepted self-determination
only insofar as it applied to the disintegration and dissolution
of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and former Rus-
sian empires. There was no intention of applying the principle
to their own colonies and subject peoples."'" The phrase was
not referred to in the peace treaties of 1919, nor in the Covenant
of the League of Nations, but was reincarnated in the Charter
of the United Nations.
Article 1(2) of the Charter expressly refers to "the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples." Article
55, dealing with international economic and social cooperation,
also refers to self-determination as a principle rather than a
right. In Article 73, a non-self-governing territory is defined as
one "whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government" (emphasis added). Although self-determination
is contained in the Charter as a principle, it is not a legal right,
and was not listed as one in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948."8
Self-determination did not become a significant working
principle of the United Nations until the 1960's, by which time
the world order had significantly changed. In 1948, there were
only three self-governing African nations-Ethiopia, Liberia,
and the Union of South Africa.'9 Throughout the Sixties, sev-
eral colonies gained independence every year. The Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples 0 was the first of several General Assembly resolutions
16. Id. at 25. For a thorough treatment of the doctrine and the literature dealing
with it, see U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
17. Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1975 DET. COL. L.
REV. 71, at 71 [hereinafter cited as Friedlander].
18. G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2, U.N. Doc. A/555 (1948).
19. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 84.
20. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). The
Declaration reads as follows:
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responding to the change in circumstances. The clear purpose
of this document is to brand all colonialism as illegitimate, and
contrary to the right, now not merely the principle, of self-
determination. Whether this pronouncement affected interna-
tional law in a strict sense is debatable, but it was certainly an
indicator of the change in "the entire setting and international
frame of mind in which the world's colonial-or anti-
colonial-affairs are conducted."'" Another indicator is the fact
that nine states, including the United States, the United King-
dom, France, and Portugal, the major colonial powers of the
past, abstained in the unanimous adoption of the resolution.
Where such a body of doubt exists, "the existence of a rule of
international law cannot lightly be assumed."22
Problems of definition make the application of this, and
later resolutions, difficult. Neither "people" nor "nation" has
any generally accepted meaning, so that the entity endowed
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploi-
tation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to
the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion
of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peace-
fully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity
of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independ-
ence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any
conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will
and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or color, in order to
enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-
interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sover-
eign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.
21. R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION 28
(1964) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
22. Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 459, 462 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Emerson].
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with the right, and the precise goal toward which self-
determination is directed, are both unclear. However, a
formula for self-determination has been developed through
these resolutions: 23
(1) All dependent peoples are entitled to freedom;
(2) The peoples so entitled are defined in terms of the existing
colonial territories, each of which contains a nation;
(3) Once such a people has come to independence, no residual
right of self-determination remains with any group within it or
cutting across its frontiers.
The last part of the formula was firmly established in 1960 by
Resolution 1514,24 which stated that "an attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the terri-
torial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." There-
fore, the right of self-determination can only be exercised once;
the ethnic diversity of the peoples of the new state is no longer
acceptable as a justification for self-determination. This caveat
has served as a protection for the new elite of Africa against the
threat of a Biafra-like secession. 25 The most recent major Gen-
eral Assembly resolution on the subject, a Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, 26 reaffirmed the "one-time-only" rule.27
In December 1966, two international human rights
covenants-the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights-contributed to the continuing process of
formulation of the principle. In identical language, they state
that "[all] peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status
and freely preserve their economic, social, and cultural
development."28 Although stated as a right, the Covenants do
23. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 28.
24. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
25. Note, The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions, 82
YALE L. J. 533, 541 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note].
26. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
27. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 79. For the view that self-determination in-
cludes the right of secession, see Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Con-
text: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 321 (1975).
28. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
See Friedlander, supra note 17, at 77.
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not recognize self-determination as an absolute, continuing
right. As international covenants are considered authoritative
interpretations of the Charter, these add to the debate as to
whether self-determination is now a legal right. 9 By its
Charter, resolutions, and Covenants, the United Nations has
formalized self-determination as an important principle of in-
ternational law. It pressured colonial powers to give up their
colonies in the Sixties and Seventies.39 But the present selective
self-determination may still be more of a political doctrine
than a legal right. A succinct summary of the present effective-
ness of the concept is that it has
historically depended upon the particular area and the particular
peoples involved. It has never been universally applied and is
more an ideological weapon than a practical political device. As
a general principle of international law it has secured wide-
spread acceptance. As a fundamental human right it is even now
a questionable doctrine."
One important additional problem with the doctrine, crucial to
the Sahara situation, is the treatment of very small territories,
or mini-states, when the question of self-determination arises.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that an entity must
meet four criteria before it can be said to be a state: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government;
and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.32
With the decrease in the number of large colonies, mini-
territories, which often do not fulfill all of these requirements,
constitute the majority of non-self-governing territories. Upon
becoming free, mini-states do not resemble the classic nation-
state. They need services from the outside world, technical and
political advice, and status, involving at least direct access to
the United Nations, if not membership. 33 There is some feeling
that, having rejected trusteeship and colonialism, these mini-
29. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 81.
30. Note, supra note 25, at 558.
31. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 91. For an application of the doctrine to the
Bangladesh conflict, see Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic
Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM.
J. INT'L L. 321 (1972).
32. Cohen, The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 1127, 1129 (1961).
33. Fisher, The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs, 62 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PROC. 164, 167 (1968).
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states should choose a new form of association with the United
Nations, in lieu of independence." At the present time, how-
ever, the U.N. Committee of 24, which deals with such ques-
tions, has "strongly tended to equate the proper exercise of the
right of self-determination with a decision for independence." 35
A Mini-State Committee, established by the United Nations in
1969, has held no meetings since 1971, an indication of the fact
that the issue of mini-state membership in the United Nations
has lost its urgency for the present; it is thought that many
small territories will desire a status less than full independ-
ence, and membership.3 1 This does not, however, speak to the
question of how mini-territories are to be dealt with, whether
they desire independence or not.
The United Nations has expressed its desire that the
choice of self-determination be free and informed. As to free-
dom of choice, the United Nations has supervised plebiscites,
or attempted to determine ex post facto the validity of elections
bearing on the issue. An informed choice is much more difficult
to implement, the colonial powers being reluctant to let the
United Nations discuss the matter with the inhabitants of their
territories. 37 The process of self-determination for the Spanish
Sahara, as revealed by formal resolutions and informal activi-
ties, is a good case study of the application of the principle to
a complex and difficult situation.
By its Resolution 2072 of December 15, 1965, the General
Assembly requested the Government of Spain
to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of
the territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domina-
tion and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems
relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories.U
In Resolution 2354 of December 19, 1967, the Assembly invited
the Administering Power to determine at the earliest possible
date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people
of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of
34. Bowett, Self-Determination and Political Rights in the Developing Countries,
60 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 129, 135 (1966).
35. Emerson, supra note 22, at 470.
36. Gunter, The Problems of Ministate Membership in the United Nations Sys-
tem: Recent Attempts Towards a Solution, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 464, 484 (1973).
37. Rapoport, The Participation of Ministates in International Affairs, 62 AM.
Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 155, 158 (1968).
38. Esfandiary, Comments, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 164, 172 (1968).
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Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, the pro-
cedures for the holding of a referendum under U.N. auspices with
a view to enabling the indigenous population of the territory to
exercise freely its right to self-determination. 31
Although this resolution reaffirms the right to self-
determination, there is no reference to territorial integrity or
independence in it.'" This may be explained by the fact that
the Spanish Sahara was considered partly as a colonial en-
clave, because of its sparse nomadic population possessing very
little understanding of concepts such as territory and sover-
eignty, and partly as a territory large enough for independence
if not for its small population. Were it not for its character as
a colonial enclave, interested parties would not have been
granted standing for referendum negotiations, but had it been
considered only a colonial enclave, no plebiscite would have
been recommended at all.4
The Sahara's right to independence as a mini-state, made
questionable by United Nations resolutions and its own scanty
population, is further complicated by the differing views of the
interested parties to the dispute. President Boumedienne of
Algeria has stated that his country has no territorial claims to
the area, but wants to insure that independence actually oc-
curs. "Algeria, which accepted the principle of self-
determination when it was at the peak of its own armed revolu-
tion, cannot abandon this principle now."42 King Hassan of
Morocco vehemently disagrees with this assessment. He has
stated that "it is unthinkable for the Sahara to be independent,
and it will not be as long as one Moroccan remains alive. By
bringing it back to Morocco we make it independent; by letting
it become independent we prepare for another colonization.
The only independence for the Sahara is to be rejoined to the
mother country."4 Morocco has opposed a referendum on the
grounds that the majority of the population is nomadic, and
would be largely absent from the territory at any one time. This
would leave the sedentary population to vote, which Morocco
believes is mostly either of Spanish stock or pro-Algerian."
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id.
41. SUREDA, supra note 15, at 215.
42. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 10.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id.
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Perhaps the most important, if often ignored, views are
those of the people of the Sahara, who are divided on the shape
their future should take. The Sahoul National Union Party
(PUNS), created by the Spanish, is of little current influence,
but there is now a rivalry between the Algerian-supported
Frente Polisario (Sahara Popular Liberation Front) and the
Moroccan-supported FLUS (United Liberation Forces of the
Sahara)." Frente Polisario is demanding total independence
and self-determination, without supervision from neighboring
states. Its membership is broadly based, and it is thought to
be widely supported by the population. Oali Mustapha Siyed,
Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, has stated that he may
be willing to accept a U.N. referendum, but only on his terms."
As of March 21, 1976, Saharans who had remained in
Aiun, the capital of the new territory of Western Sahara, after
the takeover by Morocco and Mauritania, stated that they
strongly opposed any overseer for the territory. They expressed
no reluctance to take weapons from Algeria, and, one said,
"we'll keep fighting for independence until the last Saharan is
wiped off the desert."47 These were ordinary people of the terri-
tory, perhaps the final arbiters of their country's fate. What-
ever the final result, it indicates that self-determination is not
an easily applied principle, whether a legal right or merely a
political doctrine. Like all principles of international law, it
constantly needs reevaluation in the light of such events as the
march on the Sahara.
B. Aggression and Coercion
It has been said that colonialism is permanent aggression,
and therefore that colonialists not only have no rights with
respect to their territories, but also have no standing to protest
any aggression aimed at the liberation of those territories." The
issue cannot be disposed of so easily, however. The recent
United Nations Definition of Agression, other official pro-
nouncements, and theories of nonviolent coercion need to be
examined before the unique Sahara march can be defined, and
these theories tested.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id.
47. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
48. Emerson, supra note 22, at 465.
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The concept of aggression "presently incorporates such an
expansive set of moral, legal, and political connotations so as
to be essentially devoid of conceptual clarity."" Nonetheless,
attempts began to define the concept in the 1930's with the
League of Nations. The lack of such a definition made determi-
nation of the legality of State action extremely difficult. The
United Nations Charter contains several references to the use
of force. Article 2(4) requires all members to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State
.... ." The one exception to this rule is in Article 51, which
preserves "the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations. . . ." Usually, wars of "agitation, infiltration
and subversion" carried on by national liberation movements
are considered to be too small to be effectively dealt with by
Article 51. 0 Although Article 39 calls for examination by the
Security Council of any "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression," the United Nations has usually
intervened only when overt hostilities have occurred. Interven-
tion of tribunals such as the International Court of Justice
usually occurs after the overt hostilities have ceased. 51
As the responses of international institutions are not im-
mediate, national officials must often act without their guid-
ance when aggression is threatened or occurs. As neither the
direct participants nor the international bodies had sufficient
guidelines for their actions, a definition of aggression was seen
as a necessity, and efforts continued by the United Nations.
The 1973 attempt recognized for the first time that a listing of
aggressive acts should include indirect forms of aggression.
There was much disagreement as to the relationship between
the lawful use of force and the right of self-determination."2
The United Nations Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, and subsequently the General Assem-
49. Comment, The United Nations Definition of Aggression: A Preliminary
Analysis, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 171, 172 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
50. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 812 (1970).
51. Comment, supra note 49, at 181.
52. Ferencz, Defining Aggression-The Last Mile, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
430, 432 (1973).
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bly, finally approved a Definition of Aggression in 1974.13 Sev-
eral provisions of both the Preamble and the substantive arti-
cles are of direct relevance to the issue at hand. Paragraph 6
of the Preamble reaffirms "the duty of States not to use armed
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination,
freedom, and independence, or to disrupt territorial integrity."
The next paragraph reaffirms
that the territory of a State shall not be violated by being the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other mea-
sures of force taken by another State in contravention of the
Charter, and that it shall not be the object of acquisition by
another State resulting from such measures or the threat thereof.
Article 1 contains the generic definition of aggression:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another
State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, as set out in this definition."
In an explanatory note, it is stated that the term "state" is used
"without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a
State is a member of the United Nations," and that the term
"includes the concept of a 'group of states' where applicable.""
By Article 2 of the definition, "the first use of armed force
by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression," although the
Security Council may decide that the presumption is rebutted
by other circumstances, including the fact that the situation is
not "of sufficient gravity." 11 The word "armed" indicates that
only the most serious coercive situations are covered by the
definition. "The implicit dimension reflected in this compro-
mise is the ever present problem of achieving international
consensus in a context which has significant political
implications. ,,57
Acts which constitute aggression are listed in Article 3 of
the definition. Among these are territorial invasion or attack,
and any resulting occupation or annexation; and indirect ag-
53. See Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression,
29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
Special Committeel; Comment, supra note 49, at 171.
54. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 53, at 11.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Comment, supra note 49, at 190.
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gression, meaning one state allowing its territory to be used by
another for an aggressive act against a third state, or the send-
ing of armed bands to perpetrate armed force against another
state. 8 Article 5 declares that "No consideration of whatever
nature, whether political, economic, military, or otherwise,
may serve as a justification for aggression," and further states
that "No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting
from aggression are or shall be recognized as lawful." Article 7
reaffirms the right of self-determination."
As a test of this Definition of Aggression, the uniqueness
of the Moroccan march demands flexibility of interpretation.
Although the use of the term "armed" throughout the defini-
tion may be only an indicator of the level of aggression, rather
than an explicit requirement for it, the unarmed Moroccans do
not, at a superficial level, fit the definition at all. It can be
claimed, however, that the purpose of the march was, to some
extent, to deprive the people of the territory of "their right to
self-determination, freedom, and independence .... ",0
Though they were actually present in the territory for only
three days, the marchers might have constituted a "military
occupation," and the territory most certainly was "the object
of acquisition by another State ... "6, If the unarmed aspect
is ignored, the generic definition contained in Article 1 can be
seen as applicable to the incident, especially as the caveat to
the Article decreases the importance of the fact that the Span-
ish Sahara was not an independent state at the time of the
march.
Although there were Spanish troops waiting for the march-
58. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 53, at 37, 40; Comment, supra
note 49, at 194.
59. Article 7 reads as follows:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3, could in any
way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence,
as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and
referred to in the Declaration of Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial or
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these
peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accord-
ance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration.
60. Para. 6 of Preamble to Definition.
61. Para. 7 of Preamble to Definition.
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ers inside the border of the Sahara, the Moroccans committed
the first forceful act, which constituted prima facie evidence of
aggression under Article 2 of the definition. Under Article 3, the
act could be seen as a territorial invasion ultimately resulting
in annexation, or as indirect aggression, by the sending of, in
this case unarmed, bands to perpetrate force against another
state. Article 5 recognizes neither political nor economic con-
siderations as justifications for aggression. If this was indeed
aggression, King Hassan's reasons for his action, which were
entirely political and economic, are unusable as justifications.
Furthermore, his "territorial acquisition" and the "special ad-
vantage" which he gained are not recognized as lawful under
the same Article.6 2
Finally, Article 7, a strong statement of the right to self-
determination and an important exception to the prohibition
of aggression, is condemnatory of the Moroccan march if it is
seen as an action taken to suppress the self-determination of
the Saharans. The Frente Polisario and Algeria would certainly
view it in this way. If seen as an action taken to preserve the
independence of the Saharans, however, the march would be
an exception to the prohibition of aggression. Morocco and
Mauritania, using Hassan's unique interpretation of independ-
ence, would support this view. As can be seen from this analy-
sis, the Definition of Aggression is helpful, but not fully applic-
able to this particular situation. Other theoretical formula-
tions, some of them amplifications of Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter, may be useful in delineating the aggressive
and coercive aspects of the Moroccan march.
If one looks at the march as more of a test of nerve than a
test of force, a brinksmanship theory provides an interesting
analysis. In brinksmanship, a contest of nerves, there is a
premium on "the quick fait accompli that leaves the other side
the choice of acquiescing or initiating some large act of violence
... .If one can arrange it so that the last clear chance to avert
disaster falls to the adversary, he is the one who is deterred
.. "'3 This is a precise description of the tactic that Hassan
used in gaining a diplomatic advantage while his adversaries
62. Article 5 of Definition.
63. Schelling, The Threat of Violence in International Affairs, 57 AM. Soc. INT'L
L. PROC. 103, 106 (1973).
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were understandably reluctant to start a full-scale war in re-
sponse to his action. An additional aspect of the theory is that
what is in dispute is not only the immediate aim of the action,
but also the expectations of the parties concerned about the
future behavior of each participant.64 Hassan no doubt knew
that he would not gain the Spanish Sahara by means of his
unarmed marchers, but he successfully demonstrated the un-
yielding strength of his desire for the territory.
The marchers themselves may be considered as volun-
teers, or as an armed band, in the application of established
theory. As volunteers, their actions would not have been con-
sidered aggression by the state of their origin if they had been
merely mercenaries. However, they were recruited, and the
"government exhortation" precluded their nation's exclusion
from the principle of aggression.15 The marchers fit more pre-
cisely into the definition of an armed band, if, again, their
unarmed status is overlooked. Under this theory, "the organi-
zation, with governmental complicity, of armed bands of
emigres or other irregular groups on national territory, for in-
cursion into the territory of another State or States" consti-
tutes aggression.6 There are numerous treaty and municipal
law provisions dealing with frontier raiding by such bands, and
the prohibition of hostile expeditions is viewed as a legal duty
in State practice. 7 Thus, it would seem that Hassan's marchers
violated an international norm, as well as part of the formal
Definition of Aggression.
It has been suggested that Article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter may be flexible enough, itself, to apply to coer-
cion other than traditional armed force. Subversion or partici-
pation in internal struggle for power, if the intervention threat-
ens the political independence of the victim, would seem to be
as much a prohibited use or threat of force as an armed at-
64. Id.
65. Brownlie, Volunteers and the Law of War and Neutrality, 5 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 570, 571 (1956).
66. Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L &
COMp. L. Q. 712, at 712 (1958).
67. Id. at 724. See e.g., Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between Iraq and
Transjordan, Apr. 14, 1947, 23 U.N.T.S. 147; Agreement for Friendship and Neigh-
borly Relations between the United Kingdom on behalf of the Sheikh of Koweit and
Saudi Arabia, Apr. 20, 1942, 10 U.N.T.S. 117; Treaty of Friendship between Egypt and
Yemen, Sept. 27, 1945, 9 U.N.T.S. 373.
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tack. 8 More strongly stated, the interpretation of "force" as
including political and economic coercion is a necessary inter-
pretation "in view of the potentially disastrous consequences
that may attend a rigid adherence to the narrower prohibition
of simple armed force.""9 This theory recognizes hierarchies of
coercion in its nature, its intensity, and its purpose. As to its
nature, there are three levels: military force; intermediate coer-
cion, including ideological persuasion and the fomenting of
civil strife by organized bands; and economic and political
coercion, including diplomacy, boycotts, and embargoes. A
judgment on the permissibility of such action must take into
account the intensity of the coercion "in relation to the in-
tended goal and the degree of provocation," and the purpose
of the coercion, as the Charter allows the resort to force only
in self-defense or as part of a United Nations enforcement ac-
tion. 0
If these hierarchies of coercion are recognized, the analysis
of aggression and coercion becomes much more flexible, and
Article 2(4) remains effective as "a behavioral norm." The cur-
rent necessity for this may be seen by the search for a definition
of aggression, international treaties that refer to non-military
coercion, and General Assembly resolutions that do the same.7'
For example, the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissability of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protec-
tion of Their Independence and Sovereignty states that "no
State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind."12 The inclu-
sion of economic and political coercion within Article 2(4)'s
proscription may thus be seen as an increasingly perceived
necessity "to develop among nations a commitment to refrain
from these forms of force. '7 3
68. Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International
Law, 57 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 147, 158 (1963).
69. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 988 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Nonviolent Coercion].
70. Id. at 992.
71. Id. at 999.
72. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
73. Nonviolent Coercion, supra note 69, at 1006.
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Applied to the Sahara situation, this theory allows a more
subtle and relevant analysis than the simple armed
force/noncoercion dichotomy. In the hierarchies of coercion, the
march can be classified as political coercion, with enough in-
tensity to threaten a full-scale war and with the intention to
annex a territory, and as having an impermissible purpose,
being neither a defensive nor a U.N. enforcement action. Al-
though certainly not a typical confrontation, the Moroccan
march may be indicative of a modern trend, recognized by
treaties and resolutions, towards the use of nonviolent coercion
by smaller states who, by virtue of their relative lack of military
power, must turn to other means to attain their perhaps unlaw-
ful goals. If international law is to remain an important influ-
ence on the world order, it must be flexible enough to define
and deal with such disruptive behavior as the march on the
Sahara.
C. "Non-Legal" Factors in International Law
There are several factors influencing the meaning and ap-
plication of international law which have a particular bearing
on the case at hand. These include collective psychology and
the dynamics of non-Western societies and new states.
The closest historical analogy to the Saharan march, in
terms of its psychological dynamics, is the medieval Crusades.
A reaction to them would fit the march as well: "One marvels
at the fantastic heights of devotion to which old and young,
rich and poor, well-born and base-born were occasionally able
to ascend."74 Other manifestations of collective psychology
have emerged throughout history, witch-burnings and revolu-
tionary mobs among them, and they have influenced interna-
tional law in several ways. Crowd actions have initiated contro-
versies and have influenced the identification of the parties to
the dispute, their claims, the justifications for the claims, and
the ultimate outcome. 5 Collective psychological factors have
particularly influenced crises connected with the emergence of
nation-states. They may arise spontaneously, or be incited by
a charismatic leader. Political elites may protect their own
74. Lasswell, The Impact of Crowd Psychology Upon International Law, 9 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 664, 665 (1968).
75. Id. at 669.
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positions by directing frustration and hatred toward foreign
targets.76
Although carefully managed by King Hassan, the march
was a true exercise in crowd psychology. The crowds of Moroc-
cans who answered his exhortation may not have had any
inkling of the precise political reason for the march, but the
call to a crusade was too exciting for thousands of them to
resist. Their collective psychology was a major factor in the
delineation of the dispute and its ultimate outcome. And Has-
san's reign, which had never been particularly secure, gained
a measure of support far greater than it had ever known, as the
frustrations of the Moroccan people were directed toward an
entrancing vision of national glory.
Another important factor in the genesis of the march may
have been the ethnic and political composition of the partici-
pant nations. As a traditional Islamic monarchy, "the inter-
play of politics in Morocco is characterized by a marked ambi-
guity" of objectives. Islam and traditional values often are used
to justify these ambiguous goals.77 The essential Moroccan ter-
ritorial thesis, for example, equates the old Islamic tradition of
the community owing allegiance to a particular descendant of
ancient rulers and the modern theory of the nation-state." On
the other hand, Algeria is an emerging leader of the Third
World, an Islamic nation, but committed to socialism and
modernization. It may not be possible for such opposing politi-
cal systems to successfully settle territorial disputes without
violence or threats.
As newly-independent and non-Western states, the partic-
ipants in the dispute may be expected to apply international
law and norms differently than a long-established Western
European state would. The recently emerged African states
tend to approach international law conservatively. Regional
disputes are usually resolved through political processes rather
than by means of international law.7" When they do accede to
international legal principles, it is the result of a careful choice,
76. Id. at 677.
77. M. BRETT, NORTHERN AFRICA: ISLAM AND MODERNIZATION 125 (1973).
78. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 98.
79. Spencer, The Impact of International Law on Political and Social Processes
Within the African Context, 66 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 56, at 56 (1972).
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rather than automatic acceptance. The concept of sovereignty
is of great importance, and they are reluctant to accept any
limitation of it. Their attitude toward international organiza-
tions is ambivalent, as they often need advice from outside
sources, but they are reluctant to become dependent on such
aid. 8 0
As to the sources of international law, new states are un-
willing to accept rules of state succession, which "provide that
a new state is bound by all the general rules of international
law which were in force at the time of its creation, regardless
of their source."'" Treaties are generally more acceptable than
customary international law. The "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" and unilateral acts of organi-
zations such as the General Assembly are important as sources
of law because the new nations can more easily contribute to
the development of international law by these means. 2 As to
the subjects of international law, most new states do not sup-
port the recognition of individuals as such, fearing the encour-
agement of secessionist groups. The concept of territory is val-
ued as a legal shield against incursions from the outside. There
is a liberal attitude toward recognition, which usually does not
arise except for former colonies. The doctrine of state responsi-
bility is unacceptable as "a cloak for imperialism by investor
countries." 3 Because of this selective interpretation of interna-
tional law, the newly-independent states are reluctant to ac-
cept compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies.
The acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction "implies the accept-
ance of the substantive rules." Without the possibility of appli-
cation by an adjudicative organ, the rules themselves lose
value. 4
International law began as a body of generalizations from
state behavior in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Euro-
pean state system. If these generalizations are allowed to be-
come moral ideals which states must be forced to accept, it will
become totally inapplicable to the present world order. In-
80. Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law:
An Outline, 8 How. L. J. 75, 103 (1962).
81. Id. at 105.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Id. at 114.
84. Id. at 119.
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stead, international law should be viewed as consisting of "the
patterns in state behavior that exist in a particular place at a
particular time and which have no necessary moral status."85
Norms are likely to remain stable if there is a low level of social
change, but the rate of change has greatly accelerated since the
principles of international law were first formulated. In order
to adjust to the quickly changing world, the international legal
system must never assume that contemporary political and
social processes are constants, to which a body of law may be
steadfastly and permanently applied."
In their choice of international legal theories, norms, and
institutions, the non-Western, newly-independent states not
only demonstrate an increasing skill at adapting an essentially
foreign legal system to their own situations, but also illustrate
the need for international law to keep abreast of social and
political currents. The participants in the Sahara incident ex-
hibited this selective application of international law in their
attitudes toward the independence and self-determination of
the Spanish Sahara, and especially in their vacillation with
regard to the use of international organizations such as the
United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The
effectiveness of these organizations in dealing with the problem
presented to them by these non-Western states is another as-
pect which needs to be examined.
D. International Organizations
The announcement of the march on the Sahara was made
almost immediately after the International Court of Justice
announced that Morocco had no valid legal claim to the terri-
tory. Of course, the march had been planned for several weeks
previously, but the timing indicates both the importance of the
decision and the International Court's effectiveness as an arbi-
ter of international disputes.
That the dispute came before the Court at all is an excep-
tional circumstance. A state's decision to accept jurisdiction of
the Court is a political one, influenced by certain aspects of
international law and society. 7 Several factors inhibit recourse
85. Barkun, International Norms as Facts and Ideals, 66 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC.
39, 42 (1972).
86. Id. at 46.
87. Merrills, The Justiciability of International Disputes, 47 CAN. B. REV. 241, 242
(1969).
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to the International Court. The possibility of an adverse verdict
cannot be accepted when vital interests are at stake. A state
which loses its case not only has had its legal arguments de-
feated, but its political position has thereby been weakened. If
international law is seen by the states concerned as a reflection
of European values, this may lead them to reject settlement by
the application of that law. 8 It may be a greater advantage for
one party to take possession of the subject matter of the dispute
by an exercise of power. Finally, it may be a severe disadvan-
tage to the state to have the legal merits of its case publicly
determined. In short, compulsory jurisdiction "circumscribes a
State's freedom of action." 9
Although political questions are ordinarily regarded as not
justiciable by the Court, it may be more helpful to consider the
political nature of the Court itself. Article 92 of the United
Nations Charter constitutes the International Court as the
"principal judicial organ" of the United Nations, thus making
it an integral part of a political phenomenon. 0 The separation
of international disputes into political and legal ones, by this
theory, is itself artificial, as they are all at least partially politi-
cal. The nature of the Court's political task, a difficult one,
may thus be seen as
isolation of the legal problem from the political circumstances in
which it originates; consequent reduction of tensions between
states; and solution of the legal problem on the bases of objective
and even abstract examinations, to the exclusion of all political,
moral, or extralegal considerations.9'
While the Court has almost unlimited power to answer a
request on any legal question, the propriety of rendering an
opinion when noncompliance is a certainty may be questiona-
ble.9 2 Compliance with its decisions is a major problem for the
Court, which by its nature as an international tribunal has no
power of action against nations. Enforcement of its judgment
rests with the Security Council by Article 94 of the Charter.93
88. Id. at 256.
89. Id. at 268.
90. Doeker, International Politics and the International Court of Justice, 35 TUL.
L. REV. 767, 773 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Doeker].
91. Id. at 785.
92. Schwartz, The International Court's Role as an Advisor to the United Nations,
37 B.U. L. REV. 404, 427 (1957).
93. Deutsch, Problems of Enforcement of Decrees of International Tribunals, 50
A.B.A.J. 1134, 1135 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Deutsch].
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However, a violation of the Court's decree by invasion of dis-
puted territory would unquestionably constitute aggres-
sion-to the breach of international peace would be added the
violation of a precedent judicial adjudication. Therefore, while
it has no power of enforcement of its own, the Court by its
decision aids in delineating the extent of the aggression. 4
It is difficult to understand why Morocco initiated the
process of submitting the Saharan issue before the Court. Sev-
eral of the inhibiting factors were present-the interests at
stake made an adverse verdict unacceptable, and the Moroc-
can political position would have been severely weakened if it
were not for the march. An exercise of power became of much
greater advantage. If Hassan had chosen to follow the Court's
opinion, his freedom of action would have ceased to exist. Al-
though the Court treated the dispute as a legal issue, it was
never depoliticized sufficiently by the parties involved to per-
mit them to accept an objective examination. Particularly in
this case, the probability of noncompliance was so great as to
make the Court's deliberations an exercise in futility. However,
it did add to the strength of the characterization of the march
as an aggression.
Although the United Nations, as an international political
organization, would seem to be better equipped to deal with
highly politicized situations, its response to and effectiveness
in this incident are indicative of several problems.
It was originally intended by the United Nations Charter
that the General Assembly would be limited primarily to rec-
ommendatory powers. In recent years the Assembly has taken
on more responsibility as the Security Council "has failed to
promote the aims of the Charter" due to the frequent use of the
veto and the antagonisms between East and West." The fre-
quent General Assembly resolutions on such issues as aggres-
sion and self-determination have been a powerful tool in shap-
ing international norms. Although not binding, in certain con-
texts a series of resolutions "assumes a prescriptive or quasi-
legislative role by generating a consensus that it constitutes a
source of law binding on all parties."9 The Security Council
94. Id. at 1136.
95. Note, supra note 25, at 550.
96. Id. at 552.
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has also been reluctant to submit requests to the International
Court of Justice for advisory opinions, but again, the General
Assembly has seen fit to use this method of problem-solving.
Advisory opinions are not binding, but they are of great pres-
tige and often politically persuasive. 7 In dealing with self-
determination questions, the United Nations has particular
difficulties, due to the fact that states are almost always the
only international persons recognizable by it. Unless individu-
als are recognized, it is practically impossible to hear griev-
ances of secessionist groups and oppressed minorities. 8
The enforcement process is the most important, and the
most problem-ridden, of the United Nations' functions. The
attitude in which the U.N. delegations approach the task of
enforcement, the unavailability of information as to the merits
of each party's case, and the limitations of time "all militate
against an informed and dispassionate examination of the legal
obligations of the parties," with the aim of determining which
party violated the law. 9 The Security Council or General As-
sembly may call upon nations to refrain from aiding or furnish-
ing supplies to the participants in a conflict, and may protest
excessive force, even if used in self-defense.""° After the Interna-
tional Court of Justice renders an opinion, enforcement by the
Security Council "is, in effect, a new dispute to be resolved
politically." The Security Council may, by examination of the
entire political setting of the dispute, decide that the weight of
the judicial decree is less than that of other considerations. 0'
The Security Council's enforcement function is discretionary,
not obligatory. One possible, although extreme, measure would
be the enforcement of Article 5 of the Charter, which states:
A member of the United Nations against which preventive or
enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may
be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of
membership by the General Assembly on recommendation of the
Security Council. 01
97. Doeker, supra note 90, at 785.
98. Note, supra note 25, at 558.
99. Baxter, The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force Under the
Charter, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 68, 71 (1968).
100. Id. at 74.
101. Deutsch, supra note 93, at 1135.
102. See id. at 1139.
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Although this last enforcement measure might seem rather
harsh, it would be applicable to Morocco, against which pre-
ventive action had been taken. The Security Council had
called on the parties to avoid unilateral action before the march
occurred, and had the Secretary-General intensify negotia-
tions. During the march, the Security Council requested Mo-
rocco to immediately withdraw from the area.'0 3 Although the
marchers did almost immediately withdraw, it was clearly not
as a result of United Nations' pressure, but because of the
impending confrontation with Spanish troops. The Security
Council's actions did not fully support the International
Court's opinion, as the effort was to negotiate a settlement
between all of the interested parties, ignoring the opinion's
conclusion that Morocco and Mauritania had no legal claim to
the Spanish Sahara. As pointless as a stricter stance might
have been, it remains that the United Nations had almost no
effect on either the confrontation or the ultimate resolution of
the dispute-Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania came to the
agreement among themselves.
IV. CONCLUSION
The key to the Spanish Sahara incident, in terms of its
impact on international law, is the measure of success that
Morocco enjoyed. Amidst vehement protests from a more pow-
erful neighbor, and strongly worded requests from the major
international organizations, Hassan finally received the
valuable piece of desert that he had desired for so long. The
march is a symbol of his victory; it is also a measure of the
applicability of international law and the effectiveness of inter-
national institutions.
If it is not now a definitive legal right, self-determination
is at least a vitally important legal and political principle. Es-
pecially in this highly politicized situation, the implementa-
tion of self-determination would seem to be a highly desired
goal, even if independence were not the final result. Instead,
the march and its repurcussions effectively blocked the Sahar-
ans from exercising, at least for the present, their right of self-
determination.
Although there is still some difficulty in applying theories
103. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1975, at 13, col. 1.
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of aggression and coercion to the march, the new Definition of
Aggression and recent delineations of nonviolent coercion have
increased the flexibility of the concept. The march was an act
of aggression in the intensity of its political coerciveness, al-
though arrival at this conclusion is made more difficult by the
Definition's insistence on "armed" force.
In addition to prompting traditional legal analysis, the
march demonstrates the applicability of theories formulated
outside the legal framework. Collective psychology, economics,
history, and the cultural and political background of new states
all shape the way in which international incidents manifest
themselves. A long-established Western state would not spon-
sor a crusade, but the march was a logical extension of the
dynamics of Moroccan society.
The United Nations and the International Court of Jus-
tice, as the major vehicles for the application of international
law, have had mixed success in dealing with international
crises. As formulators of international doctrine by way of reso-
lutions and opinions, they have an impressive record; as enfor-
cers of that doctrine, the record is much less impressive. Their
failure to affect the aftermath of the march strongly suggests
the problems in regard to enforcement.
Recommendations are not easily made, as all of these
problems are complex and elusive. However, four general
suggestions can be made, corresponding to the four problem
areas:
1. Continuing efforts should be made to insure that the Sahar-
ans will be afforded the opportunity to determine their own fu-
ture. More generally, U.N. attempts at arranging self-
determination referendums should not be halted by the "one-
time-only" principle or any other inhibiting factor. Disallowing
secession may be comforting to new elites, but it should be imper-
missible as a principle of international law.
2. As a codification of an international legal norm, the Defini-
tion of Aggression is a useful tool. However, it should be broad-
ened to include unarmed force, using as a guide recent theories
of nonviolent coercion. Incidents such as the march may then be
more quickly determined to be aggression, and responded to with
greater decisiveness.
3. An effort should be made to make international law more
responsive to nation-states with perspectives differing from those
upon which international law was founded. It will then be easier
to determine what nation-state behavior to anticipate, and
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whether that behavior violates not merely Western norms, but
basic international norms as well.
4. The United Nations and the International Court of Justice
should work together in their decision-making processes. If the
International Court continues to accept highly politicized dis-
putes, the United Nations should at least follow the Court's deci-
sion in its own actions, if for no other reason than to preserve the
Court's credibility. And in its own actions, the United Nations
should escalate its responses to such incidents by being less hesi-
tant to brand aggression as such, and by maintaining pressure for
more equitable solutions than the present arrangement in the
Sahara.
That Hassan was able to do what he did signifies not only
the imaginativeness of his tactic; it serves as a warning to the
international legal system to maintain the utmost flexibility in
dealing with the quickly changing international order. There
may never again be another crusade, but there will be other
challenges to take the place of the march on the Sahara.
Abigail Byman*
* B.A., 1974, Carleton College; J.D. candidate, University of Denver.
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The Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe: Implications for Soviet-American
Ddtente
I. INTRODUCTION
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE, and formerly known as the European Security Confer-
ence),' which was held in Helsinki, Finland from July 30 to
August 1, 1975, prompted heated discussion both of the terms
of the Final Act of the Conference and the policy of detente,
as pursued by the Ford Administration.2 Since the late summer
of 1975, however, the Conference has all but disappeared as a
focus for public discussions and as a consideration in the for-
eign policy of the United States.
1. The term Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe refers to both the
meeting of heads of state and government in Helsinki and to the lengthy process that
led up to it. Preparatory talks were held in 1972, while Stage I, a meeting of Foreign
Ministers, was held from July 3 to 7, 1973, at Helsinki. Stage II consisted of continuing
negotiations by national experts in Geneva, which ran from September 18, 1973 to July
21, 1975. Stage Ill was the meeting of heads of state and government in Helsinki from
July 30 to August 1, 1975, at which the Final Act, the product of more than two years
of bargaining, was signed by the 35 participating States: Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria;
Canada; Cyprus; Czechoslovakia; Denmark; Finland; France; German Democratic
Republic (GDR); Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); Greece; the Holy See; Hun-
gary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Malta; Monaco; the Nether-
lands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland;
Turkey; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.); the United Kingdom; the
United States; and Yugoslavia. The only European state not present was Albania.
The history of the CSCE can be found at M. PALMER, THE PROSPECTS FOR A EURO-
PEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as PALMER]; W. KLAIBER, L.
HADuK, J. HARNED, J. SATTLER & S. WASOWSKI, ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS Ch. 2, Apps. A-T
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS]; W. KULSKI, THE SOVIET UNION IN
WORLD AFAIms 112-16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as KULSKI]; Russell, The Helsinki
Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 261-62 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Russell]; Povolny, The Soviet Union and the European Security
Conference, 18 OiRis 200 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Povolny].
The complete text of the Final Act has been published at 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1293
(1975); and 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975). The Final Act was divided into "Baskets"
for negotiating and drafting purposes, and each has retained its distinct status, al-
though the Final Act is considered a single document.
2. For example, Senator Henry Jackson, a Democrat, called the Final Act "yet
another example of the sort of agreement that has become the hallmark of the Nixon-
Ford Administration." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 14. And Senator
James Buckley, a Conservative-Republican, asked, "What the devil is in it [the decla-
ration] for the West?" TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16. See also Buchanan, US. Weak, Blind,
Foolish in Agreeing to Divided Europe, Rocky Mountain News, July 29, 1975, at 27,
col. 1.
CSCE AND DETENTE
The present comment is premised on the belief that an
analysis of the background of the Conference and the terms of
the Final Act serves two valuable functions. President Ford
and Secretary Kissinger presented the CSCE as "a step in the
process of detente,"3 which is currently the subject of a great
deal of unstructured, unproductive debate within the govern-
ment-particularly the Congress-and among the general pub-
lic-especially in the context of a Presidential election year.
The author believes that the format and the provisions of the
Final Act of the CSCE provide an excellent framework within
which to, first, define the notion of detente, and then to gener-
ate useful, informed discussion of detente, its value and its
application.
Second, the Final Act, as was foreshadowed by its limited
invocation in the context of the Portugese unrest of 1975,' can
be an important weapon in the diplomatic arsenal of the
United States. Thus both the provisions of the Final Act, in
which the participating states agreed upon criteria by which to
judge each others' actions, and the forum for evaluation in a
follow-up conference in 1977, provide a basis for an active U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union, particularly in the human
rights field.
This comment will not deal with the question of whether
American participation in the CSCE was a good idea at the
time;, the United States has signed the Final Act, so the
question then must be, does it have value for U.S. policy, and
if so, how can it be used? In Section I, we shall examine some
of the significant provisions of the Final Act, while in Section
III, we shall analyze the legal, political and moral weight to be
3. U.S. Department of State, Briefing Paper: CSCE Background (mimeographed,
undated), at 4 [hereinafter cited as Briefing Paper].
4. Larrabee, The Soviet Union and the Final Act of the Helsinki Summit, paper
presented at a meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Feb. 23-24, 1976; reprinted
at CONG. REC. S6603 (daily ed. May 5, 1976).
5. It would be well at this point for the author to express his belief that on balance,
the Final Act is a good document, in the context of the relations of the period. Without
advocating linkage between them, the CSCE must be evaluated in light of the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
in Europe talks (MBFR), and the series of agreements on Germany and Berlin con-
cluded in 1970 to 1972. The West did not agree to anything of significance to which it
had not already agreed, and as we shall argue below, the potential for use of the Final
Act and the follow-up conference is great.
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attached to the Final Act. Finally, in Section IV, we shall for-
mulate some conclusions about the CSCE and about detente,
and make some recommendations for the future use of the
Final Act of the CSCE in American foreign policy.
II. THE FINAL ACT
A. Questions Relating to Security in Europe
The section of the Final Act relating to security questions,
the so-called Basket One,6 has received the most attention and
criticism, but in reality it is a rather unexceptional document.
Indeed, over time, the success or failure of the CSCE will prob-
ably be evaluated in terms of the implementation, or lack
thereof, of Baskets Two and Three, those dealing with econom-
ics, technical and scientific cooperation and with human con-
tacts.
While the provisions of Basket One, and particularly the
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Partici-
pating States, constitute an impressive statement of high in-
tentions, they are, with a few noteworthy exceptions, merely
reformulations of principles found in a number of multilateral
instruments, such as the United Nations Charter' and the U.N.
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations,8 and bilateral
instruments such as the Soviet-West German Treaty of 1970
and the Basic Principles of Relations between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
of 1972.10 To make this point is not to ignore the significance
of the reaffirmation of such principles in the context of a Euro-
pean security conference, for it is that political context which
gives the Final Act the political and symbolic importance it
has."
6. There are essentially four separate parts to Basket One: a Preamble, the Decla-
ration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, Matters Related
to Giving Effect to Certain of the Above Principles, and the Document on Confidence-
Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament.
7. Russell, supra note 1, at 261-62.
8. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as the Friendly Relations Declaration]. The Declaration is also
found in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (I. Brownlie ed. 1972).
9. L. WHETTEN, GERMANY'S OSTPOLITIK: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES 224 (1971).
10. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 756 (1972); 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 898 (1972).
11. President Ford continually stressed that "we are not committing ourselves
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The text of the Principles closely parallels the principles
enunciated in the U.N. Friendly Relations Declaration, which
was primarily a Soviet initiative to codify the notion of peace-
ful coexistence as a matter of international law." Indeed, sev-
eral principles are taken almost verbatim, with only stylistic
changes.
Principle I of the Final Act deals with the sovereign equal-
ity of states and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty,
such as juridical equality, territorial integrity, and political
independence.'3 Two parts of this principle deserve closer at-
tention. One is the sentence which states that "frontiers can be
changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful
means and by agreement." The significance of this provision
is seen in conjunction with Principle III, on the inviolability of
frontiers.
It has long been recognized that a paramount concern of
Soviet foreign policy has been the acceptance of existing fron-
tiers in Europe, in particular the Oder-Neisse line and the fron-
tier between the two Germanies.'4 Indeed, such an acknowl-
edgement has been linked with the idea of a European security
conference for years.'5 In Principle III, the Soviet Union ob-
tained recognition of this long-sought-after objective. It states:
"the Participating States regard as inviolable all one anothers'
frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and
therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assault-
ing these frontiers."'"
This principle, although sought for so long by the Soviets,
and criticized so loudly in the West, is, in essence, nothing the
beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and
by more formal treaty agreements, such as the U.N. Charter and Declaration of
Human Rights." U.S. NEwS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18.
12. R. HIGGINS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST 101-03, 166-70 (1965); McWhinney, The
"New" Countries and the "New" International Law: The United Nations' Special
Conference on Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 3 (1966).
13. Principle I. See Russell, supra note 1, at 263-64.
14. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 114; ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 55-57;
PALMER, supra note 1, at 18; Povolny, supra note 1, at 200.
15. Stressed by Leonid Brezhnev at both the 23rd and 24th Congress of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in 1966 and 1971. 23RD CONGRESS OF THE
CPSU 56 (1966); 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU 37 (1971); see also PALMER, supra note
1, at 5, 18.
16. Principle H. See Russell, supra note 1, at 250-53.
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parties have not heretofore accepted." The Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), which is the state most directly affected, ac-
cepted the principle in the legally binding treaties with the
Soviet Union, Poland and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR).'8 The United States, as well, at the time of President
Nixon's historic trip to Moscow in 1972, has accepted the no-
tion of "inviolability of frontiers" in Europe.'9 In addition to
the verbal commitments, Western practice for 30 years has
recognized the inability to change European frontiers. 0
What is new is the parallel recognition by the Soviet Union
of the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers, a provision
that was the sine qua non of West German participation in the
CSCE.Y This is seen as allowing a future reunification of Ger-
many. Since that prospect is received rather cooly from Wash-
ington to Paris to Moscow, the concession was of symbolic
rather than of actual political significance.2
Perhaps it would be best to state what Principle III does
not do, for meanings have been attached to the Final Act that
do not have any firm basis in its provisions. As much as the
Soviet Union would wish otherwise, the Final Act does not
constitute formal recognition of European frontiers, as would
a peace treaty. Western participants, and President Ford in
particular, have made this reading of the Final Act quite
clear.Y
Essentially, the two provisions mark acknowledgement of
the political reality that the risks inherent in keeping open the
option of non-peaceful challenges to existing frontiers are sim-
ply too great in a nuclear world, indeed, if such challenges were
17. Id. at 249.
18. W. KULSKI, GERMANY AND POLAND: FROM WAR TO PEACEFUL RELATIONS Chs. 8,
9 (1976); KULSKI, supra note 1, at 132-37.
19. Joint Communique issued after the visit of President Nixon to the Soviet
Union, May 29, 1972. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 899 (1972); N.Y. Times, May 30, 1972, at
18, col. 4.
20. See e.g., ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 61.
21. Russell, supra note 1, at 252-53; Schmidt, What Americans, Soviets Gain from
Helsinki Charter, Christian Science Monitor, July 21, 1975, at 1, col. 4; TIME, Aug. 4,
1975, at 21; Briefing Paper, supra note 3, at 3.
22. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 124-26; TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 21.
23. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18; Briefing Paper, supra note
3, at 3, 4. The Congress has reaffirmed this interpretation by passing S.Res. 406. CONG.
REc. 6599-6000 (daily ed. May 5, 1976).
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ever feasible.24 Officially, however, the United States main-
tains that only a formal peace treaty can definitively answer
questions dealing with Germany,25 and still refuses to recognize
incorporation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union."
The other frequent assertion about the effect of the Final
Act is that it legitimizes Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
For an analysis of this point, we must turn back to our consid-
eration of Principle I, and its relation to the infamous Brezhnev
Doctrine, by which the U.S.S.R. sought to justify its invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968.27 In essence, the doctrine holds that
socialist states have both a right and a duty to protect the gains
of socialism wherever threatened, by whatever means. It has
also been dubbed the doctrine of "limited sovereignty."
It was frequently stressed in the preparations for Helsinki
that the West should strive for at least an implicit repudiation
of the Brezhnev Doctrine.2s The provisions of Principle I do, in
effect, contradict the underpinnings of the doctrine. 9 In addi-
tion to the reference to sovereign equality, juridical equality,
territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence,
the principle states that the participating States "will also re-
spect each others' right freely to choose and develop its politi-
cal, social, economic and cultural systems. . . . ,30 In conjunc-
24. A perceptive analysis of American incapacity, and unwillingness, to challenge
the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is found in Harsch, Ford Prepares to "Ratify
Yalta, "Christian Science Monitor, July 25, 1975, at 26, col. 3. See also note 20, supra.
25. Briefing Paper, supra note 3, at 4.
26. President Ford in U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18; Schmidt,
supra note 21, at 19, col. 4.
27. The author believes this to be a misleading misnomer, in that the doctrine is
merely a new formulation-in public-of old policy, as evidenced tragically in Berlin
in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 313-39; J. KORBEL,
DETENTE IN EUROPE: REAL OR IMAGINARY? 101-03 (1972). Other useful treatments of the
doctrine are found in T. FRANCK & E. WEISAND, WORD POLMCS 33-40 (1972) and T.
WOLFE, SOvIET POWER AND EUROPE 1945-1970 at 383-85 (1970).
28. Povolny, supra note 1, at 201, 218; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1973, at 3, col. 6.
29. Russell, supra note 1, at 255-57; the Brezhnev Doctrine, however, has been
declared dead before. Schwebel, The Brezhnev Doctrine Repealed and Peaceful Coex-
istence Enacted, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 816 (1972). Like the reports of the death of Mark
Twain, the reports of the demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine are greatly exaggerated, in
the view of the author. One should have no doubts that if the Soviet Union perceived
a threat to its control in Europe, it would act just as it did in Berlin, in Hungary and
in Czechoslovakia, doctrine or no doctrine. Perhaps the area where the potential for
East-West conflict is greatest-and the reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine most
uncertain-is in Yugoslavia after Tito's death. ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at
60.
30. Principle I.
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tion with Principle VI, on the non-intervention in internal af-
fairs, "regardless of their mutual relations," and the statement
in the Preamble that the principles should govern relations
between states "irrespective of their political, economic or so-
cial systems,"3' this would seem to pre-empt the idea, basic to
the Brezhnev Doctrine, that relations between socialist coun-
tries are governed by different principles than those between
other states.32 While this interpretation should not be overesti-
mated33-such agreements inevitably fall when they conflict
with perceptions of vital national interest-its symbolic value
should be seen to be as great to the West as is that to the Soviet
Union of the inviolability principle. Just as the Soviets are
likely to use for propaganda purposes those provisions it favors,
so the West should use those provisions which by their terms
contradict the Brezhnev Doctrine.
The other Principles of the Declaration on Principles add
little that has not been previously agreed to. They speak of
refraining from the threat or use of force, 34 the territorial integ-
rity of states, 35 the peaceful settlement of disputes, 36 non-
31. Preamble, para. 5. See Povolny, supra note 1, at 225, for a discussion of Soviet
resistance to this provision. It should be noted that the Yugoslavs pushed this idea
strongly. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
32. On the concept of international law between socialist states, see G. TUNKIN,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 427-47 (W. Butler trans. 1974); KULSKI, supra note 1,
at 296-300; Lapenna, The Soviet Concept of "Socialist" International Law, in THE
YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1975 at 242 (1975); Shurshalov, International Law in
Relations among Socialist States, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (G. Tunkin
ed. 1969).
33. Secretary of State Kissinger apparently felt this interpretation to be valid. He
characterized General Secretary Brezhnev's Helsinki speech, which stressed non-
interference, as "conciliatory" and as pointing "both ways." It should be noted in this
regard that Brezhnev made no exceptions for socialist states in his speech. For the text
of his speech, see CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 27, 1975, at 12. See also
Russell, supra note 1, at 256 n.39; Osborne, Ford in Europe, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16 &
23, 1975, at 10; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1975, at 17-18; Denver Post, July 31, 1975, at 1,
col. 3; Denver Post, Aug. 10, 1975, at 10, col. 1.
34. Principle II. See ERA OF NEGOTATIONS, supra note 1, at 60-61; Russell, supra
note 1, at 264-65.
35. Principle IV. It is significant that this principle stresses that no occupation of
another state's territory is legal, which applies to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslova-
kia (not ratified by treaty until 1970, in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance, signed May 6, 1970. 735 U.N.T.S. 218). Russell, supra note 1, at
265-66. It is also contended that the "illegal" incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia by the Soviet Union are covered by this principle. Id. at 266. Cf. Mitchell &
Leonhard, Changing Soviet Attitudes toward International Law, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 227, 294 (1976).
36. Principle V. See Russell, supra note 1, at 266-67.
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intervention in internal affairs,3" equal rights and self-
determination of peoples," cooperation among states," and the
fulfilment in good-faith of obligations under international
law." Principle VII, on human rights, will be discussed infra.
The last important aspect of Basket One is the
'confidence-building" measures accepted by the participating
States.4' Originally proposed by Canada,42 and actively sup-
ported by Yugoslavia and Romania,43 they were opposed for a
time by the Soviet Union, but were accepted at a fairly early
stage in the preparatory discussions." These measures include
prior notification of military maneuvers, exchange of observers
and prior notification of major military movements.4 5 The ef-
fect of these "confidence-building" measures is by no means
clear, as they have been invoked only in limited circumstan-
ces.
46
B. Cooperation in Economics, Science, Technology and the
Environment
The provisions of Basket Two, although receiving perhaps
least attention of the provisions of the Final Act, may in the
long-run be among the most important results for the CSCE.
Cooperation in this area has been an agenda item proposed by
the Soviet Union since 1966. 41 In this light it has been suggested
37. Principle VI. See Russell, supra note 1, at 267-68. This principle should be
read in conjunction with Principle VII; thus, human rights are not exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of a state. Id. at 268.
38. Principle VIII. See Russell, supra note 1, at 269-70.
39. Principle IX. This principle recognizes the roles of "governments, institutions,
organizations and persons" in the promotion of cooperation among states (emphasis
added). The socialist states generally deny any applicability of international law to
individuals. Id. at 270.
40. Principle X. See Russell, supra note 1, at 270-71.
41. Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security
and Disarmament.
42. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1972, at 15, col. 5.
43. Sulzberger, A Cold Peace for a Cold War, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1972, at 31,
col. 6.
44. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 23, 1973, at 1, col.
1.
45. This last provision is heavily qualified, as the parties "may at their own
discretion" notify of such movements.
46. See report in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 9, 1976, at 28, 29.
47. Povolny, supra note 1, at 206. See generally M. GOLDMAN, DETENTE AND
DOLLARS (1975) [hereinafter cited as GOLDMAN]; Z. NAGORSKI, JR., THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF EAST-WEST TRADE (1974); S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE (1970); G. STEIBEL,
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for some time that a central reason for the Soviet desire for
detente is to obtain trade and technology from Western indus-
trialized countries." Economics and technical cooperation have
been NATO discussion topics since at least 1969.11
There is no general agreement as to the proper role that
trade and economic relations should-or can-play in the gen-
eral relations between states of differing social systems. Three
major positions can be identified, each of which achieves a
measure of support in the various analyses of detente.
The first position derives from the proposition that trade
is and/or should be used as a means to desired political ends.
This position is exemplified by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
to the Trade Act of 1974.50 The Trade Act, finally passed on
January 3, 1975,1' was designed to implement the Trade Agree-
ment of 1972, one of the major results of the Nixon-Brezhnev
summit of June 1972.5 The key provision was that granting
most-favored-nation (MFN) status 53 to the Soviet Union. The
Jackson Amendment, which passed with the Act, conditioned
such a grant, however, on a showing to the Congress by the
country seeking MFN status that free emigration was allowed
to all its citizens."4 The condition was, after some appearance
of acceptance, heatedly rejected by the Soviet Union, which
dismissed it as meddling in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R. 5
This position of "politicizing" trade is based upon a belief
DETENTE: PROMISES AND PITFALLS ch. 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STEIBEL]; ERA OF
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 61-66.
48. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 57-61; ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 61.
49. PALMER, supra note 1, at 14.
50. For the history of the Jackson Amendment, see V. PETROV, U.S.-SovIET DE-
TENTE: PAST AND FUTURE 18-23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PETROV]; STEIBEL, supra
note 47, at 39-45; Fitzpatrick, Soviet-American Trade, 1972-1974: A Summary, 15 VA.
J. INT'L L. 39, 67-68 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fitzpatrick]; Editor's Foreword,
Soviet-American Trade in a Legal Perspective, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 217-
18 (1975); 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 652 (1975). See also 18 ORais 630 (1974); 18 ORaIs 983,
987-90 (1975).
51. P.L. 93-618 (1975).
52. Fitzpatrick, supra note 50, at 40-43; PETROV, supra note 47, at 16.
53. On MFN status with the Soviet Union, see Usenko, Most-Favored-Nation
Treatmpnt in Soviet-American Trade Relations, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 243
(1975); Metzger, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment of Imports to the United States
from the US.S.R., 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 251 (1975); Fitzpatrick, supra note 50,
at 66-68.
54. Editor's Foreword, supra note 50, at 217.
55. Id. at 218; 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 652 (1975).
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that the fruits of the economic relations between the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A. are far greater for the former than for the latter.
Thus the argument runs that the chronically inefficient Soviet
economy requires infusions of technology, capital and goods
from the West, and that such infusions, while returning little
to the West, greatly strengthen Soviet power in the world as
well as improve the position of the leadership of the Soviet
Union domestically. 6 Therefore, one analyst has concluded,
"We should not help the Soviet Union economically and tech-
nologically unless we receive important political concessions in
return . . . ."s' Those concessions can be either in the sphere
of politics and security"8 or human rights. 59
This variation of Dr. Kissinger's famous "linkage" theory
was criticized recently in this JOURNAL by Professor Harold
Berman. He argued that the linkage is "only as strong as the
weakest link."" That is, in a linkage situation, a deterioration
in economic relations could lead to a deterioration in the politi-
cal sphere, as well as the inverse. He suggests that it would be
a mistake to allow economic fluctuations to inhibit political
relations, just as it would be a mistake to allow political ups
and downs to determine levels of economic intercourse.6 ' To do
so would be to return to the "anachronistic" policies of the
1950s.62
Two further points have been put forward in this regard.
First, Berman argues that there should be some symmetry be-
tween claims and responses in international relations, that the
latter should be appropriate to the former. It is his contention
that a policy as suggested above would be inappropriate and
asymmetrical. 3 Second, the fate of the Jackson Amendment
56. G. NUTTER, KISSINGER'S GRAND DESIGN 23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
NurrER]; Conquest, A New Russia? A New World?, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 482, 493 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Conquest].
57. Nu'rER, supra note 56, at 23.
58. Political concessions were suggested by NutrrER, supra note 56, at 23. The use
of trade for political concessions has been suggested by members of a Democratic study
group. Denver Post, Feb. 15, 1976, at 27, col. 2.
59. This is the approach upon which the Jackson Amendment was based.
60. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Politics in Trade Relations Between the
United States and the Soviet Union, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 231, 234 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Berman].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 234-35.
1976
132 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
certainly suggests that the Soviet leadership will be highly un-
likely to agree to such demands, depending of course on the
degree to which the Soviet Union needs the goods, credits or
technology in issue.64
The second major position on the role of trade is that it
should be carried out in a politics-free environment to the mu-
tual benefit of the parties; it is thus essentially a free trade
notion. Professor Berman has argued for this approach of con-
centrating on economic advantage-"regardless of how good or
bad our political relations may be and without the purpose of
securing particular political advantages." 5 At the heart of this
position is the concept of MFN status," which means essen-
tially that each trading partner should be treated equally.
Two main criticisms have been leveled at this position.
First, there are those, such as Robert Conquest, who contend
that such mutually profitable trade is impossible "for the
perfectly simple reason that Russia has practically nothing the
West needs" (emphasis in the original)." It is argued that there
is very little trade in the sense of a two-way flow of goods, but
rather deals like the grain deal which are goods for cash, or even
more often, goods and long-term credits to allow payment.
The second argument is that deals that are made, while
profitable for the individual corporation, are not necessarily
good for the United States.6 Conquest cites Lenin who alleg-
edly said of Western hemp manufacturers, "they would hap-
pily turn a fast buck by selling him the rope to hang them
with.",9
The third major position is that trade helps to bring about
closer relations, and perhaps, peace. 0 This is akin to the func-
64. Id. at 235; Fitzpatrick, supra note 50, at 66-67.
65. Berman, supra note 60, at 232. Averell Harriman, the former Ambassador to
the Soviet Union, and a leading Democratic foreign affairs expert, recently called for
"normalization of trade" with the U.S.S.R. Denver Post, Feb. 15, 1976, at 27, col. 2.
See also, Fritchey, Uncle Sam Will Be Uncle Sap if the Grain Deal is Cancelled, Rocky
Mountain News, Feb. 23, 1976, at 29, col. 1; Kennan, Is Detente Worth Saving?,
SATURDAY REVIEW, Mar. 6, 1976, at 12, 17. Like Professor Berman, Kennan argues for
exploitation of those "exchanges ... which would be mutually profitable." Id. at 17.
66. See note 53, supra.
67. Conquest, supra note 56, at 491.
68. "[Tlhis is emphatically not a case of what is good for Corporation X being
good for America." Id.
69. Id.
70. NLrTEa, supra note 56, at 19; Berman, supra note 60, at 231-32. It is also
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tional approach to international relations,7' and the idea of a
"tangle of hopes" that Professor Haas has invoked in similar
analysis.72 Thus, Samuel Pisar has written that "[t]he tender
sword that will open the East is economic and industrial coop-
eration and the human freedoms that go with it. ' '1
This creation of interdependence and thus closer relations
is refuted as "extraordinary naivety."'' It is argued that history
shows no such correlation; indeed, in the 20th century most of
the states that went to war were close trading partners. For
example, before both World Wars, Germany was Russia's larg-
est trading partner.75 The critics of this position recall Norman
Angell's eloquent pre-World War I book, The Great Illusion, in
which he argued that the possibility of gain from war was ren-
dered impossible by the network of commercial relations in the
world.7"
It should be noted that the second two positions are not
necessarily incompatible, and can be accepted together. In-
deed, we shall see that elements of both are present in the Final
Act.
In the Preamble to Basket Two, the participating States
stated their conviction "that their efforts to develop co-
operation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technol-
ogy, the environment and other areas of economic activity con-
tribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe
and in the world as a whole."77 Further, they reaffirmed "their
contended that such trade would make life better for the average citizen in the Soviet
Union. ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 65.
71. D. MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (1966); E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-
STATE (1964).
72. E. HAAS, TANGLE OF HOPES (1967). Secretary Kissinger refers to "a network of
vested interests." Speech reprinted at 14 THE ATLANTIc COMM. Q. 20, 25 (1976).
73. Pisar, The Changing Economic and Legal Environment for East-West
Investment, 10 INT'L LAW. 3 (1976).
74. Conquest, supra note 56, at 490.
75. Id. NUTTER, supra note 56, at 19. Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 278-79. "The
belief that trade leads to peace can sometimes be as much a product of fanciful hopes
as of actual experience. Nonetheless, on balance, the likelihood of peaceful interna-
tional relations seems to be greater with a reasonable level of mutually beneficial
foreign trade than without it." Id. at 279.
76. NtrrrEa, supra note 56, at 19.
77. Preamble to Document on Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science
and Technology and of the Environment, para. 1.
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will to intensify such cooperation between one another irrespec-
tive of their [economic and social] systems. '7 8
In the section on commercial exchanges, the participating
States agreed to promote the expansion of trade and "to ensure
conditions favorable to such development." 9 In addition, they
agreed to "foster a steady growth of trade while avoiding as far
as possible abrupt fluctuations in their trade. ' 80
They further agreed to "endeavor to reduce or progres-
sively eliminate all kinds of obstacles to the development of
trade."8' And more specifically, they "recognize[d] the benefi-
cial effects which can result for the development of trade from
the application of most-favored-nation treatment. '82
The various sections of Basket Two consist of 33 pages of
"guidelines and concrete recommendations,"" for the expan-
sion of trade and cooperation in these areas. Among the under-
takings are those to expand business contacts, 4 to improve the
quantity and quality of economic and commercial informa-
tion,85 and to promote industrial cooperation and projects of
common interest.86
In science and technology, cooperation is foreseen in areas
such as agriculture, energy production and conservation, trans-
portation, computer technology, space, medicine and a host of
other areas.87 The participating States also agreed to cooperate
in the environmental field-air pollution, water pollution,
human settlements, and natural resources.8 The document
also contains provisions on the promotion of tourism," and the
improvement of the conditions of migrant laborers.90
78. Id. at para. 4.
79. Section 1, para. 4.
80. Section 1, para. 10.
81. Section 1, para. 9.
82. Section 1, para. 5.
83. Preamble, para. 9.
84. Section on Business Contacts and Facilities.
85. Section on Economics and Commercial Information.
86. Industrial Cooperation and Projects of Common Interest.
87. Science and Technology, Possibilities for Improving Cooperation. See ERA OF
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 69-70.
88. Environment.
89. Promotion of Tourism. See ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 67-68.
90. Economic and Social Aspects of Migrant Labor.
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C. Cooperation in Humanitarian and other Fields
The Third Basket of the Final Act of the CSCE, dealing
with human contacts-the flow of information and cooperation
in cultural and educational relations between states-was the
most contested part of the long negotiations leading to the
Helsinki summit. Western pressure for the "free flow of people,
ideas and information"'" was countered throughout the nego-
tiations by Soviet resistance and claims of "ideological subver-
sion.""2
While presented from 1970 onward as a joint NATO
position,9 3 Britain, Germany and other Western European
states were the prime movers in the areas of human contacts. 4
American policy was indifferent until 1974, when a more vigor-
ous policy was followed. 5 The Western position from 1974 for-
ward was essentially that there would be no Conference, and
particularly no summit of heads of state, without Soviet ac-
ceptance of the essentials of Basket Three. 6
Western states were not alone in seeking freer contacts
across national frontiers. The Yugoslavs, in particular, stressed
the need for "a progressive opening of all possible channels for
contacts and cooperation.""
91. PALMER, supra note 1, at 51, 104; Palmer, A European Security Conference:
Preparations and Procedures, 28 WORLD TODAY 36, 42 (1972); Povolny, supra note 1,
at 223.
92. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, at 12, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1973, at 10,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1;
Korey, Good Intentions, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2 & 9, 1975, at 6 [hereinafter cited
as Korey]; Povolny, supra note 1, at 225.
On human rights generally in the Soviet Union, see Reddaway, Dissent in the
Soviet Union, DISSENT, Spring 1976, at 136 [hereinafter cited as Reddaway]. For
eloquent and informative descriptions from within the Soviet Union, see A. SAKHARov,
MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD 11-62 (1975); and R. MEDVEV, ON SOCIAUST DEMOCRACY
chs. 4, 9, 10, 12 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MEDVEDEV]; and Amalrik, Arrest on
Suspicion of Courage, HARPER'S MONTHLY, July 1976, at 37.
See also the Soviet Constitution of 1936, Ch. X. It is found in BASIC DOCUMENTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 25-29 (1. Brownlie ed. 1971).
93. See PALMER, supra note 1, at 104, for an excerpt from the NATO Communique
of Dec. 1970 on the ESC.
94. Korey, supra note 92, at 6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1973, at 15, col. 1 (State-
ments by Chancellor Brandt of the FRG and Foreign Secretary Home of the UK).
95. Korey, supra note 92, at 7.
96. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1972, at 15, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1973, at 10, col.
1.
97. Acimovic, The European Problem and the Perspectives on its Settlement, in
PROBLEMES DE LA CONFERENCE EUROPEENE POUR LA COOPERATION ET LA SECURITE 11, 17
(1971).
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The Soviet Union, and its socialist allies (it is interesting
to note that Romania, which received MFN status just prior to
the CSCE, and is highly regarded in the West for its independ-
ence of the Soviet Union, is at least as strong on this point as
is the Soviet Union98), were highly critical of Basket Three from
the outset, seeing it as an invitation to "subversive activities"99
and the introduction of "anti-culture" into socialist society. 0
In the earlier stages of the conference negotiations, the Soviets
accepted the notion of human contacts as long as they took
place "on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, laws and
customs of each country."'' This idea was firmly rejected by
the West as allowing selective interpretation of the provisions
of the Basket, and was eventually dropped by the Soviets in
1973.102
It is instructive to note what provisions the Soviet Union
did not accept, and were thus not included in the Final Act.
The United States had sought Soviet agreement to stop jam-
ming Western radio broadcasts into Eastern Europe and the
U.S.S.R., but failed.' In addition, the Western phrase "free
flow of people, ideas and information" is not found in the Final
Act despite significant pressure for its inclusion. 104 Much of the
substance of the concept, however, is incorporated in the
human contacts sections.
Before briefly reviewing the provisions of Basket Three, we
must return to Basket One, the Declaration on Principles
Guiding Relations between Participating States. 5 Principle
VII concerns "Respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
98. See KULSKI, supra note 1, at 335. Romania's "independence" is limited to
foreign affairs, while the internal regime is perhaps the harshest in Eastern Europe,
with the possible exception of Bulgaria. Id. at 335-38. Six Months After: The East
European Response to Helsinki, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 59, 64 (1976).
99. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
100. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 5. "Anti-culture is 'pornography, the cult
of violence, racism and slanderous, false propoganda.'" Povolny, supra note 1, at 225-
26.
101. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1973, at 3, col.
6; Povolny, supra note 1, at 226.
102. Id.
103. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1972, at 15, col. 5; Rocky Mountain News, July 29, 1975,
at 3, col. 5.
104. Povolny, supra note 1, at 226.
105. See Section ll.A supra.
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belief."' 16 The provisions of Principle VII are not new, in that
they parallel very closely the language of both the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' 7 and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights. 08 What is significant, how-
ever, is the reaffirmation of the principle in this highly political
document on peace and security, thereby underscoring the be-
lief that human rights and their implementation are matters
of international concern, both in their own right and because
of their relationship to peace and security.0 9
Indeed in Principle VII, the participating States agreed to
"endeavor jointly and separately, including in co-operation
with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective
respect for them [human rights and fundamental free-
doms].""l 0 Thus the participating States have recognized that
human rights issues are legitimate subjects for bilateral and
multilateral negotiations, as well as within the framework of
the United Nations. As we shall argue below, this recognition
of the proper scope of concern, in conjunction with the follow-
up conference in 1977,"' provides an important political tool for
the West in dealing with the Soviet Union.
Two further points on Principle VII are appropriate here.
First, the Principle explicitly recognizes the rights of national
minorities to "equality before the law [and] . . . the actual
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms." The
participating States further agreed to "protect their [the mi-
norities] legitimate interests in this sphere." '1 l2 We will discuss
106. Principle VII, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Partici-
pating States.
107. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), arts. 18 and 2 [hereinafter cited as Declaration]. The Universal Declaration
is conveniently found in BAsic DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (I. Brownlie ed.
1972).
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature,
Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Covenant]. The Covenant is also found in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (I. Brownlie ed. 1972).
The Covenant came into force on March 23, 1976. See After 30 Years, an Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights, 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Apr. 1976, at 50.
109. This relationship is made explicit in the Final Act, both in the Preamble to
the Declaration and in Principle VII itself, at para. 5.
110. Principle VII, para. 6. The U.S.S.R. has ratified the Covenant. 12 U.N.
MONTHLY CHRONICLE. Apr. 1976, at 50, 52.
111. See infra, Section II.D.
112. Principle VII, para. 4.
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this point further below. Second, the Principle invoked the
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration, the states agree-
ing to "act in conformity with the purposes and principles
[contained therein]." The International Covenants on Human
Rights were also cited, recognizing that many of the participat-
ing States were bound by them, including the Soviet Union."'
The provisions of Basket Three, which cover 33 pages, were
adopted by the participating States "conscious that increased
cultural and education exchanges, broader dissemination of
information, contacts between people, and the solution of hu-
manitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these
aims" ["the strengthening of peace and understanding among
peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human
personality .. ].' This again constitutes recognition, al-
beit in a non-legal document, of the international nature of
issues of human rights and contacts.
The major significance of the provisions of Basket
Three-and the aspect which makes their future use possible
in the context of the follow-up conference-is that they provide
a number of specific areas to enhance transnational communi-
cation, contacts and cooperation, and provide for unilateral,
bilateral and multilateral means to discuss and achieve these
ends. To a great degree, what the Final Act does, therefore, is
to give both specific content to many of the more general
human rights principles" 5 in the context of a conference of all
the states of Europe,"' and a process for continuing considera-
tion and negotiation of these specific ends, and for evaluation
of compliance with them.
The Basket consists of four sections. Section One deals
with human contacts, the participating States "mak[ing] it
their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts .. .de-
clare their readiness . . . to conclude agreements or arrange-
ments among themselves, as may be needed . ." to imple-
113. Principle VII, para. 8.
114. Preamble, para. 1, 2.
115. The need for explication of community expectations as to the content of
human rights prescriptions is argued in McDougal, Human Rights and World Public
Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community
Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387 (1974).
116. Europe for purposes of the CSCE includes the United States and Canada,
but excludes Albania, which would not attend the conference.
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ment those aims.' 7 The states further expressed "their inten-
tion now to proceed to the implementation" of the provisions
of Section One." 8
Among these provisions are those dealing with contacts
and regular meetings on the basis of family ties"9 and reunifica-
tion of families across national frontiers' 0 (the most freqent
reason given for Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R.). It is
clear that these specific provisions are subclasses of the right
of all persons, protected by both the Universal Declaration and
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' to leave and enter
their country. The importance of these provisions, then, is that
they are specific, thus making evaluation of their implementa-
tion far easier than for more general formulations.
Further provisions of Section One include those dealing
with marriage between citizens of different states,' 2 facilitation
of travel for personal and professional reasons,' 3 improvement
of conditions for tourism,'24 encouragement of meetings among
young people,' 5 and other expansion of transnational con-
tacts.'2
Section Two was designed to "facilitate the freer and wider
dissemination of information of all kinds," ''"7 in order to con-
tribute "to the growth of confidence between peoples."'2 8 Thus
the participating States "express[ed] their intention" to im-
prove the circulation of, access to, and exchange of all kinds of
information.'1 They agreed to facilitate dissemination of oral
information,'30 printed information in the form of newspapers,
117. Section 1, Preamble, para. 5, 6.
118. Id. at para. 7.
119. Section 1(a).
120. Section 1(b).
121. See arts. 13 and 16(3) of the Declaration, supra note 107; arts. 12 and 23(1)
of the Covenant, supra note 108.
122. Section 1(c). This again is covered in general terms by the Declaration, supra
note 107, art. 16, and the Covenant, supra note 108, art. 23.
123. Section 1(d).
124. Section 1(e).
125. Section 1(f).
126. Section 1(h).
127. Section 2, Preamble, para. 6.
128. Id. at para. 2.
129. Section 2(a).
130. Section 2(a)(i). The Soviets, however, did not agree to cease jamming West-
ern broadcasts, see text accompanying note 103. See also ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra
note 1, at 68-69.
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periodicals and other publications, 3' and filmed and broadcast
information.' 2 The participants further agreed to work to im-
prove the conditions under which journalists work, to ease visa
requirements, travel opportunities, and communication with
local sources. 3 In addition it was agreed that journalists
should be allowed to "transmit completely, normally and rap-
idly" their information,'34 and that legitimate journalistic ac-
tivity "will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor
otherwise penalize them."'35
Section Three deals with cooperation and exchanges in the
field of culture. The participating States agreed to extend rela-
tions between governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions, increase mutual knowledge between cultures, promote
fuller access to books and artistic works and performances, and
to further develop contacts and cooperation among artists and
others involved in cultural activities. 31 Section Four deals with
cooperation and exchanges in the field of education. It provides
for expansion of contacts and exchanges, improvement of ac-
cess for foreign students and teachers to each other's educa-
tional institutions, facilitation of travel and scholarships, coop-
eration in research in the sciences and humanities, as well as
foreign languages and civilizations, and the promotion of coop-
eration in teaching methods. 137
Of note in Sections Three and Four, and particularly rele-
vant to the Soviet Union, is a special provision recognizing the
contribution and rights of minorities or regional cultures in the
fields of culture and education. 38 The Soviet Union is a multi-
national state, and non-Russian nationalities make up one-half
of the population of the U.S.S.R.3 9 The Russian people are the
131. Section 2(a)(ii).
132. Section 2(a)(iii).
133. Section 2(c). The Soviet Union has agreed to relax restrictions on travel,
although it is by no means unlimited. Denver Post, Mar. 2, 1976, at 18, col. 5.
134. Section 2(c).
135. Id.
136. Section 3.
137. Section 4.
138. Sections 3, 4. See also text accompanying note 112. Art. 27 of the Covenant,
supra note 108, recognizes the rights of minorities in protection of their culture and
language.
139. W. KULSKI, THE Soviet REGIME 54-59 (1963); Ulam, Smug Russians, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1976, at 12, 13. On minorities generally in the Soviet Union,
see Reddaway, supra note 92, at 143-49; MEDVEDEV, supra note 92, at chs. 4, 12;
Keenan, Soviet Time Bomb, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 21 & 28, 1976, at 17.
VOL. 6:122
CSCE AND D9TENTE
"leading force of the Soviet Union and. . . the first among the
equal and friendly family of the Soviet nations."' 40 While the
rights of other nationalities are officially recognized-including
the right to secede-the "russification" of the "Soviet people"
and the elimination of "bourgeois nationalism" are seen as real
threats to the non-Russian nationalities.'
As in the case of the provisions of Basket Two, the degree
of implementation over time of the commitments made at Hel-
sinki will determine whether the CSCE can be evaluated a
success or a failure. In the conclusion, we shall suggest an ap-
proach to these human rights issues that will utilize Basket
Three in a positive manner to bring about a loosening of some
of the strictness presently found in a number of European so-
cieties, Socialist and Western alike.
D. Follow-up to the Conference
Basket Four has been the least discussed part of the Final
Act, yet if the Act is to have any force over time, much of that
force will derive from the pressures implicit in this last basket.
The prospect for a conference in 1977 should make each partici-
pating State more aware of its commitments, and of the price
of failure to implement those commitments.
The idea of a permanent standing committee to supervise
implementation of the Final Act was originally a Soviet initia-
tive.'4 2 While the NATO powers were indecisive on a perma-
nent organization,'43 several small Eastern European states
pressed the idea forcefully in the negotiations. Over time, as
the Romanians and Yugoslavs, in particular, continued their
strong support, the Soviet Union became less and less suppor-
tive as the Soviet leadership came to see such an organ as a
potential threat to Soviet policies both in Eastern Europe and
at home.' 4
The compromise arrangements eventually achieved at
Helsinki fall into three parts. First, the participating States
140. W. KULSKI, THE SoviET REGIME 127 (1963).
141. Id. at 127-35; Reddaway, supra note 92, at 144.
142. PALMER, supra note 1, at 56-58; ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 70-71;
Povolny, supra note 1, at 224; N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 2. It was generally
perceived as an attempt to replace NATO (and the Warsaw Pact). ERA OF
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 70.
143. PALMER, supra note 1, at 56; Povolny, supra note 1, at 226.
144. TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 21.
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resolved to act to implement the provisions of the Final Act
through unilateral actions,'45 bilateral negotiations,"'4 and mul-
tilaterally, by meetings of experts and within the framework of
existing international organizations, such as the Economic
Commission for Europe and UNESCO.'47
Second, the parties resolved to "continue the multilateral
process initiated by the Conference,"' 48 through a "thorough
exchange of views,"' 49 and the holding of meetings of experts
to "define the appropriate modalities for the holding of other
meetings which could include further similar meetings and the
possibility of a new Conference; .... "I"
Third, the Final Act provides for the first follow-up meet-
ing to be held in Belgrade in 1977.11 The symbolic importance
of the choice of Belgrade, and the potentialities for the use of
the follow-up procedures, will be discussed further in Section
IV.
III. LEGAL, POLITICAL AND MORAL EFFECT OF THE FINAL ACT
The status of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe is even more tenuous than that
ascribed to political treaties by President DeGaulle. He com-
mented that "treaties are like young girls and roses; they do not
last long."' 2 Political instruments, be they treaty or non-legal
instruments, retain validity only so long as the instruments are
seen to further the interests which originally created the basis
of agreement. 53
The point that the Final Act is not a treaty or a legal
document has been stressed heavily by President Ford' 54 and
145. Section l(a).
146. Section 1(b).
147. Section 1(c).
148. Section 2.
149. Section 2(a).
150. Section 2(b).
151. Section 3.
152. That DeGaulle made this statement shortly after ratification of the Franco-
German Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship in 1963 certainly amplifies its meaning.
W. KULSKI, DEGAULLE AND THE WORLD 278 (1966).
153. This point is well made in J. MILLER, THE NATURE OF POLITICS 148 (1962).
154. "I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it
legally binding on any participating State." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975,
at 18.
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many commentators. 5 5 The signatures of the heads of govern-
ment were made "mindful of the high political significance
which they attach to the results of the Conference, and declar-
ing their determination to act in accordance with the provi-
sions" of the Final Act. 15 The document has been termed a
"declaration of good intentions,"157 and a "statement of politi-
cal resolve."'5 8 As such it is said to resemble the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Friendly Relations
Declaration.6 0
General Secretary Brezhnev, however, has intimated that
some provisions are "of a binding nature,"'' apparently in ref-
erence to principles of inviolability of frontiers and non-
interference, the provisions to which the Soviet Union attaches
most weight and importance. While the assertion is evidence
that the U.S.S.R. will probably interpret the Final Act selec-
tively, it is unfounded. It is true that the language of the Decla-
ration on Principles is less qualified than that of other sec-
tions,1 2 yet the participating States merely declared "their de-
termination to respect and put into practice" those Princi-
ples,'63 and reaffirmations of the non-bindingness of the Final
Act were plentiful. In addition, at the insistence of the Western
states,' 4 the Final Act, although negotiated by "baskets,"' 15 is
one document, with equal weight to be attached to each sec-
155. See e.g., TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16; Denver Post, Aug. 3, 1975, at 17, col. .;
Schmidt, What Americans, Soviets Gain from Helsinki Charter, Christian Science
Monitor, July 21, 1975, at 1, col. 4; Kraft, Ford May Gain Leverage at Helsinki, Denver
Post, July 30, 1975, at 22, col. 4. See also discussion in Russell, supra note 1, at 246-
49.
156. Basket Four, Section 4, para. 6. Since the Final Act is not a treaty or legal
agreement for purposes of art. 102 of the U.N. Charter (recognized at Section 4, para.
4), it cannot be invoked before any organ of the United Nations. Art. 102(2). See
Russell, supra note 1, at 247.
157. TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16.
158. Briefing Paper, supra note 3, at 4.
159. In the words of one analyst, the Declaration is "no more than a general
statement of moral purpose and not a vehicle of legal obligation." D. GRIEG, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 93 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GRIEG].
160. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 8.
161. Denver Post, Aug. 17, 1975, at 19, col. 1.
162. The most frequently-used verb is "will," whereas in the human contacts
section the construction is "will favorably consider."
163. Preamble, para. 5, Declaration on Principles.
164. TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 17.
165. See discussion of each, supra, Section II.
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tion.66 Thus if the Soviet Union characterizes one section as
binding, other states have an equally persuasive case for the
binding nature of other provisions, such as those dealing with
human rights.
The assertion of the non-legal nature of the Final Act has
been made so frequently as to render it a truism. It is, however,
like many simplifications, misleading, and could serve to de-
emphasize important effects of the Final Act. The analogies to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Friendly
Relations Declaration' 7 provide valuable insights for a bal-
anced appraisal of the Final Act.
To say that the Universal Declaration is not a legal instru-
ment per se is not to imply that it is devoid of legal, political
and moral effect. It has been suggested, though not totally
accepted, that the Declaration represents a norm of customary
international law,' 8 as recognized by Article 38(1)(b) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.' 9 It has also been
argued that provisions of the Universal Declaration constitute
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,' 0 as
under Article 38(1)(c).' 7
It is not the intention here to characterize the Final Act
as customary international law,"'7 but rather to suggest that it
166. It is true, however, that most of the provisions of the trade and human
contacts sections require bilateral or multilateral negotiations to implement them,
while the Principles are merely guides to state action. If the Soviet Union continues
to suggest greater importance for the Principles, it will be difficult consis-
tently-although consistency is not necessarily a virtue in diplomacy-to discount
Principle VII, by which "[tihe participating States will respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
167. See text accompanying notes 158-61.
168. Separate Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun in Advisory Opinion on the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S.W. Africa), [1971] I.C.J. Reports
16. The Office of Legal Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat has written: "[fln so far as the
expectation [of compliance] is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration
may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States." Cited
in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 n.24 (3d ed. 1971).
169. Article 38: "1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: .. .(b) interna-
tional custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; ..
170. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 144.
171. Article 38(1)(c): ... the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations .... "
172. Russell, one of the U.S. negotiators of the Final Act, has written: "It [the
Final Act] is viewed, however, as consistent with international law, and, given the
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is not totally removed from the sphere of law. First, as time
passes and the participating States conform to the various pro-
visions, if in fact they do conform-which is of course the ulti-
mate test of the success or failure of the CSCE-the Final Act
could perhaps contain general principles by which states might
be bound. Second, as provisions of the Final Act parallel or
duplicate such instruments as the Universal Declaration, the
Friendly Relations Declaration and the Charter itself,' 3 the
totality of pronouncements, in conjunction with State practice,
can be evidence of customary norms of international law.
In addition, a significant indirect legal effect of both the
Universal Declaration and the Friendly Relations Declaration
derives from their nature as "evidence of the consensus . . . on
the meaning and elaboraton of the Charter."'7 The Final Act
can be seen in this light as well. For the participating States,
it can be seen as a reformulation and refinement of the princi-
ples governing state behavior set out in the Charter and as
such, arguably, have indirect legal effect,' 5 or at least height-
ened political effect.
As the legal effects discussed above are tenuous at best,
the substantial effects of the Final Act will likely be political
and moral. Again, reference to the experience of the Universal
Declaration exhibits the type of influence that a non-binding
instrument can generate. As the Declaration itself states, it is
''a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations,""' and as such serves as a benchmark by which state
behavior is to be judged. According to one commentator, "its
level at which it was concluded, many observers think it may become in fact one of
the most widely quoted sources of customary international law." Russell, supra note
1, at 248.
It is ironic to note that the state which has initially suggested some legal force for
the Final Act is the Soviet Union, while Soviet legal theory de-emphasizes the role of
custom in international law. Lukashuk, Sources of Present-Day International Law, in
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 164, 174-79 (G. Tunkin ed. 1969).
173. Some of the similarities between these documents have been discussed supra
in Section 1I.
174. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 32; see also statement of the French delegate to
the Third Committee on the Declaration as "authoritative interpretation," quoted in
BISHOP, supra note 168, at 469 n.21.
175. In the Preamble to the Declaration on Principles, para. 4, it is stressed that
the principles "are in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.;" in addition, there are
numerous references throughout the document to the Charter, the Universal Declara-
tion, and the Friendly Relations Declaration.
176. Preamble, para. 8.
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political authority is now second only to that of the Charter
itself."' 77 This is not to say that states do not violate its provi-
sions-and a look at any day's newspaper would certify that
they do violate them-but it does provide a strong political and
moral basis for protest and criticism of such violations. When
a state commits itself publicly to a formulation of a policy, that
formulation cannot be lightly set aside, even when not legally
binding."'7
This approach to the results of the CSCE has been stressed
by many commentators, as well as by President Ford. His
statement expresses well the potential uses of the Final Act:
"We are getting a public commitment . . . and establishing a
yardstick by which the world can measure how well they [the
Soviet Union] live up to these stated intentions.""'7 This is
particularly valid for the human contacts basket, where this
kind of specific evaluation device has not existed previously. 8 '
Again, this is no guarantee of compliance, but such detailed
provisions will be valuable in evaluating the performance of
each participating State.'
A further political point that has often been lost in the
discussions of the CSCE is that by discussing issues of human
rights and contacts in a multilateral forum, and agreeing to
work, independently and jointly, where necessary, S2 to achieve
177. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 624 (N. Leech, C. Oliver & J. Sweeney eds.
1973).
178. As Professor Franck has written, the pronouncements of states are "part of
that trellis of reciprocal expectations on which the fragile international system grows."
Franck, Word Made Law: The Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Test Cases, 69 AM.
J. INT'L L. 612, 616 (1975); see also T. FRANCK & E. WEISRAND, WORD POLITICS 120-21
(1971).
179. Denver Post, July 25, 1975, at 16, col. 3; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug.
4, 1975, at 18.
180. Basket Three is 33 pages long and contains detailed provisions such as the
two pages of recommendations on the improvement of working conditions of journal-
ists, including the easing of travel restrictions, restrictions on personal contacts, and
facilitating visas, etc. Section 2(c) of the Declaration on Cooperation in Humanitarian
and Other Fields.
181. The point was well made by a U.S. official: "There is no court to take
anybody into, but this document gives us some moral authority for saying 'You agreed.
Why are you not living up to your word?'" TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 22.
182. Preamble, para. 3 states: "Determined therefore to cooperate among them-
selves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create
better conditions in the above fields, to develop and strengthen existing forms of
cooperation and to work out new ways and means appropriate to those aims . .. ."
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the objectives set out in the Final Act, the participating States,
and the Soviet Union in particular, have recognized that these
issues are not purely internal matters, to be shielded from in-
ternational concern." 3 The invocation of the notions of "non-
interference" and "domestic jurisdiction"'8 4 has been the stan-
dard Soviet response to the raising of human rights questions,
as evidenced by the fate of the Trade Act of 1974, and the
Jackson Amendment."5 Such a claim, while likely to be
raised,' 8 is less powerful in light of multilateral discussions of
the issues, as at Helsinki.
Another point in this regard, alluded to earlier,'87 concerns
the explicit recognition by the parties to the Final Act that
issues of human contacts contribute to "the strengthening of
peace." Issues of peace and security, are, by definition, sub-
jects of international concern; tying human rights to peace and
security is a means of changing what otherwise might be con-
sidered issues of internal concern into issues on which interna-
tional consideration is proper. 188
Governments are not insensitive to world public opin-
ion"'-whatever it is conceived to be-especially to claims of
illegality or immorality. Commentators have long been im-
pressed-and generally dismayed-by how international law
and moral principles can be marshalled for totally contradic-
tory policies. An important corollary is often overlooked. Such
uses of international law emphasize the importance govern-
183. Russell, supra note 1, at 260. See generally J. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS
136 (1968); GRIEG, supra note 159, at 314-15; J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 357 (6th
ed. H. Waldock 1963). As these authorities demonstrate, a treaty undertaking in a
particular area removes that area from "domestic jurisdiction." The same argument,
though less definitively accepted, can be made for the case of Basket Three of the Final
Act.
184. Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 286 (E. Luard ed. 1967); GRIEG, supra note 159, at 318-
22.
185. See note 50 supra.
186. As Professor Fawcett has pointed out, "the old Adam of sovereignty, the sire
of domestic jurisdiction remains a potent force in the present international system."
Fawcett, supra note 184, at 302.
187. See Section I.C supra.
188. As, for example, in the case of South Africa and the U.N.'s fight against
apartheid. South Africa's racial policies have often been termed "a threat to the
peace," which triggers art. 39 and Security Council involvement.
189. Bilder, The International Promotion of Human Rights, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 728,
733 (1964).
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ments attach to the appearance, if not the substance, of
legality, legitimacy and morality. 190
An example of this phenomenon is presented by the Soviet
Union's seeming obsession with a European security conference
as the legitimation of post-war expansion and hegemony. Even
when, as argued earlier, the essence of that goal Was already
achieved, Brezhnev continued to press for the CSCE, as some-
thing approaching a surrogate peace conference for Europe. 9'
That the Soviet Union has felt the need to have formal ratifica-
tion of its acquisitions suggests at least some sensitivity to
legality and morality in international relations.'92
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Much has been written about the current detente'93 be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union.'94 There have
been calls for a "national debate" on detente. 9 ' The dissatis-
faction-the malaise of which Professor Korbel speaks in his
lecture' 96-is widespread, and criticism of the policy of detente
190. Stern, Morality and International Order, in THE BASES OF INTERNATIONAL
ORDER 133, 139, 154 (A. James ed. 1973).
191. Reportedly when asked by then-Chancellor Brandt why the Soviet Union
placed such emphasis on the CSCE, General Secretary Brezhnev responded, "We want
a document." TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18.
192. In addition, that it was felt necessary to justify the invasion of Czechoslova-
kia publicly-and especially in light of the major repurcussions and criticisms of the
Brezhnev Doctrine-should not be forgotten.
193. The fact that the period of detente brought about by the Nixon Administra-
tion is not the first such period is often forgotten. This historical perspective is stressed
in STEIBEL, supra note 47, at 4-10; Pipes, Detente: Moscow's View, in SOVIET STRATEGY
IN EUROPE 12-18 (R. Pipes ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Pipes].
194. See, e.g., NurrTER, supra note 56; V. PETROV, DETENTE: PAST AND PRESENT
(1975); Pipes, supra note 193; G. BALL, DIPLOMACY FOR A CROWDED WORLD chs. 6, 7
(1976); STEIBEL, supra note 47; Shulman, The Future of the Soviet-American
Competition, in SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: THE TWO AND THE
MANY 1 (Adelphi Paper No. 66, 1970); Birnbaum, The Future of the Soviet and Ameri-
can International Systems, in id. at 24; Sommer, Detente and Security: The Options,
in EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE 1970s: I: BETWEEN DETENTE AND CONFRONTATION 10
(Adelphi Paper No. 70, 1970); Tatu, The East: Detente and Confrontation, in id. at
17; GOLDMAN, supra note 47; J. KORBEL, DETENTE IN EUROPE: REAL OR IMAGINARY?
(1972); Yergin, In Faint Praise of Detente, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 29, 1976, at 17
[hereinafter cited as Yergin]; Rosecrance, Detente or Entente?, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
464 (1975); Conquest, supra note 56; Morris, Detente, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 30,
1976, at 7; Salter, It Takes Two to Detente: or Can Russia Change Its Spots?, 9 INT'L
LAW. 517 (1975); Draper, Detente, 57 COMMENTARY 25 (1974); Kennan, Is Detente
Worth Saving?, SATURDAY REVIEW, Mar. 6, 1976, at 12.
195. E.g., Egan, Kissinger Seeks, and Gets, a "Detente" Debate, Nat'l Observer,
Feb. 14, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
196. Korbel, Detente and World Order, 6 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 9, 13 (1976),
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as pursued by the Nixon and Ford Administrations has come
from all sides.'97
The disillusionment with detente derives basically, as Pro-
fessor Korbel argues, from the differing perceptions of detente
held by the United States and the Soviet Union. 9 ' The misper-
ception by Americans of what detente is, and what it can
achieve, stems from two main factors. The first is the tendency
discussed by Professor Korbel for Americans to clutch at "easy
answers.""' The second is the nature of the diplomacy prac-
ticed by the Nixon Administration, and the way that detente
was "sold" to the American public.
To the American people, detente appeared to be the end
of the Cold War, the beginning of a "new relationship" of coop-
eration, and, perhaps, friendship between the Soviet Union
and the United States. 200 The Soviets frequently argue that
detente is "irreversible, 20 ' and the American public seemed to
accept this interpretation. Furthermore, it was seen-or more
accurately, hoped-that this detente governed all aspects of
relations between the two states-that is, political, military,
economic and ideological relations-everywhere in the world.
Thus, when Soviet writers stress that there is no "cessation of
the ideological struggle,"' 202 this is seen to discredit the entire
policy of detente. Soviet "adventurism" (as it is characterized
in the West)-or legitimate support for national liberation
movements (as seen from Moscow)-in Angola further rein-
forces the disillusionment.
The disenchantment is frequently expressed in the propo-
sition that detente is a "one-way street," that concessions by
supra in this issue [hereinafter cited as Korbel].
197. See, e.g., BALL, supra note 194, at chs. 7, 8; NuTrrER, supra note 56; A.
SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD (1975).
198. Korbel, supra note 196, at 13. This point is also argued persuasively by
Richard Pipes in Pipes, supra note 193; see also PETROV, supra note 194, at 3-5. Petrov
refers to the "asymmetry of national objectives." Id. at 3.
199. Korbel, supra note 196, at 13.
200. Yergin, supra note 194, at 21. He cites former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger's warning that, "detente means [to many minds thatl the possibility of
conflict has ended and we could afford unilaterally to disarm." Id.
201. Shattan, How the Soviets See Detente, NEw LEADER, Feb. 2, 1976, at 8, 9.
202. Arbatov, Maneuvers of the Opponents of Detente, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 1, 1975, at 1, 5. See quotations cited in Korbel, supra note 196, at
17-18.
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the West in the political, military, economic and ideological
spheres are not matched by reciprocal Soviet concessions .2
Without denying that in some cases negotiations were not bal-
anced, much of this criticism stems from the misperceptions of,
and unrealistically high expectations for the policy of detente.
The second set of factors leading to the disillusionment
with the policy are direct results of the Nixon-Kissinger way of
practicing diplomacy. As one analyst has put it, "Detente is
now suffering from the fact that it was deliberately obscured
as diplomacy and oversold as politics."2 °4 The personalization
of foreign policy-by both Nixon and Kissinger-was useful as
a means of selling policy, but as the personalities fell from
favor, the policy-regardless of its merits (which was often the
way it was accepted)-has been denigrated in the public eye
as well.05 Further, the penchant for secrecy and surprise of the
Nixon years contributed to this disillusionment. Perhaps most
damaging was the molding of the policy of detente to meet
domestic purposes, most often, domestic political purposes.0 6
One of the major costs of detente which led to more disillu-
sionment was in America's relations with Western Europe and
Japan. Draper, among others, has argued that detente, as pur-
sued, was "the attempt to solve our problems through our an-
tagonists, without, or even at the expense of, our friends. Con-
ceivably, we might have tried to bolster both fronts simultane-
ously, but this effort was never seriously made." 207 A further,
and still continuing problem is the total eclipse of Third World
relations by "super power politics."
The disillusionment, and the connection of detente in
many minds with discredited persons, have "gone beyond a
healthy deflation of the Nixon Administration's puffed-up
rhetoric and now are swinging towards an indiscriminate and
203. See, e.g., Yergin, supra note 194, at 18.
204. Morris, supra note 194, at 7.
205. Yergin, supra note 194, at 21, argues this well.
206. Morris, supra note 194, at 40. See J. SCHELL, THE TIME OF ILLUSION 246-47
(1976). Schell argues that the "image" of policy and of governing was the prime force
behind Nixon policies. "President Nixon's reaffirmation of the doctrine of credibility
disclosed in this foreign policy a practice that had come to govern most of his domestic
policies: the practice of subordinating the substance of governing to the image of
governing." Id. at 66. Thus it is argued that shortcomings in SALT I were the result
of the political need for the agreement rather than the merits of the positions.
207. Draper, supra note 194, at 44.
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short-sighted hardening of our positions."8 Thus the aim of
discussion of the policy of detente must be to attempt, while
eliminating illusions-"about its limits, about the character of
the Soviet system or the expansionist elements in Soviet for-
eign policy" 20 -to develop the full potentialities of detente.
Secretary Kissinger has written that "[d]etente is a pro-
cess, not a permanent achievement.""21 That is, contrary to the
Soviet conception,"' detente is not irreversible, as past periods
of detente demonstrate."' Further, different aspects of rela-
tions, in different geographical areas, between the Soviet Union
and the United States do not progress, or regress, at the same
pace. Thus, the author believes that detente is not best ap-
proached as one concept, but rather, it must be analyzed in its
various aspects, as well as in specific geographical contexts.
Contrary to the simplistic conceptions of "indivisible" detente,
the policy can best be understood and pursued by approaching
each area separately.
The Final Act, then, by dividing the results of the CSCE
into three baskets-political, economic, and humanitarian-is
instructive."' We shall discuss each in turn. This is not to argue
that there is no "linkage" among the fields, for relations in one
area certainly affect other areas. In many cases, these linkages
have negative effects in other areas. For example, the United
States cancelled its participation in bilateral meetings on
trade, energy and housing because of Soviet activity in An-
gola. 1' If these meetings have any value, to subject them to the
uncertainties and instability of political relations seems un-
wise.
Political detente is based upon recognition of the realities
of a nuclear world. "Detente is an imperative. In a world shad-
208. Shulman, Priorities for Detente, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 42 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Shulman].
209. Yergin, supra note 194, at 21.
210. Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Apr. 14, 1974, at 518.
Cited in NUTTER, supra note 56, at 91.
211. See, e.g., Shattan, How the Soviets See Detente, NEw LEADER, Feb. 2, 1976,
at 8, 9.
212. See note 193 supra.
213. Professor Korbel analyzed detente in this manner in J. KORBEL, DETENTE IN
EUROPE: REAL OR IMAOINARY? (1972). He entitled chapters: "Politics," "Economics,"
and "Ideology" (which I shall argue is where humanitarian concerns will fall).
214. TIME, Mar. 29, 1976, at 31; Denver Post, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 2.
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owed by the danger of nuclear holocaust, there is no rational
alternative to the pursuit of relaxation of tensions." ' It is a
relaxation-not an end-to tensions. And it is a relaxation that
can be reversed. It is contended that if this is all that detente
accomplishes, then it is little different from Cold War."l'
Most commentators recognize "stages" of detente, from
the very limited conception of avoidance of war to positive and
cooperative relations."7 Generally, the detente between the
Soviet Union and the United States has not progressed much
beyond the point of conflict avoidance and crisis-limitation.'
Further, it is in different stages in different areas of the world.
Thus in Europe, where the fear of nuclear confrontation has
been greatest, a fairly high degree of detente has been achieved,
as evidenced by the CSCE. In areas of the Third World, on the
other hand, proxy wars, while not ruled out, are to be limited
so as to prevent the risk of nuclear confrontation. Thus, Soviet
acquiescence in the mining of Haiphong harbor in May 1972
(two weeks before President Nixon's first visit to Moscow) 19
provides a better example of the workings of detente than does
Kissinger's appraisal of the Angolan situation as "Soviet ad-
venturism. "220
This is what Secretary Kissinger terms a "dual policy that
simultaneously and with equal vigor resists expansionist drives
and seeks to shape a more constructive relationship. '221 As the
critics of detente contend, the intentions of the Soviet Union
are not substantially different today then they were in the pe-
riod before President Nixon.2 22 Tactical considerations make
detente the best policy at the moment, but as circumstances
change, so too might Soviet perceptions of tactical advantage
215. Kissinger, cited in NuTTER, supra note 56, at 87. See also Kissinger's speech
of Feb. 3, 1976, reprinted in 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20 (1976); Shulman, supra note
208, at 43-44. Cf. Pipes, supra note 193, at 5. "We are told that detente is vital because
the only alternative to it is a nuclear holocaust. This, however, is an appeal to fear,
not to reason." Id. at 5.
216. Draper, supra note 194, at 38.
217. Id.; Kissinger speech in 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 22-23 (1976).
218. Detente in Check, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 45 (1976).
219. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 36; KULSKI, supra note 1, at 438-40.
220. Denver Post, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 2. Indeed Kissinger's attempts to match
Soviet involvement was in line with this approach, but he was only prevented by
Congressional disapproval.
221. Kissinger speech, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 22-23 (1976).
222. Pipes, supra note 193, at 9-10.
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change. Detente then "involves making somewhat more ex-
plicit the implicit rules of the Cold War-that neither side will
push too hard in areas of the other's vital interests; that some
effort will be made to contain crises; that both sides will coop-
erate in avoiding nuclear war." 23
It also involves a higher level of communication between
the leaderships of the two countries,2 4 which serves to enhance
the function discussed above. It further involves "atmospher-
ics, 1 22 or the perceptions of better relations. It is argued that
perhaps the atmospherics outdistance the real achievements,
leading to disarray in the West and reluctance to fully under-
stand Soviet moves and build-ups.
The most important part of detente in this field is the
separate discussions of SALT and MBFR, which will-if con-
cluded-contribute substantially to a true lessening of ten-
sions, and a meaningful curtailment of the technologies that
threaten the peace. The political pronouncements have been
made; it is now time to see if concrete results, seriously bar-
gained, can be obtained. Whether this can be accomplished
lacking the trust of which Professor Korbel spoke, 2 remains to
be seen.
Detente also means cooperative efforts, which Secretary
Kissinger says will lead to a "pattern of relations" and a "pat-
tern of restraint" that will bring about the higher stages of
detente. This "network of vested interests" is in large part in
the field of economics.2 2
In the matter of economics, an important distinction must
be made between trade and what is more accurately considered
aid. 2 1 By trade is meant normal commercial transactions,
goods for cash, or goods for goods exchanges. This is contrasted
to what is in reality aid, that is credits, often long-term and on
lenient terms. 29 The distinction may be fuzzy at times, but it
is nevertheless valid.
223. Yergin, supra note 194, at 17.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Korbel, supra note 196, at 18.
227. Kissinger speech, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 24-25 (1976).
228. This distinction is recognized by G. KENNAN, ON DEALING WITH THE COMMUN-
IST WORLD 31 (1964) [hereinafter cited as KENNAN]; Draper, supra note 194, at 31-32.
229. KENNAN, supra note 228, at 31; Draper, supra note 194, at 32.
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As George Kennan has argued, "The problem of East-
West trade is, in short, primarily a political problem, and
should be approached as such." 30 Thus the decision to pursue
or not to pursue trade with the Soviet Union should be seen as
a political one. There is a further question, however. That is,
if trade is to be pursued, are political goals best served by
allowing trade on economic terms, or should political concerns
govern not just trade generally, but its particular applications?
Kennan also contends that "[t]o demand political con-
cessions as a quid pro quo for normal commercial transactions
is, after all, only another way of renouncing trade altogether;
.... 2,31 Trade with the United States-as opposed to aid
from it-is probably not so important to the Soviet Union that
it will yield to political demands in return.2 3 To link trade and
politics, furthermore, would subject each area to the weak-
nesses and fluctuations of the other. Thus, the linkage is only
as strong as its weakest link. 33 The danger of subjecting politi-
cal relations to the fluctuations of trade relations (and crop
yields) is apparent; it is also unwise to allow trade decisions to
be governed by the vagaries of political relations.
To subject trade to political conditions in this way is to
deny two important political ramifications of such trade. First,
there is leverage inherent in having trade-trade which is sub-
ject to diminution or cancellation if political relations deterio-
rate badly. There is thus a positive incentive to maintain sta-
bility in the politico-military sphere. 34
Second, it is argued that trade can have beneficial effects
on the internal system of the U.S.S.R. While this point is often
taken much too far, it can be said that "the inflow of ideas and
goods [and personnel] nevertheless has some impact and pro-
vides some momentum for those who otherwise have had no
230. KENNAN, supra note 228, at 31.
231. Id. at 32.
232. Secretary Kissinger has put it like this: "the Soviet Union has survived for
nearly sixty years without American grain; it could do so now. Cutting off grain would
still lose Angola." 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 35 (1976). Kennan argues that the
effect of cutting off trade would, at best, "slow down, to a minor and undecisive extent,
the advance of the Soviet economy." KENNAN, supra note 228, at 30.
233. Berman, supra note 60, at 234.
234. Shulman, supra note 208, at 44. Keatley, The Give and Take of Detente,
Wall St. Journal, Aug. 4, 1975, at 10, col. 4.
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hope for internal liberalization." 3 ' The effect may be small,
but it is likely to be greater than that achieved by demanding
political concessions for trade. 36
The amounts of trade will remain limited due to the lack
of Soviet goods for Western consumers and the chronic shortage
of hard currency in the Soviet Union, "but the market and the
mutual needs are there.""2 7 In addition to the political advan-
tages of trade, the United States can benefit economically from
trade with the Soviet Union. Not only does the balance of trade
benefit, 38 but individual enterprises, workers and farmers ben-
efit as well. 31
Aid-long-term credits, easy financing, etc.-presents a
different picture. The Soviet Union needs, because of its ineffi-
cient economic structure, Western technology and capital. For
much of this, the United States is often the only, or the best,
source-unlike the case with consumer goods. Thus, the bar-
gaining position of the United States is much better than in the
trade area. The United States has no moral or other obligation
to supply aid to the Soviet Union, as it arguably does to LDCs.
Further, as the economic benefit is more tenuous and long-
term, and the bolstering of the Soviet economy greater,
political considerations should weigh more heavily in such
decision-making.
Will the Soviet Union accept political conditions on aid?
Professor Goldman has concluded that "under the proper con-
ditions economic pressure can be used to win political conces-
sions, particularly when the Soviet Union is in economic
need. 2 0 As the Soviet Union's economic position improves,
their willingness to make concessions decreases, but the need
for credits and technology, generally, can be expected to con-
tinue for some time.
What kind of concessions should be sought from the Soviet
Union? The author believes that to seek politico-military con-
cessions would be risky. As we have argued previously, for pol-
235. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 280. See also MEDVEDEV, supra note 139, at 320-
21.
236. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 280.
237. Id. at 267. Cf. Conquest, supra note 56.
238. Id. at 276; Yergin, supra note 194, at 19.
239. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 276-77. Cf. Conquest, supra note 56.
240. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 69.
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itical detente to be meaningful, there must be that level of trust
that leads to sound bargaining."' That trust and those bargains
cannot and should not be "bought." As Professor Goldman
cautions, "it must never be forgotten that the minute the Rus-
sians feel they no longer need American goods [credits] or
technology, their purchases from the United States may dry up
as they did in the 1930s and the 1940s."' 2 So too could pre-
viously made concessions "dry up" as Soviet needs decrease.
To have, for example, a SALT agreement subject to such an
uncertain future would introduce instability into the political
arena that is highly undesirable and potentially dangerous. As
we shall see, changes brought about in the human rights area
are less easily shut off, and would have more lasting effects.
The failure of the United States to take an active human
rights position throughout the world has been noted for years.2 3
The reluctance of the U.S. Government to denounce human
rights violations in the period of detente was been criticized
particularly strongly.214 Pursuit of human rights objectives has
been seen to "interfere" with political objectives in relations
with the Soviet Union.
What the Final Act of the CSCE does is demonstrate that
human rights concerns are of an international nature, that they
are appropriate for international negotiations, and that they
are seen as an integral part of the Western conception of de-
tente.
The Soviet Union continually stresses that there is no
"ideological cease-fire, 2 5 and there is little reason to expect
that stance to change, given Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Rather
than decry this attitude and do nothing, perhaps it would be
best for the West to accept this formulation, and pursue the
"ideological struggle." By this, the author does not mean a
return to Cold War rhetoric. As one commentator has written:
Since the Soviets do not seem to be dismantling this twilight
apparatus, perhaps the West needs to become more sophisticated
in coping with the dialectics and semantics of this form of elec-
241. Korbel, supra note 196, at 18; J. KORBEL, DETENTE IN EUROPE: REAL OR
IMAGINARY? 250 (1972).
242. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 283.
243. See, e.g., the excellent Symposium, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 591 et seq. (1974).
244. See note 50 supra.
245. See Korbel, supra note 196, at 17-18.
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toral struggle. Not with the crude anti-Communist sloganeering
of the past, but with more subtle discourse and more credible
symbols which we are capable of evolving. Surely we need not
fear to engage in a wide spectrum of East-West contacts on this
front, even though our adversaries are trained Marxists: for the
West has learned to live with dissent and pluralism and contro-
versy and the East is very wary indeed of that sort of engage-
ment."'6
By the "ideological struggle," we mean the struggle of ideas
and political freedoms, pursued by the flow of people and infor-
mation.
It is not a struggle with the Soviet Union that the West can
"win." It will be won-if at all-by the people of the U.S.S.R.
Thus if there is to be any liberalization of the Soviet regime, it
will come from within. 27 While it cannot be forced from out-
side, that change can be aided from the West.
First, this can be done by persistently and publicly re-
minding Moscow of the commitments it has undertaken,
whether in the Final Act, or in the Covenants, or in the Soviet
Constitution. Further, the West should continually evaluate
the performance of the Soviet Union 4-and this is where the
forum provided by the follow-up conference in Belgrade will be
important. 49 An important step has been taken in the passage
246. Barnett, Comment, in THE NEW ATLANTIC CHALLENGE 232, 233 (R. Mayne ed.
1975).
247. See MEDVEDEV, supra note 139, at 16; Larrabee, supra note 4, at S6606.
248. Of course, the Soviet Union has and will continue to question whether the
United States has "clean hands" in this regard. "Really, what right do they have to
pose as champions of the eternal values of freedom and democracy?-especially in the
light of what has been going on in America in the past few years." Arbatov, Maneuvers
of Opponents of Detente, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 1, 1975, at 1, 5.
Cf. Manning, Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 271, 278-84.
In the long view, the surest way for the United States to influence for the
better the ideological future of mankind everywhere is by being sure that
we present an unwavering example of commitment to our principles at
home. And that is an ideological target that can be-has been-set for
all Americans.
Nevertheless, the United States should continuously speak out interna-
tionally to reassert its ideological stance on individual freedom and ex-
pression. In time, the audience of the world will once more listen and
respond. Id. at 284.
249. Current evidence of compliance by the Soviet Union is sketchy, but seems
to show some compliance, but in selective areas and with limited scope. See Larrabee,
supra note 4, at S6605-06; Radio Free Europe, Six Months After: The East European
Response to Helsinki, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 59 (1976); Evans & Novak, Russ
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of the Case-Fenwick Act, 25 which establishes a Commission to
monitor implementation of the Final Act. The author believes
that such a Commission should be established at the NATO
level, or among interested states, as such a body would have
far more impact on the policies of the Soviet Union than would
a unilateral body.25" '
Second, the United States should use the political leverage
inherent in aid to obtain concessions from the Soviet Union in
this area. Unlike in the political sphere, advances in human
rights are difficult to undo should the economic basis of the
agreement disappear. While access to information may be cut
off, what has already passed is in the hearts and minds of
people, and cannot be expunged.2 12 Further, the process of
samizdat would allow continued circulation of information
even if the source were cut off. Likewise, the memories of easier
emigration, or freer travel, are difficult to erase once allowed.
Third, the West should continue to provide the informa-
tion to the Soviet people that is denied them by their own
government. This is the most important service that the West
can provide to the Soviet people-the ammunition of the
"ideological struggle" with the Soviet Union.
There are no "easy answers." Detente is a complex, and
often frustrating, phenomenon. It is not the "new relationship"
that so many desire, in the East and in the West; it requires
much the same vigilance that was required by the Cold War.
But it is more than the Cold War; it has the potential to expand
in scope and in application. Higher stages of detente are possi-
ble, but they will not be easily achieved, nor are they inevita-
ble. Compared to the alternative of nuclear war, however, it is
a policy that must be pursued.
Douglas G. Scrivner*
Flout Helsinki Agreement, Denver Post, June 21, 1976, at 18, col. 5. See also remarks
of Congressman Drinan, CONG. REC. H4435 (daily ed. May 17, 1976).
250. S.2679. See CONG. REC. S6600-09 (daily ed. May 5, 1976); CONG. REc. H4432-
44 (daily ed. May 17, 1976).
251. Remarks of Congressman Derwinski, CONG. REC. H4436 (daily ed. May 17,
1976).
252. See MEDVEDEV, supra note 139, at 315. "Ideas that take possession of the
masses are now almost directly capable of becoming a 'material force.'" Id.
* A.B., 1973, Duke University; M.Sc., 1974, London School of Economics; J.D.
candidate, University of Denver College of Law; Ph.D. candidate, Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver.
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Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and Its
Control
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) has been with us now for seven years and has gained the
adherence of a substantial number of nations. Yet one nation
recently exploded its first nuclear device, and others may do so
in the near future. Does nonproliferation remain a realistic
goal? What problems exist with the Treaty and its implemen-
tation? Under what circumstances is further nuclear weapons
proliferation likely? What pressures promote it, and how can
these pressures be mitigated? This comment assesses the cur-
rent problem areas and identifies recent activity in, and pros-
pects for, proliferation control.
I. THE NPT AND THE IAEA
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons,'
which was the subject of lengthy U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations,2
was completed and opened for ratification in 1968. As of July
1976, 98 nations had ratified (or acceded to) the NPT, another
12 nations had signed but not ratified, and the remaining na-
tions had neither signed nor ratified. As mandated by Article
VIII of the Treaty,3 the first Review Conference met in May
1975 to make recommendations for the future operation of the
Treaty.
Impetus for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to
nations not now possessing such weapons derived from a con-
cern that unchecked nuclear proliferation would seriously en-
hance the possibility of nuclear war, and from a hope that an
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968,
119701 1 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 [hereinafter cited as NPT].
2. The first nonproliferation proposals were part of a partial disarmament plan
submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee in 1957; similar proposals became
part of the draft agreements for a general disarmament considered by the Ten Nation
Disarmament Committee in 1960 and later by the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, INTERNATIONAl. NEGOTIA-
TIONS ON THE TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 3-6 (1969).
3. Article VIll:
(3) Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of
Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to
review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the
purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realized.
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agreement on nonproliferation would reduce international ten-
sions and thereby facilitate an end to the dangerous interna-
tional arms race.
These goals were to be accomplished by a number of mea-
sures. First, the NPT forbids all parties from transferring nu-
clear technology or nuclear source material (such as uranium
or plutonium) to any non-nuclear-weapon nation' without in-
ternational safeguards. ' These international safeguards are to
insure that the transferred nuclear technology or material is
not diverted from peaceful uses to use in nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices.' Second, the Treaty forbids nuclear-
weapon nations from transferring nuclear weapons to non-
nuclear-weapon nations.' Third, the NPT forbids acceptance of
nuclear weapons by non-nuclear nations who are parties to the
Treaty and prohibits these nations from manufacturing nu-
clear weapons. 8 Fourth, the Treaty requires each non-nuclear
4. The NPT does not directly define either a nuclear-weapon nation or a non-
nuclear-weapon nation. However, since the Treaty forbids nuclear-weapon nations
from transferring-and non-nuclear weapon nations from receiving or manufactur-
ing-nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a nuclear-weapon nation is
one which possesses nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosion capability (or both), and
a non-nuclear-weapon nation possesses neither. For convenience, this comment will
use nuclear nation to mean nuclear-weapon nation and non-nuclear nation to mean
non-nuclear-weapon nation.
5. Article III:
(2) Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fis-
sionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur-
poses, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to
the safeguards required by this article.
6. As will be discussed infra, there is little difference in effect between a nation's
possession of nuclear weapons and its possession of nuclear explosive devices. This
comment will use the words "nuclear weapon" to include any destructive nuclear
explosive device, unless a narrower definition is specifically stated.
7. Article I:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to trans-
fer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly.
or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weap-
ons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or
explosive devices.
8. Article II:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or
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nation which is a party to the Treaty to accept international
safeguarding of all its peaceful nuclear facilities.' The Treaty
also urges the free exchange of information and technology for
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,'" encourages nuclear na-
tions to make peaceful nuclear explosives available to non-
nuclear nations on a favored basis," and directs that "good
explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to
seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices.
9. Article III:
(1) Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to
accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and
concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguard system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the
fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards
required by this article shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in
any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safe-
guards required by this article shall be applied on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear facilities within the territory
of such state, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control any-
where.
10. Article IV:
(2) All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the
right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, mate-
rials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also
cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or interna-
tional organizations to the further development of the applications of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-
nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for
the needs of the developing areas of the world.
11. Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures
to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate interna-
tional observation and through appropriate international procedures.
potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions
will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the
explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge
for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits pursuant to a special interna-
tional agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international
body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Nego-
tiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the
Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty
so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agree-
ments.
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faith" measures be taken to end the arms race and achieve
complete disarmament." In short, the NPT calls for rigorous
control of nuclear weapon proliferation even as it encourages
the unhampered proliferation of peaceful nuclear energy and
its benefits.
The NPT is implemented through the International At-
omic Energy Agency (IAEA). 1" IAEA, acting under its basic
statute, 4 and through bilateral agreements between itself and
nations party to the NPT,1' applies the NPT-required safe-
guards to peaceful nuclear reactors and source material, con-
ducts research to improve safeguards, and provides informa-
tion and assistance to its member nations. The safeguards
which are applied to prevent diversions include periodic physi-
cal inspections, tamper-proof technology, and national infor-
mational reporting requirements (with subsequent IAEA anal-
ysis of the reported data).' In addition, IAEA inspects nuclear
12. Article VI:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control.
13. An in-depth look at the organization and functions of IAEA from formation
through 1966 is provided in P. SZASz, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL.
AToMIC ENERGY AGENCY (International Atomic Energy Agency Legal Series No. 7,
1970). A similar study through 1969 is A. MCKNIGHT, ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS: A STUDY
IN INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION (1971) [hereinafter cited as McKNIGHT]. See also
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. 94TH
CON(;., 2D SESS., NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL. ATOMIC EN-
ERGY AGENCY (Comm. Print 1976).
14. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done October 26, 1956.
[1957] 2 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, as amended, [1963] 1 U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S.
No. 5284 and [19731 2 U.S.T. 1637, T.I.A.S. No. 7668.
15. For a concise statement of IAEA's ideal bilateral agreement, see IAEA, THE
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND STATES REQUIRED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(IAEA Doc. INFCIRC 153, June 1974); reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION 757 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as PEACEFUL NUCI.EAR
ExPorTsl. As of February 1975, the IAEA had concluded safeguards agreements with
only 35 non-nuclear parties to the Treaty. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH
INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK 1975 495 (1975).
16. An analysis of IAEA safeguards is provided in J. MADDOX, PROSPECTS FOR
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 22-26 (Adelphi Paper No. 113, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
MADDOXi. For a detailed look at the scope and procedures of IAEA inspection, see
Szasz, International Atomic Energy Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARI)S AND
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 73 (M. Willrich ed. 1973); reprinted in PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPORTS,
supra note 15, at 884.
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material and reactors in nations not party to the NPT when
such safeguarding has been agreed to by all parties-IAEA, the
nuclear-exporting nation (when appropriate) and the nuclear-
importing or host nation. 7 More recently, IAEA has begun to
provide its member nations with information and recom-
mended standards for the physical protection of nuclear mate-
rials from theft."
II. CURRENT LIMITATIONS IN PROLIFERATION CONTROL
Although the NPT was designed to halt any further prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons, the possibility of proliferation re-
mains. Indeed, certain pressures in the present international
environment increase the probability of additions to the num-
ber of nuclear nations. The proponents of nonproliferation
must now contend with five important problem areas: (1)
loopholes in the NPT; (2) limitations in IAEA capabilities; (3)
the decisions of nations not parties to the Treaty; (4) the possi-
bility of proliferation through peaceful nuclear explosions; and
(5) non-governmental diversions (including terrorist attacks).
The NPT and the IAEA safeguards contain loopholes
through which a non-nuclear party to the NPT could acquire
the technology and materials to manufacture nuclear weap-
ons.' Under the NPT, a nuclear-seeking nation has a number
of options which may be more attractive than a simple clandes-
tine diversion of nuclear material from safeguarded nuclear
facilities. Two are of particular importance today:
1. A nation may purchase nuclear facilities, study these facili-
ties, and then replicate them. By proclaiming the replications not
peaceful, NPT-required safeguards would be effectively
blocked.2 '
17. A list of agreements (current through 1974) providing for IAEA saleguards
other than in connection with the NPT is in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RE-
SEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NUCLEAR AGE 129 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR AG.EI.
18. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OP-
ERATIONS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: A HANDBOOK 229
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATIONI.
19. Willrich, The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear
Technology Confronts World Politics, 77 YALE L.J. 1463 (1968) provides a comprehen-
sive treatment of possible loopholes in the NPT, although later events have closed
some of these loopholes.
20. Proliferation by replication has become a real danger. Brazil, a non-party
nation, recently purchased the technology for a complete nuclear cycle from the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. This technology, although safeguarded, will provide an
ideal learning tool for Brazil's nuclear establishment. 19 ORBIs 319 (1975). Similar fears
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2. While the NPT prohibits non-nuclear parties from manufac-
turing nuclear weapons, it does not specifically prohibit a country
from manufacturing the component parts of a nuclear weapon.
The advantage of such research and development is that it can
be easily disguised as peaceful research, and it enables a country
to "go nuclear" in a short time should the need arise.2
IAEA enforcement practices provide other loopholes which
may permit illegal transfers of nuclear weapons, technology or
assistance. For example, a non-nuclear party to the NPT may
persuade a nuclear nation to provide nuclear weapons. Such a
transfer, although prohibited by Article II of the Treaty, is not
monitored by IAEA. Illegal transfers of this type are made
more probable by the fact that nations not parties to the NPT
include countries with nuclear weapons (France and China),
highly-developed nuclear technology (for example, India and
South Africa), and extensive uranium reserves (South Africa
and Brazil, among others). These nations are under no legal
obligation not to transfer nuclear weapons, nuclear technology,
and source materials to any nation requesting or willing to buy
them .22
have been expressed regarding the French contract for the sale of fuel reprocessing
facilities to Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1976, at 6, col. 4, and Germany's discussion
with Iran for the sale of full nuclear technology, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1976, § 1. at 1,
col. 6.
21. Israel, a non-party to the NPT, is reported to have constructed ten to twenty
atomic bombs without conducting test explosions. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1,
col. 2; cf. TIME, Apr. 12, 1976, at 39. If these nuclear explosive devices, although
untested, prove to be an important factor in the politics of the Middle East, Israel's
example may spur NPT parties in other potential conflict areas, such as South Korea
and Taiwan, to test the limits of IAEA safeguards by beginning research and prelimi-
nary manufacturing for nuclear explosives.
22. Of the non-party nuclear powers, France has repeatedly declared that it will
act toward non-nuclear nations as if France were an NPT member. N.Y. Times, June
1, 1976, at 7, col. 1. However, France has not complied fully with current IAEA proce-
dures. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 27. China's attitude is that no country should be
precluded from establishing a nuclear capability for use in self-defense. H. GEl.BER,
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CHINESE POLICY 28 (Adelphi Paper No. 99, 1973). To date. no
Chinese exports of nuclear weapons, technology or source material have been reported.
India has declared it would use its nuclear energy "solely for peaceful purposes" and
has remained publicly opposed to the development of nuclear weapons. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 19, 1974, at 11, col. 1. India has recently entered into an agreement to exchange
nuclear technology with Argentina and has initiated discussions for the same purpose
with Iran; the application of safeguards, if any, in each project has not been revealed.
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS,
1975-1990: COMMERCIAL, ECONOMIC & SECURITY IMPLICATIONS, App. C at 23-24 (1975)
1 hereinafter cited as LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS].
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Under its basic statute, the IAEA is charged with verifying
that nuclear material in NPT-party nations is not diverted
from peaceful uses, such as nuclear power reactors, and used
"to further any military purpose." IAEA's small staff for moni-
toring-40 active inspectors for 289 nuclear facilities (38 nu-
clear power stations, 104 other reactors, 14 fuel conversion fa-
cilities, and 133 other projects)23 -as well as its limited budget
prohibit constant monitoring of all nuclear facilities subject to
its inspection. Instead, IAEA requires periodic reports from
those in charge of nuclear facilities and depends on statistical
evaluations of those reports and periodic inspections to identify
possible diversions of nuclear material. 4 The reports include
measurements of nuclear material made at strategic points in
the nuclear cycle. Although in theory these reports should show
any diversion of material, in practice the accuracy of the sys-
tem is significantly degraded by instrument measurement
error, operational fuel losses, and the inadequacies of national
reporting systems. As a result, IAEA's statements of nuclear
material accountability are necessarily probability statements
rather than statements of certainty. 5 Thus, the possibility
persists that a diversion of nuclear material will not be de-
tected, a possibility likely to increase in probability under pres-
ent procedures as peaceful nuclear facilities proliferate in num-
ber and size." Although IAEA must constantly balance the
need for credibility in its inspection statements with the incre-
mental costs of increasing the accuracy of its monitoring sys-
tem, its limited budget precludes significant increases in cer-
tainty using present verification methods.
It is well to remember, however, that the NPT is a political
document and exists as much to promote deterrence through
early detection and warning as it does to physically prevent
non-nuclear nations from acquiring discretionary nuclear ma-
terial.27 For this reason, any realistic critique of NPT loopholes
23. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1976, at 5, col. 7.
24. See McKNIGHT, supra note 13, at 97-150. The basic inspection documents are
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 and IAEA Doc. GC(V) INF/39.
25. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at V-52; R. IMAi, NUCLEAR
SAFEGUARDS 11-14 (Adelphi Paper No. 86, 1972) [hereinafter cited as IMAI].
26. Bomb production potential figures are provided for certain less-developed
countries in LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at V-6 to V-10. World
plutonium production to 1990 is estimated in FAcTs ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra
note 18, at 121.
27. IMAI, supra note 25, at 11-14.
1976
166 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
and IAEA inspection inadequacies must consider the economic
and political costs of a more rigorous prevention system, the
probabilities that these loopholes will be used, and the conse-
quences of such use."
The third problem area for proliferation is the nations that
have not ratified the NPT. Among these nations are the two
nuclear powers mentioned above and a number of nations with
the relatively developed economic and industrial capability
necessary to become nuclear powers.29 Many of these nuclear-
capable non-party nations are in regions with severe security
problems and rivalries, such as Israel and Egypt, India and
Pakistan, Brazil and Argentina, and South Africa. These secu-
rity pressures and other factors that might influence these na-
tions to acquire nuclear weapons are discussed in detail below.
A likely route for these potential nuclear nations to follow
in acquiring nuclear weapons will be that of peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs), following the example of India. India's nu-
clear explosion capability, developed by utilizing indigenous
nuclear experts and the by-products from inadequately safe-
guarded imported nuclear technology, 30 demonstrated that fur-
ther proliferation in the number of nuclear nations is likely to
bring no immediate international disaster and will probably
not trigger significant retaliation by other nations.3 1
For nations contemplating nuclear weapons, the advan-
tage of the PNE route is its ambiguous nature. Since a PNE is
indistinguishable from an explosion specifically for testing nu-
clear weapons and requires similar technology and research, a
PNE advertises that a nation has the tested capability to be a
nuclear weapons power, even while allowing the nation to claim
only peaceful intentions. This very ambiguity contributes to
the proliferation problem. Because the testing of a nuclear ex-
28. Id. at 15-20.
29. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 35, lists eleven nuclear-capable non-party nations.
See also STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE NEAR-NUCLEAR
COUNTRIES AND THE NPT (1972) for an in-depth analysis of the nuclear capabilities of
certain of these nations and of their attitudes toward the NPT and their interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons.
30. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 15-16. See also N.Y. Times, June 11, 1976, at A9,
col. 1.
31. Although Canada has permanently suspended its nuclear aid to India, India's
second Canadian-aided reactor, which was close to completion, can probably be made
operative using indigenous Indian expertise. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1976, at 8, col. 5.
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plosive is the last "firebreak" before actual deployment of nu-
clear weapons which other nations can readily use to measure
the intentions of the testing nation, these other nations must
consider the possibility-and difficulty in detecting-the cov-
ert manufacture of nuclear weapons by a nation with a proven
capability for nuclear explosions. One nation's PNE will
strongly motivate adversary nations to begin their own nuclear
weapons program to guard against this contingency.32 It is for
this reason that the NPT made a nuclear explosion of any kind
the equivalent of a nuclear weapons explosion.
Development of a PNE capability via the Indian pattern,
however, requires both domestic sources of nuclear expertise
and a supply of fissionable material. Since only those nations
with a relatively developed technological base and advanced
economy are likely to have the ability to support an indigenous
nuclear program, the number of nations that can realistically
be expected to develop PNEs is limited. Further, necessary
nuclear experts can be trained only with actual reactor experi-
ence, and reactors are currently the most probable source of
explosion-grade material.3 3 Thus, the best candidates for a na-
tional PNE program will be relatively developed nations that
either are not party to the NPT (and have non-safeguarded
reactors) or are party to the NPT (and have nuclear reactors
of sufficient size so that slight diversions of nuclear material
will escape detection). One recent study estimates that only 13
less-developed-nations will account for 90 percent of all nuclear
power generated by all less-developed countries by the year
2000.31 Those of the 13 nations that have not signed the NPT,
32. For an analysis of the effect of India's "peaceful" explosion on other nations
in the region, see Chandrasekhara Rao, Proliferation and the Indian Test: A View from
India, 16 SURVIVAL 210, 210-212 (1974); cf. Dougherty, Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,
19 ORBis 932-39 (1975).
33. Recent technological breakthroughs in laser enrichment technology may pro-
vide efficient and readily available alternatives to reactors as sources of explosion-
grade material in the future. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 1; see also N.Y.
Times, May 30, 1975, at 50, col. 1. In addition, centrifuge enrichment plants, now at
the pilot testing stage, are projected to be economical at less than one-third the mini-
mum size of presently-used gaseous diffusion enrichment plants. This will encourage
the purchase of enrichment technology by medium-power nations. N.Y. Times, July
5, 1976, at 24, col. 5.
34. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at 11-44. These nations are
Mexico, Iran, Taiwan, South Korea, the Phillipines, Thailand, India, Brazil, Argen-
tina, Pakistan, Singapore, Egypt, and Turkey; the latter seven are not parties to the
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plus the more developed non-party nations, comprise the likely
future nuclear nations and should be the focus of concern for
future PNE proliferation.
The possibility of nuclear diversions by non-governmental
personnel35 has received much attention in recent years. 31 Such
diversions, whether thefts by terrorists, criminals or political
factions, or simple diversions by nuclear reactor personnel for
personal use, would permit these persons or groups to fashion
crude atomic bombs. 37 These bombs could be used for economic
or political blackmail and outright destruction. While the po-
tential for theft or sabotage is difficult to estimate in all situa-
tions, 3 the Rosenbaum Report, prepared for the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission, estimated that the maximum threat of
non-governmental diversion in the United States could be
achieved by 15 highly trained persons and the threat to the
public of such illicit diversions is greater than any plausible
nuclear power plant accident. 39
NPT. Nuclear power plants in operation, under order or under construction worldwide
are provided in FACTS ON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 18, at 144-56. A listing
of research reactors in operation is in NUCLEAR AGE, supra note 17, at 82.
35. Willrich, Non Governmental Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, in STOCKHOLM
INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS 170-79
(1974) [hereinafter cited as NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS], includes as "non-
governmental personnel" one person acting alone, criminal groups, terrorist groups,
managers and personnel of nuclear facilities who are acting for their own gain, and
political factions within a nation.
36. PREVENTING NUCLEAR THEFt: GUIDELINES FOR INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT (R.
Leachman & P. Althoft ed. 1972); M. WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR THEFT: RISKS
AND SAFEGUARDS (1974); ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, FINDINGS
SUPPORTING DETERMINATION RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER EXPORT
ACTIVITIES 107-18 (1975)[hereinafter cited as ERDA FINDINGS]; LDC NUCLEAR POWER
PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at V-34 to V-40.
37. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission recently stated that at least 175 threats
of violence or actual incidents of violence have taken place against U.S. nuclear facili-
ties since 1969, although no diversion of nuclear material has been reported. Attacks
on nuclear facilities have also been reported in France, Argentina, and Italy. L.A.
Times, Apr. 25, 1976, § II, at 1, col. 2.
38. ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, I U.S. NUCLEAR POWER
EXPORT ACTIVITIES 6-1 to 6-8 (ERDA-1542, 1976) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT
ACTIVITIES], examines the rationale for thefts of differing nuclear materials and con-
cludes that while some nuclear materials are likely to be more attractive to terrorists
and other groups than other such materials, there is no way to predict the probability
of thefts occuring.
39. 120 CONG. REC. 86623 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1974). Other studies have also re-
ported a substantial threat. L.A. Times, Apr. 25, 1976, § II, at 1, col. 2.
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In the past, questions of physical protection40 were left
exclusively to the national government having possession of the
nuclear material and facilities.4 The IAEA provided advice,42
but did not require physical security. The questions of proper
responsibility for, and adequacy of, physical protection seemed
likely to remain unsolved either until a significant diversion
occurred or until technology provided economical solutions not
in conflict with national sovereignty. However, as a result of a
recent agreement, the United States, along with certain other
nuclear-exporting nations, will require importing countries to
have "adequate" physical security.43
III. THE PRESSURES FOR PROLIFERATION
Non-nuclear nations have three major inducements to ac-
quire nuclear weapons: (1) the need to maintain or increase
security; (2) the desire for greater international prestige; and
(3) the need for independent energy sources." Unfavorable bal-
ance of payments created or exacerbated by the recent petro-
leum crisis is the major pressure on nuclear nations (and oth-
ers) to export nuclear technology and source material." As de-
scribed below, however, a number of factors, including technol-
ogical advances in armaments and recent multinational safe-
guards agreements, may mitigate these proliferation pressures.
A. Security
A nation becomes concerned with its security when it per-
40. Willrich, supra note 35, at 179-86, discusses possible safeguards against non-
governmental diversions.
41. U.S. agreements for cooperation in nuclear matters have not required the
imposition of the relatively strict U.S. standards of physical security (which the Rosen-
baum Report, supra note 39, considers inadequate) on recipient nations.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., UNITED STATES AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY
14-15 (Comm. Print 1976).
42. See note 18 supra. The original guidelines were IAEA, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL (1972), reprinted in PEACEFUL NUCLEAR
EXPORTS, supra note 16, at 789. Newly revised guidelines are in IAEA, THE PHYSICAL
PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/225, Sept. 1975, and reprinted
in 2 EXPORT ACTIVITIES, supra note 38, at C-8.
43. Statement of Fred C. Ikle, Director, United States Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, before the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International
Organizations, and Security Agreements, Feb. 23, 1976.
44. These pressures are explored in G. QUESTER, THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION 2-8 (1973) [hereinafter cited as QUESTER], and analyzed in depth in L.
JENSEN, RETURN FROM THE NUCLEAR BRINK 1-48 (1974) [hereinafter cited as JENSEN1.
45. QUESTER, supra note 44, at 8-11; JENSEN, supra note 44, at 51-75.
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ceives a danger of attack on its territory. Such an attack may
utilize nuclear armaments, conventional (high explosive) ar-
maments, or a combination of the two. A threatened attack
with either type of armament creates an incentive for a nation
to acquire nuclear weapons in order to deter that attack; how-
ever, the remedies to minimize this perceived need for addi-
tional security vary with the type of armament that is threaten-
ing.
Until recently, nuclear weapons and delivery systems were
perceived in the context of a cold war in which the nuclear
nations directed their weapons exclusively against an opposing
superpower or its nuclear allies. The relatively bipolar alliance
system, the then prevailing concept of international politics as
a zero-sum game, and the dominant strategic theory of mutual
assured destruction (which targeted all nuclear weapons on
adversary nuclear nations) all gave a measure of credibility to
assurances by nuclear nations that the non-nuclear nations
were not nuclear targets, and that if a non-nuclear nation be-
came the target of nuclear aggression, other nuclear nations
would come to its defense.
Two events changed this situation and increased the per-
ceived need46 by non-nuclear nations for nuclear weapons.
First, the bipolar alliance system has fallen into decay and is
being replaced by a number of regional power centers." This
decreases the credibility of guarantees given by nuclear powers
to protect non-nuclear nations from nuclear aggression. Sec-
ond, technological breakthroughs have enabled nuclear nations
to maintain the necessary deterrence against other nuclear na-
tions, while at the same time targeting strategic nuclear weap-
ons on non-nuclear nations. 9 These two factors increase the
46. Jensen did content analysis on speeches made at the 1968 U.N. General As-
sembly debate on NPT and discovered that security was the most salient issue raised
by the speakers. JENSEN, supra note 44, at 2. See also Gellner, The Conference on Non-
Nuclear- Weapon States, 1968: A Survey of Views and Proposals, in Hearing on the
Nonproliferation Treaty Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong.,
Ist Sess., pt. 2, at 450 (1969).
47. A. HARTLEY, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON ERA 13 (Adelphi Paper
No. 110, 1974).
48. For an assessment of this problem as it affects the U.S. guarantee to Japan,
see R. CLOUGH, EAST ASIA AND U.S. SECURITY 91-93 (1975).
49. Nuclear missiles are now able to offer this dual use because of new rapid
retargeting capabilities and increases in the number of targets that can be destroyed
by a given number of missiles. The introduction in the U.S. of the Command Data
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credibility of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
nations."' Since the only generally accepted defense against the
threat of nuclear attack is deterrence through threatened retal-
iation by other nuclear weapons, these events serve to
strengthen non-nuclear nations' perception of nuclear weapons
as necessary to maintain their prior level of security.
Nuclear weapons also have deterrence value against the
threat of attack by conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons in
this instance act to increase a nation's security as against a
conventionally armed adversary. For this reason, nations in
conflict situations (such as Israel) may be tempted to manufac-
ture nuclear weapons,' although such manufacture may act to
spur regional nuclear proliferation and in time cancel whatever
security increase was initially achieved.
From a security standpoint, increasing the prospects for
nonproliferation means: (1) reducing the perceived threat of
nuclear attack; (2) reducing the perceived threat of conven-
tional attack; (3) devising substitutes with substantial deter-
rence value to replace nuclear weapons; and (4) strengthening
the belief that proliferation will be the precursor of a nuclear
holocaust. As explained below, a continuing opportunity exists
to implement the first and last of these strategies, and technol-
ogical advances may now provide a means to implement the
third strategy.
Reducing the perceived threat of nuclear attack involves
short-term assurances and long-term substantive changes. In
the short term, nuclear nations must voice assurances that
their nuclear weapons targeting policy does not threaten non-
nuclear nations, that they will react strongly to any threat of
nuclear attack on non-nuclear nations, and that they will avoid
the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations. These
assurances were last provided substantively in 1968 through
United Nations Security Council Resolution 255;52 this Resolu-
Buffer System allows individual missiles to be retargeted in 36 minutes and the entire
Minuteman III missile force to be retargeted in 10 hours. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
ANNUAL DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT: FY 1977, at 79 (1976). The U.S. targeting policy
which promotes nuclear insecurity is dismissed in L. DAVIS, LImIr NUCLEAR OPTIONS
(Adelphi Paper No. 121, 1976).
50. Rathjens, Flexible Response Options, 18 ORBIS 687 (1974).
51. Supra note 21.
52. S/Res./255, 23 U.N. SCOR 1430th meeting in U.N. Doc. S/PV 1430 (1968). The
resolution applauded the:
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tion has been criticized, however, for its vagueness and lack of
firm commitment. 3 Another opportunity for providing such
assurances came at the recent Geneva Review Conference: an
Additional Protocol to the NPT restating the pledge of assis-
tance to threatened non-nuclear nations in slightly stronger
language was proposed, 54 but was not included in the Final
Declaration.
Reducing the perceived threat of nuclear attack can also
be achieved by actively supporting the movement for nuclear-
weapons-free zones. These zones-areas in which nuclear
weapons would be banned-would act to strengthen the per-
ceived security of nations within the zones by reducing fears
that neighbors will choose to acquire nuclear weapons. In re-
cent years the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific and South
America have been proposed as nuclear-weapons-free zones.
The proposal for a "Zone of Peace" comprising the Indian
Ocean and littoral countries, although repeatedly passed by
the U.N. General Assembly, is embroiled in a controversy over
international freedom of the seas and the zone's possible effect
on the current U.N. Law of the Sea Conference. Generally, the
. . . intention expressed by certain states that they will provide or sup-
port immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-
nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of
aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
53. Goldblatt, The U.N. Security Council Resolution of 19 June 1968 and the
Security of Non-nuclear-weapon States, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, supra
note 35, at 236. See also M. WILLRICH, NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 166-73 (1969). For an analysis of the problems of unilateral
guarantees by nuclear nations to non-nuclear nations, see Schwarz, Inhibition Through
Policy: The Role of the Non-Nuclear Powers, in A WORLD OF NUCLEAR POWERS? 143-47
(1966). A general discussion of "no first use" declarations in the context of nuclear
nonproliferation is in Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications,
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the
House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 33, 59-60, 234 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Nuclear Proliferation].
54. Final Documents of the Review Conference of the Treaty for Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF/22, at 2 [hereinafter cited as Final Documents],
which said in part:
Article 3. In the event a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty
becomes a victim of an attack with nuclear weapons or of a threat with
the use of such weapons, the States Parties to the Protocol, at the request
of the victim of such threat or attack, undertake to provide to it immedi-
ate assistance without prejudice to their obligations under the United
Nations Charter.
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nuclear nations have not favored the Indian Ocean zone.55 The
recent proposal for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone5" is certain
to encounter the same resistance, as well as French intransig-
ence toward interference with her nuclear testing area. South
America, acting through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nu-
clear Weapons in Latin America,57 has made the most progress
toward actually implementing such a zone, although the
Treaty has not yet entered into force for all Latin American
nations.5"
In the long term, however, reductions in the perceived
threat of nuclear attack will require substantive changes by the
nuclear nations to make the international environment less
threatening. This must include a reduction in the number of
existing nuclear weapons, a reduction or end to nuclear weap-
ons testing, and an increased emphasis on international coop-
eration and compromise. But more is needed: until the causes
and dynamics of a "fear of nuclear attack" can be clearly iden-
tified and understood, attempts by nuclear nations to restruc-
ture the international environment to promote nonproliferation
must be haphazard and will often take a back seat to more
compelling national policies.
Reductions in the perceived threat of conventional attack
will derive from reductions in the number and intensity of dis-
putes between nations, mitigation of regional conventional
arms races, 59 and the use of strengthened international
adjudicatory machinery, 0 to name just a few of the many fac-
tors thought to influence international conflict. These factors
can be altered by both non-nuclear and nuclear nations.
55. Misra, International Politics in the Indian Ocean, 18 ORsls 1093-99 (1975).
The official U.S. policy toward nuclear-weapon-free zones is given in NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 236.
56. 18 SURVIVAL 32-33 (1976).
57. Done Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281.
58. See U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISAR-
MAMENT AGREEMENTS 55-60 (1975) for a brief history of the Treaty and its accompanying
protocols.
59. A comprehensive analysis of regional arms races is found in STOCKHOLM INTER-
NATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ARMS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD (1971).
One example of regional conventional arms control is Latin America's Ayachuco Pact.
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1975, at 4, col. 4.
60. A proposal for strengthening the machinery is R. HOLTON, AN INTERNATIONAL
PEACE COURT (1970). F. GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
(1969) describes the contemporary international justice structure.
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Unfortunately, no effective substitute has been found to
replace nuclear weapons as a deterrent against the threat of
strategic nuclear attack."' While the "weight of world opinion"
and collective security through a strengthened U.N. security
force have been proposed as substitutes for nuclear weapons,
the utility of these proposals remains to be shown. The idea
that economic forces are achieving more weight in this increas-
ingly interdependent global society of nations has gained re-
spectability in the last decade, but the ability of these forces
to effectively counterbalance the threat of nuclear weapons in
any particular circumstance is problematical.2 In spite of the
uncertainty of these forces, however, they should be strength-
ened whenever possible, as they may well be the ultimate solu-
tion to the problem of nuclear weapons and their proliferation.
Fortunately, less devastating means have been invented to
maintain a nation's security in the face of a threatened conven-
tional attack. The new technology of precision-guided conven-
tional munitions promises to strengthen the capabilities of the
defender nation over a conventional attacker at a reasonable
cost, certainly at a cost much less than that of acquiring nu-
clear weapons."1 The proliferation of these munitions should
encourage feelings of greater security in nations subject to re-
gional adversary relationships."
Another avenue for decreasing the likelihood of prolifera-
tion rests on the belief that proliferation equals nuclear disas-
ter. The belief that increasing the number of nations possessing
nuclear weapons increases the probability that they will be
61. Conventionally-armed long-range cruise missiles equipped with the new ter-
minal guidance technology may offer a partial substitute. Burt, The Cruise Missile and
Arms Control, 18 SURVIVAL 15 (1976). For the view that long-range cruise missiles will
only lead to additional nuclear weapons proliferation, see STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAl.
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: SIPRI YEARBOOK
1975 337 (1975).
62. For an analysis of the present-day relationship between economic forces and
military power, see Bergsten, et al., International Economics and International Poli-
tics: A Framework for Analysis, in WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 6-
10 (1975).
63. J. DIGRY, PRECISION-GUIDED WEAPONS 12 (Adelphi Paper No. 118, 1975).
64. But see Merglen, Military Lessons of the October War, in THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 26-27 (Adelphi Paper No. 114, 1975), who states that
the impact of precision-guided missiles depends on the type of war (in guerilla wars
the new technology strengthens the rebels), the characteristics of opposing equipment,
and geographical factors, among others.
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used rests on a number of hypotheses: the increased chance
that nuclear weapons will be launched by mistake or by a local
commander who can evade poor command and control proce-
dures, the greater chance for theft by-or transfer to-extra-
nationalist (terrorist) groups, the fear that nations lacking
strong conventional forces will use their nuclear weapons at the
onset of any hostilities, and the greater number of independent
national decision makers who may miscalculate. 5
It is unfortunate that the validity of this belief depends on
the advantage of nonproliferation to the international com-
munity as a whole. From the perspective of each individual
nation, the acquisition of a nuclear explosive capability brings
immediate advantages and few, if any, disadvantages. Since it
is not clear even to the most ardent nonproliferationist when
the prudent level of proliferation has been breached, each as-
piring nation can argue in favor of nonproliferation but state
that an exception should be made in its case and that the world
will be no worse off for one more nuclear power. India's
"peaceful" nuclear explosion made it clear that the magic
number of nuclear nations was not five, and that a single incre-
ment of proliferation did not precede nuclear disaster. 7 How-
ever, the nonproliferation proponents hold the strong argument
that unlimited proliferation increases the chance of nuclear
disaster, and no one can tell which new nuclear power will
precipitate an international nuclear conflict. This uncer-
tainty, and the inertia of the status quo, clearly serve the non-
proliferation cause and should be strengthened whenever possi-
ble.
B. Prestige
A nation's drive for increased prestige and a higher inter-
national status forms another inducement to acquire nuclear
65. For these and other arguments, see Bull, Rethinking Non-proliferation, 51
INT'L AFF. 177-79 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Bull], and G. FISCHER, THE NON-
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 30-32 (1971).
66. India's justification for her PNE is given in Subrahmanyam, Indian Attitudes
Toward the NPT, in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, supra note 35, at 259-60. See
also Trivedi, India's Approach Towards Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation of Nu-
clear Weapons, in ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION, NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS 42-46
(1975) [hereinafter cited as NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS].
67. Bull, supra note 65, at 178-80.
68. The Review Conference's Final Declaration clearly links further proliferation
to the possibility of international nuclear disaster, thereby adding further credibility
to the hypothesis. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 1.
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capability. Generally, international status is concomitant with
relative national power and the freedom to use that power. In
the present international situation where so few nations have
nuclear weapons, the acquisition of a nuclear explosion capa-
bility by a nation is certain to enhance its relative national
power and-as India illustrated-to enhance its international
status. Prestige is enhanced as well when a nation has full
control of its programs and facilities; a nation subject to fre-
quent IAEA inspections and NPT restrictions will tend toward
diminished prestige.
A nation may attempt to increase its prestige in order to
have a greater ability to influence international events, to give
a greater weight to a particular viewpoint, to be included in
international conferences or consultations, to enhance deter-
rence of adversary nations, or to placate the domestic polity. 9
The increasing availability of nuclear technology" and the de-
creasing cost of preparing nuclear explosives7 may make nu-
clear proliferation an increasingly attractive method of achiev-
ing these goals in a relatively short time.
However, recent events have helped devalue nuclear capa-
bility as a currency of international status and prestige. The
Vietnam War illustrated the disutility of nuclear weapons in
wars of national liberation, and India's nuclear status reduced
the incremental gain that each new nuclear nation can achieve
upon admission to the "nuclear club." In addition, by remain-
ing non-nuclear and achieving high status, nations like Japan
and Germany have shown the availability of alternative routes
to great power status.
The value of nuclear weapons can also be diminished by
reducing the discrimination against non-nuclear nations
caused by the NPT. This discrimination takes two forms: dis-
crimination in NPT obligations and discrimination in nuclear
opportunities. Measures which have been taken to reduce the
69. H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 69-78 (4th ed. 1966).
70. The international channels for the transfer of nuclear technology are described
in 1 EXPORT ACTIVITIES, supra note 38, at 3-165 to 3-166.
71. India claimed the cost of building the explosive device was $400,000, but this
understates the actual cost since the research and development was funded through
the nuclear power program. Press Release No. 8/74, Information Service of India, June
17, 1974, at 7-8. For recent technological breakthroughs that promise to reduce the cost
of building nuclear explosives, see note 33 supra.
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NPT discrimination in obligations include applying IAEA safe-
guards to peaceful nuclear reactors in some nuclear nations72
and promoting regional enrichment and waste processing facil-
ities under multinational control, in order to reduce the de-
pendency of non-nuclear nations on nuclear nations."
Discrimination in nuclear opportunity-that is, the liberty
to pursue technological progress via an unfettered nuclear re-
search program-can be minimized by: (1) inducing all nations
to become parties to the NPT, thereby equalizing opportunity
for non-nuclear nations, or (2) increasing the rewards available
to non-nuclear nations that are parties to the NPT to compen-
sate for their inability to utilize nuclear explosions in re-
search." Under Articles IV and V of the Treaty, a non-nuclear
nation's special rewards would be any benefits of nuclear explo-
sion research conducted by nuclear nations, a low-cost peaceful
nuclear explosion service, and preferential access to peaceful
nuclear equipment, materials, and information. In fact, while
IAEA disseminates some information, much nuclear informa-
tion and technology is not made available by nuclear nations.
In addition, the PNE service has not been successful 5 and
other benefits of discriminatory access on the basis of NPT
membership have not materialized."
C. Economic
Certain economic factors also act to foster the develop-
ment of nuclear explosion capabilities in non-nuclear coun-
tries. Four are prominent: (1) the need for progress; (2) the
72. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 24-25.
73. The problem of inadequate enrichment facilities and national control of the
available enrichment technology is discussed in LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS,
supra note 22, at IV-30 to IV-34. The Review Conference in its Final Declaration
recognized possible advantages of multinational fuel cycle centers. Final Documents,
NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 6. And the United States has begun to conduct the
studies necessary to promote multinational fuel cycle centers. Press Release No. 76-3,
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Feb. 23, 1976. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
supra note 53, at 88-90, 148, provides a brief look at problems associated with regional
enrichment facilities.
74. The Final Declaration of the Review Conference recommended that the devel-
oped states make special contributions for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in
developing states. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 5.
75. IAEA Activities Under Article V of NPT, NPT/CONF/12, at 9-10, reprinted
in PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPORTS, supra note 15, at 831-32.
76. The proposal that nuclear parties to the Treaty should export nuclear technol-
ogy and source material only to other nations party to the Treaty has never been
implemented by nuclear nations.
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costs of nuclear dependency; (3) the need for a PNE capability;
and (4) the need to establish a more favorable balance of pay-
ments.
The discriminatory nature of the NPT extends to future
commercial benefits. According to many non-nuclear nations
the NPT will act to retard their progress in technological devel-
opment by limiting the amount of nuclear research that they
can accomplish. Since nuclear nations alone can conduct the
nuclear explosions which may be necessary for full research and
testing, these nations are more likely to discover and initially
utilize technological breakthroughs that may be the keys to a
better society. Non-nuclear nations will be relegated to the
permanent position of nuclear consumers purchasing progres-
sive nuclear technology and "spin off" products from nuclear
nations and thereby paying indirectly for the research they
cannot fully conduct themselves. Since nations are loath to
allow the direction and extent of their social progress to be
dictated by external research and marketing decisions, pres-
sures mount for independent national nuclear research pro-
grams which include a nuclear explosion capability.
The direct costs of nuclear dependency are also difficult for
non-nuclear nations to bear. While the expense of IAEA inspec-
tions is shared by all nations, the inconvenience of the inspec-
tion falls in main on the non-nuclear nations. Since the number
of peaceful nuclear facilities is expected to rise sharply in the
coming decades, both the expense and inconvenience of IAEA
monitoring will weigh more heavily on the non-nuclear na-
tions.77 In addition, non-nuclear nations now must ship nuclear
materials to and from nuclear nations for reprocessing and en-
richment."s The difficulty of shipping and guarding this mate-
rial means additional expense to the nation's nuclear program
and provides another incentive to acquire an indigenous repro-
cessing and enrichment capability, each a step toward a nu-
clear explosion capability.
77. This problem was recognized by the Review Conference, which recommended
limiting the costs to developing nations. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/, Annex I,
at 4.
78. See note 73 supra, for activity toward regional fuel cycle centers. Studies are
being conducted in the U.S. to determine the feasibility of an "international nuclear
transportation service," which might ease transportation problems and provide in-
creased security. N.Y. Times, May 15, 1976, at 5, col. 7.
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The third economic argument turns on the perceived bene-
fits of peaceful nuclear explosions qua explosions. For perform-
ing jobs such as excavations, one estimate places the cost of a
ten kiloton nuclear explosive at $35 per ton of explosive power
and a 100 kiloton nuclear explosive device at $4.50 per ton,
versus a cost for conventional explosives of $460 per ton. 9 How-
ever, this estimate fails to reflect the cost of safeguards that
may be necessary for nuclear excavation, such as moving popu-
lations to safer areas and preventing radioactive contamination
from escaping into the atmosphere. Despite the apparent low
cost of nuclear explosions for peaceful uses, the practicality of
PNEs remains in doubt. Although the Soviet Union continues
to tout the PNE as commercially valuable, the United States
"Plowshare" program for testing PNEs has produced only mar-
ginal evidence of commercial benefit and has been virtually
abandoned. 0 Nonetheless, non-nuclear nations remain at-
tracted to the potential of PNEs for accomplishing huge tasks
at reduced costs,8' and the IAEA, at the request of the United
Nations, has been studying the economic feasibility of applied
PNEs.
The last factor to consider is the energy crisis. The sharply
increasing costs of oil imports have had two effects: non-
nuclear nations are attracted to nuclear energy in order to re-
duce their dependence on costly oil energy and the industrial-
ized nuclear nations come under pressures to export nuclear
facilities and technology in order to generate the capital inflow
necessary to balance the huge expenditures for imported petro-
leum. In effect, the energy crisis has edged the potential nu-
clear suppliers and purchasers closer together.
The economic picture is not all one-sided, however, since
a number of factors combine to constrain the further prolifera-
79. JENSEN, supra note 44, at 59-60.
80. MADDOX, supra note 16, at 29-30. Scoville, Peaceful Nuclear Explosives-An
Invitation to Proliferation, in NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 66, at 47,
provides a short history of the problems and disappointments in the U.S.-U.S.S.R.
PNE programs. One reason the U.S.S.R. may continue to have optimism about PNE
utility is the availability of vast, sparsely settled space in the Soviet Union which
reduces the cost of radiation safeguards and movement of population.
81. The most recent proposal to be publicized concerned an Egyptian plan to use
PNEs to blast a canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Kattara Depression 42 miles
inland, thereby creating an artifical salt lake 4,300 square miles in size. Denver Post,
Nov. 27, 1975, at 59, col. 3.
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tion of nuclear power plants in less-developed countries. First,
in many less-developed countries the capacity of the national
electric grid is not sufficient to accomodate a nuclear generat-
ing plant of the relatively large sizes now offered for sale and
still maintain reliable service in the event of reactor shut-
down.2 There are presently no plans to market smaller nuclear
power plants."1 Second, the cost of commercial reactor technol-
ogy is itself skyrocketing. 4 And third, the dependency in fuel
reprocessing and reactor servicing that follows purchase of nu-
clear reactors means that non-nuclear nations will look more
favorably on developing indigenous sources of fuel, such as
coal, oil shale, or hydroelectric power.,5
A number of steps have been suggested by which nuclear
nations could defeat the economic pressures for nuclear prolif-
eration. Countries rich in nuclear technology and/or source
materials could form a cartel to restrict the supply of technol-
ogy and uranium in order to drive up prices and make prolifera-
tion more expensive." They could agree to place uniform (or
IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear exports," or allow nuclear ex-
ports only to countries party to the NPT. Finally, the nuclear
nations could endeavor to provide the promised preferential
treatment to non-nuclear NPT-party nations.
The most effective anti-proliferation device, at least in the
short term, would be a comprehensive suppliers' cartel. While
such a cartel would not eliminate the ability of many non-
nuclear nations to develop a nuclear explosion capability, it
would force significant delay on most nations and would re-
strain the competition by nuclear nations to export the technol-
ogy. However, while cartelization of nuclear technology and
source material could meet the needs of nuclear-exporting na-
tions for higher prices and income, it would also increase the
discrimination toward the non-nuclear nations.
82. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at 11-8.
83. Id. at 11-42.
84. Id. at 11-12 to 11-13.
85. Id. at 111-38 to 111-41. NUCLEAR AGE, supra note 17, at 1-17, provides an over-
view of non-nuclear energy sources.
86. See Willrich & Marston, Prospects for a Uranium Cartel, 19 ORBIS 166 (1975).
An alternative to the price/supply cartel is a market-sharing cartel, which has been
advocated as a device to reduce nuclear export competition. Ribicoff, A Market-
Sharing Approach to the World Nuclear Sales Problem, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 769 (1976).
87. This was recommended by the Review Conference. Final Documents,
NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 4.
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To date, nuclear nations have not attempted to restrict
exports in any comprehensive fashion" or to maintain artifi-
cially high prices. The difficulty of utilizing a cartel strategy
to promote nonproliferation lies in the structure of the market
for nuclear technology, the difficulty in differentiating peaceful
nuclear technology from nuclear weapon technology, and the
language of Article IV of the Treaty. The market for nuclear
technology and source material contains numerous suppliers,
and these suppliers for both economic and political reasons do
not appear capable of the concerted action necessary to main-
tain high prices or successfully restrict exports."
In fact, the haste of supplier nations to get into the nuclear
reactor market has depressed prices below the market level,
and exporting governments have often subsidized sales.'" Fur-
ther, Article IV(2) of the NPT requires the "fullest possible"
exchange of information and technology for peaceful nuclear
uses. Such transfers cannot be explicitly restricted or termi-
nated without violating the NPT,91 and a cartel involving only
nuclear weapon technology is impossible because the technol-
88. The U.S. has stated that it will use restraint in exporting the technology of
fuel enrichment, spent fuel processing, and heavy water. Statement of Fred C. Ikle,
Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the Senate
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agree-
ments, Feb. 23, 1976. That "restraint" falls short of the comprehensiveness necessary
for successful cartel action is shown by the export actions of West Germany and
France, supra note 20, and of India, supra note 22.
89. Nor do supplier nations appear willing to impose a total embargo on all nu-
clear exports. For a summary of the arguments for and against a total moratorium on
U.S. nuclear exports (and the conclusion that such a moratorium would not be in the
national interest and would actually stimulate proliferation), see ERDA FINDINGS,
supra note 36, at 138-45. Variations on a total embargo-abrupt or phased termination
of exports, embargo of only new orders and embargo of only certain nuclear ex-
ports-are explored in 1 ExPORT ACTIVITIES, supra note 38, at 9-11 to 9-20. See also
Joskow, The International Nuclear Industry Today, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 788 (1976).
90. LDC NUCLEAR POWER PROSPECTS, supra note 22, at IV-35 to IV-37. See also
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 101-02.
91. The argument has been made that Article IV is an empty gesture, since control
of nuclear technology and information will in the future be held by national industrial
concerns that will utilize secrecy as a normal commercial practice and that will act in
concert with the nation's interest. Thus, commercialization of nuclear energy may
sharply limit the scope of any "possible" governmental exchange of technology. Gold-
schmidt, International Nuclear Collaboration and Article IV of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEMS, supra note 35, at 204-05. Proposals have
been put forth in the United States to permit private companies to own nuclear enrich-
ment facilities, but these proposals have not yet been accepted. N.Y. Times, Apr. 5,
1976, at 15, col. 1.
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ogy for a PNE is indistinguishable from that for a nuclear
weapons explosion. In short, although a cartel of nuclear ex-
porting nations is legally 2 and technically feasible, it lacks
practicability.
The application of mandatory safeguards by exporting
nations has been a more fruitful strategy in minimizing and
canalizing export pressures. Twice in recent years nuclear na-
tions have agreed to make mandatory IAEA safeguards on their
nuclear exports. In 1974, Britain, Canada, the United States,
West Germany, the U.S.S.R. and a number of smaller nations
agreed that all of their exports of fissionable material made to
nations not party to the NPT would be placed under IAEA
safeguards."t The second agreement, which was revealed in
February 1976, added Japan and France to the above list94 and
stated that all recipient nations must apply IAEA safeguards
to all nuclear imports from these nuclear nations. 5 In addition,
both agreements required reassurances from the recipient na-
tion that the nuclear material and technology would not be
diverted to the production of any nuclear explosive device, and
that the imported material would not be retransferred by the
recipient nation without adequate safeguards. While this uni-
form application of safeguards does not equalize NPT
obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear parties, it does
move to equalize the economic burden of safeguards which had
hitherto often been imposed to varying degrees on different
nuclear importing nations. Further, these agreements reduce
the advantages to non-nuclear nations of remaining outside the
NPT.
92. See Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels under United
States Antitrust and Public International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 615 (1975).
93. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/209, Sept. 1974, at 3, and subsequent additions.
94. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1976, at 1, col. 8. Sweden, the German Democratic
Repuhlic, the Netherlands, and Italy may soon subscribe to the agreement. N.Y.
Times, June 2, 1976, at 16, col. 1.
95. Statement of Fred C. Ikle, Director, United States Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, before Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organi-
zations, and Security Agreements, Feb. 23, 1976, at 1. This agreement was the product
of a conference of major nuclear exporting nations, sometimes called the Nuclear
Suppliers Conference, which has been meeting in London. A new session of the Confer-
ence, which is expected to consider special controls and supervision for exports of
nuclear reprocessing equipment, began June 1, 1976, in London. N.Y. Times, June 2,
1976, at 16, col. 1.
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The policy of restricting all nuclear exports to non-nuclear
nations that have ratified the NPT has never been imple-
mented by any nuclear nation. The question was last raised in
the U.S. in the context of President Nixon's offer to sell nuclear
power plants to Egypt and Israel.9" At that time the argument
was made that such a policy would be unproductive because
of the number of available nuclear suppliers and would be
counterproductive since it would reduce U.S. influence in those
nations." Because many non-NPT nations are the more devel-
oped Third World nations presently important to the foreign
policies of nuclear nations, these arguments remain valid
today.
Proposals for the preferential treatment of non-nuclear
nations, mandated by Article V, were presented once again at
the Geneva Review Conference. Such preferential treatment as
proposed would include reduced rates in the supply of nuclear
equipment, material and information, and a Special Fund pro-
vided by developed nations and under the supervision of the
IAEA which would be used for technical assistance to non-
nuclear nations and for nuclear research."' Although a recom-
mendation to this effect was included in the Final Declara-
tion,19 no concrete developments have since emerged.
IV. PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
Although it has many loopholes, there is little immediate
likelihood that substantive amendments will be proposed to
"tighten up" the NPT. There are a number of reasons for this,
including the fact that the prospect for proliferation via non-
nuclear parties to the NPT appears remote and the problem
that making the obligations of the NPT more difficult to evade
would likely require deeper intrusions into the sovereignty of
non-nuclear nations. The NPT, moreover, is difficult to
amend.'""
96. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 4, col. 1. However, a resolution which urges such
a restriction (provided other major nuclear suppliers agree) is currently before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee after having passed the House. H.R. Con. Res.
570, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
97. 1 EXPORT ACTIvmES, supra note 38, 4-1 to 4-7, 9-20.
98. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/II, Annex II, at 17.
99. Id., NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 5.
100. The complex amendment procedures of Article VIII of the Treaty in effect
give each nuclear nation which is a party to the Treaty and all nations on the IAEA
Board of Governors an absolute veto over the amendment.
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In addition, it is unlikely that the IAEA safeguards system
will be extended in scope or significantly improved. At present,
the system monitors compliance with Article III (non-
diversion) obligations only. Other NPT obligations of non-
nuclear nations-not to manufacture and not to import-can
be policed only with radical (and improbable) increases in
IAEA inspection authority and concomitant increases in staff-
ing and cost. Similarly, any expansion of IAEA vigilance
through an intensified application of present operational proce-
dures would be costly. Consequently, significant improvements
are likely only when technology provides new and economical
solutions that do not extensively conflict with national sover-
eignty."" While the IAEA continues to research improvements
in safeguards, no such solutions appear on the horizon.
The low probability of substantial improvements in the
NPT or its mode of implementation means that realistic efforts
to encourage nonproliferation must look to other strategies.
These closely interrelated strategies include increasing the
number of subscribers to the NPT and countering the on-going
pressures that encourage non-nuclear nations to "go nuclear"
and nuclear nations to assist them. While significant move-
ment toward universal adherence to the NPT is unlikely to
occur until the substantial pressures promoting proliferation
are eased, the causal connection may be reversed if a number
of non-party nations-particularly the nuclear-capable and
nuclear nations-were to ratify the NPT. °2 The resulting
"bandwagon effect" might overpower the pressures for prolifer-
ation acting on remaining non-party nations and bring about
unanimous ratification. Regardless of the order in which these
strategies are pursued, the goal remains a universal ratification
of the NPT in order to significantly delay further prolifera-
tion. 103
These strategies can be implemented by formal interna-
tional agreements of two types, both of which have a low proba-
101. The Review Conference, while recommending that safeguards be improved,
qualified that recommendation by calling for "optimum cost effectiveness" in the
implementation of the safeguards. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35i, Annex I, at 3.
102. Japan's recent ratification of the NPT may aid this movement toward uni-
versal adherence. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1976, at 2, col. 7.
103. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 1. Not all nations are in
agreement with this goal, however.
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bility of success. The first type of international agreement is a
supplemental agreement, that is, an agreement closely tied to
the NPT. At the recent Geneva Review Conference two Addi-
tional Protocols to the NPT were proposed which set forth in
contractual terms trade-offs between additional NPT ratifica-
tions and actions by nuclear nations. Additional Protocol I re-
quired nuclear powers to suspend all underground nuclear test-
ing for ten years once one hundred nations had ratified the
NPT, to extend that suspension by three years each time five
additional nations ratified the NPT, and to make the suspen-
sion of underground tests permanent once all other nuclear
nations become parties to the NPT.'14 Additional Protocol II
proposed an initial major reduction in nuclear strategic deliv-
ery vehicles once the number of NPT parties reached one
hundred and further incremental reductions in such vehicles
whenever an additional ten nations became parties.' 5 Since
neither Additional Protocol was included in the Final Declara-
tion of the Review Conference, the likelihood of agreements of
this type coming into force in the near future is not high.'10
The second approach utilizing international agreements
would require the implementation of the NPT's Article IV,
which urges movement toward a treaty on general and com-
plete disarmament. Since the rationale for the NPT closely ties
nuclear war not only to proliferation between nations but also
to arms races among existing nuclear nations, movements to
halt or reverse the costly nuclear arms races should diminish
the perceived militarization of the international environ-
ment."7 While international agreements such as the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty and SALT I are now in effect, these were
not perceived by non-nuclear nations at the Review Conference
as having materially reduced the arms race or the quantity of
nuclear weapon power in the world today.' 8 The continuing
104. Id.. NPT/CONF/35/II, Annex II, at 4.
105. Id., at 8.
106. Epstein states that the nuclear powers at the Review Conference rejected
both Protocols. W. EPSTEIN, RETROSPECTIVE ON THE NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: PROPOS-
AILS FOR THE FUTURE (Stanley Foundation Occasional Paper No. 9, 1975).
107. The connection between a comprehensive test ban treaty and the NPT is
briefly explored in Hearings on S.Res. 230 and S.Res. 273 Before the Subcommittee
on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1972).
108. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, at 8. Also see, for example, the
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purchases by nuclear nations of more and improved nuclear
warheads, nuclear delivery systems, and other arms reinforces
the image of nuclear nations lusting for military power.'"9 Since
the NPT, in essence, attempts to trade a portion of the sover-
eignty of non-nuclear nations for comprehensive arms control
by nuclear powers, the failure to achieve meaningful arms con-
trol emphasizes the discriminatory nature of NPT's obliga-
tions. In the near future, breakthroughs in the progress of arms
control negotiations significant enough to alter the perceptions
of the non-nuclear nations do not appear likely;" 0 thus, this
approach, too, offers little hope for moderating nuclear prolifer-
ation.
V. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, it is clear that future nonproliferation
is by no means assured. The NPT "dike" contains a number
of weak spots, any one of which may in time develop into a
major breach, and many international pressures encourage
non-nuclear nations to exploit these weaknesses.
There are no easy solutions. Prospects for multilateral
treaties to close the NPT loopholes are poor. No major im-
provements to the current safeguards system are on the hori-
zon, and substantial increases in IAEA staffing and budget are
improbable. Comprehensive arms control is likely to take
decades (if it can be accomplished at all), and international
conflict is certain to continue. What, then, can be expected in
the future?
First, the non-nuclear, NPT-member nations are unlikely
to develop nuclear weapons in the near future. Since relatively
few nuclear reactors as yet have been completed in most na-
Yugoslav statement on this point. Final Documents, NPT/CONF/35/II, Annex II, at
32. The point is amplified in Epstein, NPTArticle VI: How Have the Parties Met Their
Obligations?, in NPT: PARADOXES AND PROBLEMS, supra note 66, at 74.
109. This image is reinforced as well by a recent study sponsored by private arms
control organizations in the United States, which found world military expenditures
to be at a record high and characterized the arms race as "out of control." N.Y. Times,
Mar. 1, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
110. The difficulty of achieving a general and complete disarmament is examined
in J. DOUGHERTY, How TO THINK ABOUT ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 107-29 (1973).
Nonetheless, there continues to be progress in arms limitation: the most recent agree-
ment is a size limitation on underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
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tions,"' there presently exists little nuclear source material
which, althouqh safeguarded, is available for clandestine diver-
sion. In addition, considerations of cost and competing priori-
ties, as well as the generally low level of technological develop-
ment ' '2 and the commitment to the NPT, combine to minimize
the near-term potential for proliferation in this group of na-
tions. This delay is advantageous, since it will provide the
IAEA with the opportunity to develop the more effective safe-
guard techniques which might make these nations perma-
nently "safe" from indigenously-developed nuclear weapons.
Second, the recent actions of the major nuclear exporting
nations, which admirably mitigate certain proliferation pres-
sures, also promote an extensive proliferation of nuclear capa-
bilities among the non-NPT nations. Consequently, the near-
term threat to nonproliferation and the NPT is likely to come
from those non-NPT nations with perceived economic, security
or prestige needs and a level of development sufficient to sup-
port a nuclear program.
Through the recent Nuclear Supplier's Conference, the
exporting nations have achieved agreement on the application
of IAEA safeguards to all their nuclear exports, and special
controls for reprocessing technology are now under considera-
tion. 1 3 Further, nations which have begun exporting reprocess-
ing equipment are imposing restrictions more extensive than
current IAEA safeguards."' In short, the reaction of the major
I 1. As of May 15, 1976 only 35 commercial reactors were operating in non-nuclear
nations which had ratified the NPT, although another 163 were planned or under
construction. Of these 35 reactors, six are in the German Federal Republic, eight are
in Japan, and seven are in Canada. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 393-401.
112. One recent French estimate stated that Iran would require 15 to 20 years to
develop independently its own nuclear explosive device. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1976,
at 5, col. 7.
113. Supra note 106.
114. The agreement by West Germany to provide reprocessing and enrichment
technology to Brazil contains a provision that the technology cannot be duplicated
without IAEA safeguards being applied to the replication. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,
supra note 53, at 165. The recently cancelled French-South Korean agreement on
reprocessing contained a similar restriction. Id. at 170. The United States is attempt-
ing to tie reactor fuel sales to explicit guarantees that the importing nation will share
control of any reprocessing plant built on its territory or under its control, N.Y. Times,
May 17, 1976, at 3, col. 1, and may soon require the termination of military and
economic assistance to any country that imports or exports reprocessing or enrichment
equipment. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1976, at 17, col. 2.
1976
188 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
exporting nations has been to sharply tighten control over ex-
ports.
While there is clearly a need for improved export con-
trols,"' the fear is that the extensive non-safeguarded nuclear
technology and source material currently existing in certain
non-NPT nations may negate the effectiveness of these new
restrictions by providing alternative, and more convenient,
sources of supply."' As the traditional supply of nuclear mate-
rials and technology becomes increasingly restricted, nuclear
importing nations may turn to the relatively advanced non-
NPT nations such as India, China, South Africa, or Israel for
less restricted nuclear supplies.
This would present no proliferation potential for those
importing nations party to the NPT, since IAEA safeguards
would attach once the material was received. However, an ac-
tive trade among the non-NPT nations could result in a dra-
matic increase in the number of "quasi-nuclear" nations-that
is, nations like India which possess extensive non-safeguarded
nuclear technology and a nuclear explosion capability, al-
though likely few or no nuclear weapons initially."' The non-
NPT supplier nations would have economic and political in-
centives to outbid the traditional supplier nations by applying
less stiff controls over their nuclear exports, and the non-NPT
importing nations-having already shown their disposition
toward international safeguards-would be unlikely to apply
additional safeguards to their imported materials. The result
would be an increase in the nuclear capabilities of many of the
non-NPT nations: those nations having relatively advanced
nuclear establishments would conduct nuclear explosions for
115. The shortcomings of Canadian (and possibly American) export controls
aided India's explosion program. See note 30 supra. The need for tighter controls was
also shown by a Pakistani situation in which differing safeguard standards permitted
the wastes from a Canadian-supplied reactor to be available for use in a French-
supplied reprocessing plant. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1978, at 1, col. 8.
116. Uncertainties in American supplies of enriched uranium have already caused
Brazil to look for other suppliers, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, supra note 53, at 229-30, and
has caused concern in Common Market countries, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1975, at 7, col.
I.
117. The difficulties and disincentives that medium and small nations face in
developing an effective nuclear force are analyzed in G. KEMP, NUCLEAR FORCES FOR
MEDIUM POWERS: STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS AND OPTIONS (Adelphi Paper No. 107, 1974).
Specific problems that Israel would have in developing a viable nuclear option are
discussed in McPeak, Israel: Borders and Security, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 436-38 (1976).
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research and would expand their nuclear capacity in order to
meet the new export market, and those nations having unfilled
nuclear needs and ambitions (such as Pakistan, Brazil, Argen-
tina and Egypt) would move to purchase this less-restricted
technology and use it in the most effective manner."'
The nuclear self-sufficiency of these non-NPT nations
would destroy the current linkage which induces nuclear im-
porting nations to accept IAEA safeguards in return for pro-
gressive nuclear technology. Consequently, the movement to-
ward universal adherence to the NPT would likely cease. At
that point, the nonproliferation battle would shift toward
avoiding situations which would precipitate the manufacture
of nuclear weapons by those non-NPT nations, or, if nuclear
weapons had already been manufactured, limiting their num-
ber and capabilities.
Steps can be taken to mitigate the likelihood of this new
round of uncontrolled proliferation. First, those nations having
non-safeguarded nuclear technology should be invited to par-
ticipate in the Nuclear Supplier's Conference and encouraged
to follow the example of non-party France by subscribing to the
Conference's agreements. Second, actual and potential non-
NPT supplier nations which remain committed to less restric-
tive export policies should be encouraged to reverse that stance
by economic and political incentives from other nations. And
third, as a last defense, strong incentives should be applied to
non-NPT nations that show an interest in receiving inade-
quately safeguarded technology in order to induce them to
come within the IAEA safeguards system.
118. This may already be happening between India and Argentina. See note 22
supra. In addition, Egyptian scientists are reported to be working in Indian nuclear
facilities. H. MAULL, OIL AND INFLUENCE: THE OIL WEAPON EXAMINED 23 (Adelphi Paper
No. 117, 1975). While no transfers have been reported to non-NPT nations, South
Africa is now entering the nuclear market, having established ties with Iran for the
transfer of uranium and joint development of enrichment facilities. R. Harkavy, The
Pariah State Syndrome as an Arms Control Dilemma: Conventional Arms Acquisition
and Nuclear Proliferation 64-65 (mimeo, 1976 meeting of American Political Science
Association).
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These moves toward increased control of nuclear supplies
will reduce the likelihood of proliferation in the non-NPT na-
tions and will maintain the incentive for nations to adopt, and
remain within, IAEA safeguards. The failure to pursue these
measures will speed proliferation and seriously undercut the
future effectiveness of the NPT.
Douglas Triggs*
* B.A., 1968, Augustana College; M.A., 1974, University of Michigan: J.D. candi-
date, University of Denver.
CASE COMMENT
Comment: Accepting Jurisdiction in Foreign Patent Valid-
ity Suits-Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408 (1972)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Packard Instrument Company v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., I the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois abstained from exercising jurisdiction to de-
termine the validity of several patents granted by foreign
states. In its complaint, Packard Instrument Company alleged
infringement of a United States patent and of corresponding
patents in nine foreign countries: Canada, France, Israel, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and West Germany.
Beckman Instruments, as defendant, pleaded to the first count
of infringement in the United States, asserting invalidity as an
affirmative defense and counterclaimed for a declaratory judg-
ment of invalidity. Defendant also moved to dismiss the re-
maining counts of infringement on the ground that the court
was without jurisdiction. In granting the motion and declining
jurisdiction, Judge Tone relied upon three reasons:
(1) a determination of the issue of validity of a foreign patent
would involve a "form of governmental interest;" (2) under the
circumstances, a court of the United States would "not be suita-
ble to enforcement of the foreign based claim;" and (3) resolution
of the U.S. patent claims would adequately solve the problem.'
The decision in Beckman Instruments is based upon an
arbitrary finding by the court. Without a precise rule to guide
the court in exercising jurisdiction, decisions will continue to
waver; therefore, a standard needs to be developed. To this end
the court in Beckman Instruments might better have assumed
jurisdiction over the foreign patents. This article will first ana-
lyze the court's right to assume jurisdiction. Second, some
choice of law problems inherent in an assumption of jurisdic-
tion will be examined. And finally, the effect of the application
of foreign patents will be assessed.
1. 346 F. Supp. 408 (1972).
2. Id. at 409-10.
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I. JURISDICTION
The territorial limitations of sovereignty have been held to
preclude a nation-state from giving extraterritorial effect to its
patent law.' Patents therefore confer rights which are protected
only within the boundaries of the issuing country.' Courts have
also held that a foreign patent grants no rights or protection to
the owner for acts done in the United States.' Regardless of
these well-established notions of the territorial limits of the
patent grant and its enforcement, the question of whether a
United States court may properly adjudicate a claim of the
validity of a foreign patent has not been fully considered.
There is little authority concerning the power of a federal
court to litigate a claim based on a foreign patent. The Consti-
tution and statutory language have given jurisdiction to federal
courts over causes of action arising under the patent laws of the
United States.' Yet that language does not purport to cover
claims arising under the patent laws of other countries.
While in Beckman Instruments Judge Tone assumed that
there was subject matter jurisdiction available over the foreign
patent claims,7 there is a possibility that a court could deny
that it had jurisdiction.'
Theoretically, a federal court that has diversity of citizen-
ship jurisdiction, as in Beckman Instruments, would have the
3. Note, Jurisdiction-Foreign Patents-Jurisdiction Over Foreign Patent
Claims, 66 MicH. L. REV. 358 n.1 (1967).
4. Aluminum Co. of America v. Sperry Products, Inc., 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961); Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r &
Foundry Co., 235 F.2d 224 (3rd Cir. 1956), aff'd, 351 U.S. 445 (1956); Dr. Beck & Co.
v. General Electric Co., 210 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afl'd, 317 F.2d 538 (2d Cir.
1963).
5. Dr. Beck & Co. v. General Electric Co., 210 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd,
317 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1963); Sperry Products, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 171
F. Supp. 901 (N.D. Ohio 1959), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 285 F.2d 911 (6th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 890 (1961).
6. "To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the
states in patent and copyright cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1970). See General Electric
Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932); French Renovating Co. v. Ray
Renovating Co., 170 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1948); Laning v. National Ribbon & Carbon
Paper Mfg. Co., 125 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1942).
7. Supra note 1, at 408.
8. Supra note 3, at 371.
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power to bind parties before it, regardless of the nature of the
claims.' However, courts are hesitant to rely solely upon this
reasoning. In the past, courts have been reluctant to determine
foreign patent rights even though they had jurisdiction over the
parties. Most of these cases have failed to directly address the
question and contain language which can be interpreted both
for and against taking jurisdiction.
On their facts, these decisions cannot be read as establish-
ing a broad policy of abstention with regard to foreign patent
claims. They are limited in that the courts had other patent
claims upon which they could rely to make a decision. For
example, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rubber Tire Wheel
Co.,' 0 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from bringing
suit in Cuba for patent infringement. The Federal District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that the subject
of the Cuban action was in fact a separate Cuban patent and
denied the injunction. A determination of the validity of the
foreign patent was unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by
the complaint. In addition, there was no reason for the Ameri-
can court to decide the question of Cuban law, since the action
was also before a Cuban court-a better place to decide the
issue.
Past decisions involving foreign patents or trademarks also
do not consider the possibility of all the parties being U.S.
citizens, whom the court would have the power to bind. In
Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., I the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit adopted a rule of nonintervention with
respect to foreign trademarks and refused to permit exercise of
jurisdiction in a case which involved an allegedly invalid and
infringing Canadian trademark. Fearing a conflict with the
Canadian courts, and envisioning difficulties in enforcing any
judgment it might render, the court invoked the doctrine of
forum non conveniens and dismissed the action." The facts in
Vanity Fair are sufficiently similar to permit an analogy to the
Goodyear Tire case. In both cases, the court noted the fact that
9. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 209-11 (1962) [hereinafter cited as
EHRENZWEIGJ; cf. Fall v. Estin, 215 U.S. 1, 15 (1909) (Holmes, J. concurring).
10. 164 F. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1908).
11. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), rehearing
denied, 352 U.S. 912 (1956).
12. 234 F.2d 633, at 645 (1956).
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one or both of the parties in the foreign court would not be the
same as the parties in the United States court. 3 This can be
distinguished from the case where the parties would be the
same in both U.S. and foreign courts, when a court with juris-
diction over both parties should make a controlling decision.
Two other trademark cases, Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele 4
and Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co.,'
have reached the opposite conclusion and permitted issuance
of injunctions which affected foreign trademarks. In both cases,
plaintiffs registered their trademarks under American law.
Defendants subsequently registered the same marks under
Mexican law and imported their products into the United
States. The courts enjoined the use of both trademarks by de-
fendants in the United States. While the opinions stated that
the courts did not intend to invalidate the foreign trademarks,
the injunctions may have had much the same impact. 6
All parties concerned in Steele and in Las Palmas Food
were citizens of the United States and therefore subject to its
jurisdiction. It may be concluded that the cases involved acts
which had a significant effect on United States commerce. If a
case would have an effect on commerce within the United
States it can be argued that a court would have jurisdiction.
The latter of these two points may be vital. In United States
v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 7 the citizenship factor
was overshadowed by the importance of a substantial Ameri-
can policy. The Imperial Chemical case involved a suit by the
federal government alleging a violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act (15 U.S.C. § 1). The Court required Imperial Chemi-
cal Industries, a British corporation, to grant licenses to certain
American patents and to refrain from bringing suit for infringe-
ment under the British patents. The American court thus pur-
ported to limit a foreign corporation's otherwise valid foreign
patents by qualifying their use within the territory of the grant-
ing sovereign. The court did this despite the fact that it was
against British public policy and that a British court would not
13. Id. at 647 n.20.
14. 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1952), aft'd, 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
15. 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958).
16. Supra note 3, at 362.
17. 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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enforce such a provision. The court justified its "regulation of
the exercise of rights granted by a foreign government" by rea-
soning that "it is not an intrusion on the authority of a foreign
sovereign for this court to direct that steps be taken to remove
harmful effects on the trade of the United States."' 8
The foregoing cases illustrate that American courts, hav-
ing personal jurisdiction over the parties, will interfere when
such an interference is necessary to enforce a significant United
States policy."
The reluctance of American courts to determine foreign
patent rights even when they have jurisdiction over the parties
stems from the nature of the patent right. A patent right is a
property right and an infringement of that right constitutes a
tort. 0 Once the defendant alleges invalidity of plaintiff's for-
eign patent, the action assumes the appearance of an in rem
proceeding. This is because the court is asked to rule on the
validity of a grant of title by a foreign sovereign. This presents
the problems of an invasion of the traditional notions of sover-
eignty and a foreign jurisdiction's not honoring the decision.2
A foreign jurisdiction could refuse to recognize the judgment
invalidating the patent and uphold the patent in a subsequent
suit for infringement and royalties brought by the patentee.
There are other reasons that have led courts to hold that
they should abstain from deciding on the validity of a foreign
patent. Such claims often force the court to confront a very
technical area of a foreign legal system. Some conclude, as did
Judge Tone,22 that a foreign tribunal would be more qualified
to decide the question. 3 Furthermore, the underlying policy of
the law to be enforced and its remedies may be so inextricably
tied to the economic and social systems of the granting nation
18. Id. at 228-29. Contra, a British court held against I.C.I. when it tried to follow
the U.S. court's directions. British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
[19531 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.).
19. Supra notes 3, 15 and 17; see generally United Cigarette Machine Co. v.
Wright, 156 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1907); cf. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 9, at 74-76.
20. Supra note 3, at 363.
21. See Sandusky Foundry & Machinery Co. v. De Lavand, 251 F. 631 (N.D. Ohio
1918).
22. Supra note 1, at 411.
23. Supra note 3, at 364.
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that it is alien to the American system."4 In Ortman v. Stan-
ray Corp. ,25 Judge Fairchild, in his concurring opinion, stated
several more reasons why a court cannot or should not assume
jurisdiction.
First the court may feel that the claim is based on penal or
revenue laws, or that it involves some other form of foreign gov-
ernmental interest. Secondly, the local jurisdictional machinery
may not be suitable to enforcement of the foreign based claim.
Thirdly, the action may be contrary to the public policy of the
forum. Fourthly, the forum state may be precluded from passing
on an 'act of state.' And lastly the court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.11
The problems that arise in regard to adjudication of for-
eign patents may be compared to those that develop when
dealing with title to foreign land. 7 A doctrine has developed
that assures that only local courts will decide title to land
within their jurisdiction. The local action rule requires that
certain actions concerning real estate be brought in the
jurisdiction wherein the land lies." Since a patent is akin to
property, some commentators have concluded that an infringe-
ment action or a validity question should be decided where the
patent was registered." In the Ortman case, Judge Fairchild
recognized the possibility of characterizing a foreign patent
claim as a local action but failed to fully examine the feasibil-
ity." The judge further added to the confusion when he stated,
"[t]heoretically it is possible for a state to regard almost any
sort of extrastate cause of action as local, but the current trend
24. Id.
25. 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967).
26. Id. at 159; see also Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1932); H. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
20-21 (4th ed. Scoles 1964); Paulsen & Sovem, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws,
56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The "act
of state doctrine" prevents the court of one country from sitting in judgment on the
act of another government done within its own territory; see Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 367 U.S. 398 (1964). The doctrine does not apply to acts predominantly
probate in nature, but acts where the state itself has an interest, e.g., expropriation.
See generally Symposium-Expropriation: Regional Conference, American Society of
International Law (University of Denver College of Law, April 15, 1972), 2 DENVER J.
INT'L. L. & POL. 125 (1972).
27. Supra note 3, at 364.
28. Id. at 372.
29. Id. at 365.
30. Supra note 25, at 160.
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is toward readier enforcement of claims arising under foreign
laws.'' 3'
While a-patent is considered a property right it has been
thought of as intangible property.32 Torts other than those in-
volving real property have always been classified as transitory.
The passage of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(1964), has resolved this
question by stating that, "Any civil action for patent infringe-
ment may be brought in the judicial district where the
defendant resides . . . ." (emphasis added) In other words,
Congress has statutorily determined that a patent infringe-
ment suit should be considered transitory.
The majority in Ortman felt that they need not decide the
issue of whether the action was local or transitory as they relied
upon the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.3 3 The doctrine of
ancillary, or pendent, jurisdiction allows federal courts to en-
tertain a claim not otherwise within their jurisdiction when
that claim is so closely connected with another claim having a
federal jurisdictional base that it forms one constitutional
case.34 Having originally developed as a result of an effort by
the federal courts to deal with procedural problems created by
parallel state and federal litigation in the property field, the
scope of ancillary jurisdiction was expanded to permit the ad-
judication of non-federal claims when the court believed justice
would be furthered by a single disposition of the case. 35 For the
most part, ancillary jurisdiction has been utilized to adjudicate
related claims based on state law. The court in Ortman cited
no precedent for its position that the doctrine could also apply
to foreign law. While it appeared to have difficulty with the
language of the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 31 the extension is not wholly novel. There have been a
few cases that indicate that the nature of the claim is
31. Id. at 159.
32. H. TOULMAN, JR., HANDBOOK OF PATENTS § 64, at 47 (1954).
33. Supra note 3, at 367. This principle has been defined as follows: "By this
concept it has been held that a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or contro-
versy as an entirety, and may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly raised
before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it
could not take cognizance were they independently presented." C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 17 (1963).
34. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
35. Supra note 3, at 368 n.56.
36. Supra note 34.
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irrelevant." The fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964) grants
ancillary jurisdiction in patent cases only where there is a re-
lated state claim of unfair business practices should not be held
as a limiting factor. The legislative background of the statute
would seem to indicate that the rule of Hurn v. Oustler should
be codified to extend jurisdiction. 31
The court's reliance on the "reasoning . . . in Gibbs" to
support its conclusion that ancillary jurisdiction is proper re-
gardless of the source of the law appears sound. 39 This exten-
sion is based mainly upon convenience to the parties. 0 But,
37. The vast majority of cases utilize the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to adju-
dicate claims based on state law, but there have been some exceptions which show the
nature of the ancillary claim to be unimportant. See, e.g., Kane v. Central American
Mining & Oil, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), held that related claims based
on the Panamanian corporate law can be pendent to claims based on the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934; Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in
Federal Court Jurisdiction, 51 IOwA L. REV. 151, 157 (1965).
38. Hum v. Oustler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Barron, The Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 439,
442 (1949), states that:
Subsection (b) of Section 1338 is new. It is added to give district courts
original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim for unfair compe-
tition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the patent,
copyright or trademark laws. The Supreme Court in Hum v. Oustler,
[citation omitted] held that such a claim of unfair competition of which
a federal court has no original jurisdiction is nevertheless within its ancil-
lary jurisdiction when it arises from the same acts which give rise to the
claim of copyright infringement.
The statutory confirmation of the jurisdiction of federal courts in
cases like these should not be regarded either as an extension or limita-
tion of ancillary jurisdiction in other cases or circumstances.
See Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 232 F. Supp. 814, 821-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
in which the court in a patent case utilized ancillary jurisdiction to adjudicate a
compulsory counterclaim although 1338(b) was clearly inapplicable to the particular
claim. See also Note, Pendent Jurisdiction: An Expanding Concept in Federal Court
Jurisdiction, 51 IOWA L. REv. 151 (1965).
39. Supra note 3, at 369; see also Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine
of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962).
40. Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 163 U.S.P.Q. 331, 333-34 (D.C. N.Ill. 1969).
There are two possible sources of jurisdiction which would allow a federal
district court which has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant to hear
a suit for infringement of a foreign patent by such defendant in the
foreign country which has issued the patent: (1) jurisdiction ancillary to
that entitling a federal court to adjudge United States patents and (2)
general diversity jurisdiction.
The court concluded it should hear the matter
since considerations of convenience to the parties herein which would be
served by litigating these issues in one forum outweigh the difficulties
that are anticipated from the task of applying the relevant foreign laws
involved (emphasis added).
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this justification must be carefully balanced with the protec-
tion of sovereignty, the reluctance to enter unenforceable judg-
ments, and the hesitancy to expend judicial time to investigate
the peculiarities of the body of law and procedure of another
jurisdiction.4' With careful balancing the better rule of law still
would permit an American court to take jurisdiction over a
foreign patent claim.
III. CONFLICTS OF LAW
Assuming that the court in Beckman Instruments had de-
cided it had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the foreign
patents, there would still remain the question of which law or
laws the American court should then apply. Should the court
follow United States patent law,42 the law of the place where
the patent was registered, or the law of the situs of the infringe-
ment?
For determining the validity of a patent, the generally
applied rule is the law of the country where the patent was
granted and/or is registered-the so-called "country of protec-
tion. ' 4 3 There is some authority that no conflict of law can arise
in connection with a patent's validity as there is but one law,
that of the registering country.44 This principle does not, how-
ever, operate in a vacuum. It must be tempered by another
strong conflicts policy which will not allow use of a foreign law
that is contrary to public policy. 5 American courts have consis-
tently denied enforcement of foreign law where it was contrary
to public policy." The public policy, however, must be suffi-
41. Supra note 3, at 368.
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970).
43. Meinhardt, Conflict Avoidance in the Law of Patents and Trademarks, 21 L.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 533, at 533 n.2 (1956).
It is significant that no leading treatises on American, British, Canadian,
French, German, or Swiss patent and trademark law devotes a chapter
to the conflict of laws, or even mentions the subject in its index. Con-
versely, with possibly one exception, see CLIVE M. SCHNrrTHOFF, THE ENG-
LISH CONFLICT OF LAWS 13, 14, 205, 212, 418 (3d ed. 1954), the leading
treatises on the conflict of laws deal only briefly, if at all, with patents
and trademarks. E.g. Rabel confines his treatment of the subject to a few
lines quoting a small number of cases to the effect that a patent or
trademark can be infringed only in the country of protection. See 2 ERNST
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 295 (1950).
44. Id. at 534.
45. Id. at 538; see RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAW § 332(b) (Tent. draft
No. 6 1960); RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAW § 90 (1969).
46. Paulsen & Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflicts of Law, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
969, 992-93 (1956).
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ciently strong that the court can justify its refusal to apply
foreign law.47
Admittedly, the provisions of foreign patent laws dealing
with infringement differ from country to country. An American
court faced with using several foreign statutes could find itself
hopelessly lost. Yet, for all the diversity of infringement laws,
the validity sections of many foreign patent laws are remarka-
bly similar. The major tests for patentability in the United
States are novelty, usefulness, and non-obviousness.48 For most
countries the test is quite similar, if not identical.4" A United
47. RESTATEMENT SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAW § 90, comment c (1969).
48. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
49. DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD-PATENTS & TRADEMARKS (G.
Kohlic ed. 1975). The key provisions of the foreign patent laws involved here are:
Canada: Patent Act of 1935 and Patent Rules of 1948. Subject matter and
patentability-An invention must be a "new manner of manufacture"
and meet the standards of novelty.
France: Patent Act of January 2, 1968. This law has been in force since
January 1, 1969. However, several provisions of the former law of July 5,
1844 remain applicable to patents filed prior to January 1, 1969. Subject
matter and patentability-It must be novel. It must satisfy an industrial
purpose (useful in industry). It must not be obvious.
Federal Republic of Germany: Law governing patents-Patent Act (Pa-
tentgesetz) of January 2, 1968. Subject matter-Patents are granted in
respect of new inventions which are susceptible to industrial use.
Israel: Law governing patents-The Law of Patents, in force April 1, 1968
(prior law is similar to British). Subject matter-The Law defines an
invention proper for the grant of a patent as a product or process that is
new, useful, fit for use in industry or agriculture, and reveals an inventive
advance.
Italy: Law governing patents-Royal Decree No. 3731 of October 30, 1859,
concerning industrial patents. Also in force: Law No. 1178 of December
24, 1959, effective February 1, 1960; Royal Decree No. 1127 of June 29,
1939; and Decree No. 849 of February 26, 1968. Subject matter-An es-
sential condition to grant a patent is the "industriality" (industrial use-
fulness) of the invention. The object of the patent can be any new inven-
tion which can have a concrete industrial application with industrial
results of a scientific principle, a method of manufacturing.
Sweden: Law governing patents-Patent Act, December 1, 1967. In force
from January 1, 1968. Royal Decree on Patents (Formalities) of December
1, 1967. In force from January 1, 1968. Subject matter-Patents can be
granted only for an invention that is considerably different from what was
known before the dete of application.
Switzerland: Law governing patents-Federal Act Concerning Patents of
June 25, 1954 (Patent Act); Regulations I of December 14, 1958, as
amended; Regulations II of September 8, 1959, as amended; Federal Act
concerning the priority rights with patents and industrial designs of April
3, 1914, as amended in 1959. Subject matter-An invention has to be new
and commercially applicable. It has to provide a substantial technical
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States court faced with finding the fact of novelty, usefulness,
and non-obviousness of an American patent could as easily
apply those same findings of fact to the foreign law.
A very real possibility does exist that a foreign court will
refuse to accept a judgment by a United States court.5" This
problem can be avoided if both parties are still under the juris-
diction of the American court. Such jurisdiction can be either
in personam or, if there is property of the parties within the
court's jurisdiction, in rem. Upon a finding of invalidity of a
foreign patent a court could enforce its decision through either
a mandatory injunction ordering the foreign patentee to grant
a license or the threat of a contempt citation if suit is brought
in another jurisdiction.
Some courts, however, have been wary of the use of injunc-
tions and have refused to issue such orders. In Canadian Filters
v. Lear-Siegler,5 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held
that the principle of comity prevents a district court from en-
joining a patent holder's Canadian action for infringement of
a Canadian patent." This is a strong statement that could have
far reaching effects that the court did not realize. The court did
temper this language when it stated,
[d]oubtless there are times when comity, a blend of courtesy
and expedience, must give way, for example when the forum
seeks to enforce its own substantial interests, or in limited cir-
cumstances when relitigation would cover exactly the same
point .... 11
In any event this approach is far too broad in scope in that it
prevents the court from enjoining any relitigations before for-
progress including some inventive level. Its inventive substance should
not be unknown or obvious to the expert.
United Kingdom: Law governing patents-Patent Acts of 1949 and 1957;
the Patent Rules 1958 and 1959/1964; and the Rules of the Supreme Court
(Order 103). Subject matter-A patent will be refused if the invention as
disclosed in the United Kingdom or in the Convention Country (Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property), as the case
may be, is not new, having regard to what was known or used before the
priority date of the claim. The invention must be non-obvious.
50. Compare United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 105 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) with British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
[1953] 1 Ch. 19 (C.A.).
51. 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969).
52. Id. at 579.
53. Id. at 578-79.
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eign courts, including those cases which, under settled law,
clearly would be enjoined, such as a contract action where a
U.S. court has determined the validity of disputed clauses.
Canadian Filters goes far beyond the principle that the injunc-
tive relief should be used sparingly and only when necessary to
prevent inequities. The problem of enforcing conflicting judg-
ments makes it important that the power to enjoin relitigation
in foreign courts be preserved and exercised where equity
demands.54 Given the possible pit-falls of accepting jurisdiction
over foreign patents a court can competently determine valid-
ity if it is aware of the problem areas.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The court in Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., held that it should abstain from exercising juris-
diction over claims for infringement of foreign patents where
the validity of those patents would be put in issue. The reason-
ing behind this decision was that a determination of invalidity
would involve a form of governmental interest which a U.S.
court would not be the correct forum to enforce, the court
would be required to deal with foreign laws and language, and
effective relief could be given by enforcement of the United
States patent. The better rule of law would have been for the
court to accept jurisdiction.
The court felt that by withholding relief it was furthering
a recognized public policy. To the contrary, it was impinging
upon two fundamental federal policies. There is a strong fed-
eral policy favoring free competition in ideas that do not merit
patent protection.5 By not availing itself of the opportunity to
determine the validity issue, the court thus prevented a citizen
from enjoying a free flow of ideas-clearly not in furtherance
of public policy. Likewise, by not taking jurisdiction the court
was sanctioning acts which would have an adverse effect on
United States commerce, another violation of public policy.
The court expressed a fear that taking jurisdiction would
54. Note, Federal Courts-Injunctions-The Principle of Comity Prevents Fed-
eral Court from Enjoining Canadian Patent Holder's Infringement Action in Canadian
Court. Canadian Filters v. Lear-Siegler, 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969), 6 TEXAS INT'L L.
FORUM 143 (1970).
55. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp.
v. Day Bright Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
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raise serious questions of comity." Declaring an act of a foreign
governmental agency invalid is a serious action. However,
there is a strong possibility that if the case were before a foreign
court with the validity of an American patent in question, the
foreign court would assume jurisdiction over the American
patent.57 The similarities between patent laws permit a reason-
able understanding regardless of the social and economic poli-
cies behind the foreign patent laws. If foreign courts feel com-
petent to determine the validity of American patent law, then
comity would certainly permit the converse. The court would
also be seeking to enforce its own substantial interests and
further litigation would cover the same points.
In addition, enforcement of the judgment in Beckman
Instruments would not have been as difficult as the court pre-
sumed. Both parties were domiciled in the United States and
had property within reach of the court. An injunction prohibit-
ing suit in a foreign country may not in itself have prevented a
foreign suit, but balanced against a contempt citation the
probability of a suit was small. Similarly, an order for a license,
backed by contempt power, would have resolved the problem.
An exercise of jurisdiction would have prevented the possi-
bility of additional vexatious and harassing litigation against
Beckman Instruments, Inc. In the past, other courts have ac-
cepted jurisdiction and enjoined parties from further actions.5 8
A determination of only the American patent left Beckman
Instruments open to further suits in foreign jurisdictions. Had
the court considered the full ramifications of its actions it
would likely not have denied jurisdiction.
Finally, the court felt that a decision on the United States
patent would resolve any conflict. What the court failed to
56. Supra note 1, at 410.
57. Stauder, Patent Infringement in Export Trade-The Vulnerable Combination
Patent, 3 11C n.51 (1972):
This is why today the German authors hold the view, contrary to earlier
decisions of the Reichsgericht, that German courts have jurisdiction to
decide actions based on infringement of foreign patents whenever the
German Code of Civil Procedure provides for a proper forum. See Raimer
& Nastelski, PATENTGESETZ UND GEBRAUCHSMUSTERGESErZ, at n.3 to Sec.
6 PatG; Hesse in Klauer & Mahring, PATENTRECHSKOMMENTAR, at n.175
to Sec. 6 PatG (Munich, 3d ed. 1971), with references.
58. See Harvey Aluminum v. American Cyanimid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.
1953).
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consider was the possibility of further suits in foreign jurisdic-
tions. If the court found the U.S. patent invalid, free competi-
tion would have been available in the United States, but the
ability to export to foreign countries would have been severely
curtailed due to a fear of future infringement suits in importing
countries. By accepting jurisdiction, the court would have re-
duced needless litigation in other jurisdictions.
It is granted that if the court had taken jurisdiction it
would have had to deal with the difficulties of foreign laws. But
balanced against public policy considerations, comity with
other nations, prevention of vexatious and harassing suits, and
avoidance of excessive litigation, the better decision would
have been to accept jurisdiction.
Mark S. Caldwell*
* B.A., 1973, J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
Book Notes
Foreign Legal Systems
KEETON, G.W. & SHERIDAN, L.A., THE LAW OF TRUSTS; Profes-
sional Books Limited, 6 1/2 Suffolk Street, Pall Mall, London
SWIY 4HG, U.K. (10th ed., 1974); $15.00; ISBN 0-903486-04-
0; xci, 524 p.; footnotes, table of cases, table of statutes, table
of abbreviations.
This standard English law text, used extensively for forty
years, has been completely revised by the authors in the cur-
rent edition. The continuing reliance of American trust law
upon English common law foundations makes this text a
potentially valuable tool for the American law student and
lawyer.
KOMMERS, D.P., JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT; Sage Publications,
Inc., 275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, CA 90212 (1976);
ISBN 0-0839-0125-9, LC 72-98037; 312 p.; footnotes, tables,
index. Foreword by J. Grossman. Sage Series on Politics and
the Legal Order, Vol. 5.
Kommers has prepared a timely and thorough socio-legal
study of the politics, policies and progress of the twenty-five
year old West German Federal Constitutional Court,
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Well-written and appropriately
footnoted for the generalist and scholar in German politics and
law, this work is at the cutting edge of the emerging study of
comparative judicial politics. The volume is the fruit of the
author's recent one-year visiting professorship at the Univer-
sity of Cologne.
WAKIL, S.P. (editor), MARRIAGE, FAMILY AND SOCIETY: CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVES; Butterworths, 2265 Midland Avenue, Scarbor-
ough, Ontario, Canada MIP 4S1 (1975); $8.95; ISBN 0-409-
87550-3; xiv, 515 p.; footnotes, tables, bibliography, glossary,
appendices.
The oldest of societal institutions receives a comprehen-
sive study in this compendium of materials by Canadian social
observers. Several papers devoted to marriage, changing life-
styles, the family unit, and divorce trace historical and modern
trends through both statistical and quantitative analysis. The
various conclusions reached by the authors regarding future
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developments for Canadian society adapt with little alteration
to American society.
WALSHE, G., RECENT TRENDS IN MONOPOLY IN GREAT BRITAIN;
Cambridge University Press, 32 East 57th Street, New York,
NY 10022 (1974); $5.95; ISBN 0-521-09863-7, LC 74-76570; xii,
144 p.; footnotes, tables, special indices. National Institute of
Economic and Social Research Occasional Paper XXVII.
This Occasional Paper follows and expands upon a prior
paper, MERGERS AND CONCENTRATION IN BRITISH INDUSTRY, by
the author and others. While the earlier paper was a general-
ized study of concentration in manufacturing industries, based
upon a sampling of several products, the present study focuses
upon industries selected because of demonstrated market con-
centration. The result is an objective analysis of market mo-
nopoly in Great Britian and the effects of constraints existing
within the market itself and imposed by the Monopolies Com-
mission. The pair of papers should provide useful insight into
sectors of the British economy for investors.
WRIGHT, C.A. & LINDEN, A.M., CANADIAN TORT LAW: CASES,
NOTES AND MATERIALS; Butterworths, 2265 Midland Avenue,
Scarborough, Ontario, Canada MIP 4S1 (6th ed., 1975);
$25.00; ISBN 409-87802-2 (cloth), 409-87803-1 (paper), LC 71-
131913; xxx, 768 p.; footnotes, table of cases, index. Canadian
Legal Casebook Series.
This standard work for the study of tort law in Canada,
first published in 1954, has now reached its sixth edition. The
text, although designed for Canadian law students, will serve
as a valuable resource for American practitioners requiring in-
sight into the differences between American and Canadian tort
law.
Human Rights
SCHROETER, L., THE LAST EXODUS; Universe Books, 381 Park
Avenue South, New York, NY 10016 (1974); $10.95; ISBN 0-
87663-204-5, LC 73-88461; 432 p.; appendix, bibliographical
notes, index.
The scope of the Jewish struggle to leave the Soviet Union
receives a thorough examination by Mr. Schroeter, an Ameri-
can Jewish lawyer who, since 1970, has lived in Israel. The
extent of the Soviet Jewish population becomes evident to the
reader through interviews with Soviet Jewish emigres who have
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successfully left the Soviet Union to live in Israel. The 1970
Leningrad trials are described and analyzed to provide a better
understanding of the philosophical, social, and religious under-
pinnings of the Soviet Zionist Movement.
International Business and Taxation
BOYCE, J.E. & LOMBARD, F.J., COLOMBIA'S TREATMENT OF FOR-
EIGN BANKS: A PRECEDENT SETTING CASE?; American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1976); $3.00; ISBN 0-8447-
3212-5, LC 76-12153; footnotes, tables, appendix. Foreign Af-
fairs Study 36.
Decree 295, promulgated by the Colombian government in
1975, requires that all foreign banks operating within the bor-
ders of Colombia be converted to 51 percent ownership by Co-
lombian interests. The effects of the decree upon foreign invest-
ment in the country generally, upon foreign banks specifically,
and upon the internal economy of Colombia are concisely ana-
lyzed by the authors. The study is aimed not only at multina-
tional interests, but also at the government of Columbia, which
is warned of some of the serious potential financial effects of
the Decree.
BROOKE, M.Z. & REMMERS, H.L. (editors), THE MULTINATIONAL
COMPANY IN EUROPE: SOME KEY PROBLEMS; University of Michi-
gan Press, Ann Arbor, MI (1974); $10.00; ISBN 0-472-08182-9,
LC 73-93992; x, 194 p.; footnotes, bibliography, tables, index.
The editors have collected from several respected Euro-
pean scholars materials which form a complete guide to the
most salient problems of multinational enterprise in Europe.
Intended to aid virtually any company which engages in its
principal business activity in more than one country, the essays
look at financial, taxation, management, and training issues in
multinational operation. The book offers information on struc-
turing joint venture partnerships between American and Euro-
pean interests, on allocation of resources between various inter-
national subsidiaries, and on specialized financial and ac-
counting strategies. A chapter comparing European and Amer-
ican experiences in the multinational arena provides interest-
ing insight into directions for the future.
1976
208 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
GOODSELL, C.T., AMERICAN CORPORATIONS AND PERUVIAN
POLITICS; Harvard University Press, 79 Garden Street, Cam-
bridge, MA 02138 (1974); ISBN 674-02280-7, LC 73-85888; xi,
272 p.; footnotes, bibliography, tables, appendix, index.
By focusing not on the economic implications of American
investment abroad, but on the political ramifications of U.S.
business, Mr. Goodsell sheds new light on the multinational
enterprise. Several interdependent theories are put forward
with supporting empirical evidence, designed to show the com-
peting influences of the United States government, local gov-
ernment, and management on the policies and politics of an
independent nation. The author dismisses traditional notions
of "economic imperialism" and looks at each industry in its
own context and sphere of influence.
HUDSON, C., THE LAND TRANSFER TAX ACT, 1974; Butterworths,
2265 Midland Avenue, Scarborough, Ontario, Canada MIP
4S1 (1975); $15.00; ISBN 0-409-83750-4; xi, 111 p.; footnotes,
table of statutes, table of regulations, appendices, index. Cana-
dian Annotated Legislation Series.
In 1974, the legislature of Ontario passed the Land Trans-
fer Tax Act expressly to limit the conveyance of land or of
interests in land located in Ontario to non-residents. The Act
is specifically designed to fiscally penalize non-residents of
Canada who wish to own land in Ontario by severely taxing any
profits on transfers to non-residents. Hudson's book provides a
short but comprehensive examination of the Act and the specif-
ics of the tax imposed. All practitioners with interests in Cana-
dian land or industry will find the book of assistance in evalu-
ating the impact of this new tax.
NEWBERGER, E.L. (editor), NEW YORK UNIVERSITY INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON TAX AND BUSINESS PLANNING 1974: DOING
BUSINESS IN MEXICO; Matthew Bender, 235 E. 45th Street, New
York, NY 10017 (1974); LC 74-79211; xiv, 348 p.; footnotes,
tables, index. Second International Institute on Tax and Busi-
ness Planning.
The New York University tax planning programs have for
many years provided detailed guidance for tax practitioners in
many areas of the tax law. Until 1973, however, international
tax aspects were hidden among domestic topics. In 1973, the
First International Institute on Tax and Business Planning was
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conducted and met with great success. These proceedings of
the second program focus on United States and Mexican tax
laws affecting investment in Mexico. Virtually every signifi-
cant issue involved in Mexican taxation of foreign investments
is dealt with. The book should provide an excellent companion
volume to Volume 4, Number 1 of the DENVER JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, a survey of Mexican foreign
investment laws.
OKOLIE, C.C., LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; Praeger Publishers,
111 Fourth Avenue, New York, NY 10003 (1975); $15.00; ISBN
0-275-28798-X, LC 74-31507; xiii, 187 p.; footnotes.
Technology transfer from the United States to developing
countries encounters both political and economic obstacles.
The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act prohibits the transfer of cer-
tain resources, including technology, to productive enterprises
in foreign countries where there is a threat of competition with
established U.S. enterprises, unless exports of any products are
limited by agreement for the life of the loan or license. Okolie
examines this Act and other domestic and international legal
considerations which control the transfer of the technological
resources of the United States and of the Soviet Union. Many
of the comparisons drawn would be interesting to the scholar
as well as to the American businessman.
SPITZ, B. (editor), TAX HAVENS ENCYCLOPAEDIA; Butterworths,
2265 Midland Avenue, Scarborough, Ontario, Canada MIP
4S1 (1975); ISBN 0-406-38226-3; footnotes, bibliographies, ta-
bles, maps, index.
A new looseleaf service, Spitz's guide to tax havens
throughout the world is focused primarily on the English tax
practitioner. American lawyers, however, will find the analyses
of individual countries, which form the bulk of the work, to be
of particular use in answering questions regarding tax treat-
ment of foreign and domestic enterprises. Each chapter repre-
sents an individual country and is written by a tax expert in
the country covered. Supplementary materials will be issued
periodically expanding the scope of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA to in-
clude additional tax havens and providing information on new
developments in the tax laws of countries currently covered by
the service.
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VERNON, R. (editor), BIG BUSINESS AND THE STATE: CHANGING
RELATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE; Harvard University Press, 79
Garden Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (1974); $12.50; ISBN
674-07275-8, LC 73-91784; xi, 310 p.; footnotes, tables, index.
This product of twelve authors from eleven countries cohe-
sively examines the relationships between multinational busi-
ness and various governments of western Europe. Following
introductory chapters which provide a broad overview of the
development of multinational enterprise and the inevitable
clash of business and governmental interests, the study is bi-
furcated. Several of the authors speak first to the specific re-
sponses of various European governments to multinational
business. The last part of the book is devoted to analyses of
particular industries and the international pressures each has
created; these industries include: aerospace, aluminum, com-
puters, automobiles, and steel.
International Economic Relations
BELLAMY, C. & CHILD, G.D., COMMON MARKET LAW OF
COMPETITION; Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 235 East 45th
Street, New York, NY 10017 (1973); ISBN 421-17930-9, LC 73-
80039; xxvi, 361 p.; tables, footnotes, index.
Since January 1973, the Common Market rules on compe-
tition have formed part of the domestic law of the United King-
dom. This book attempts to explore and analyze the diffuse
body of legislation and case law governing competition within
the European Economic Community. The authors not only
examine relevant treaty provisions, but also explore a substan-
tial number of regulations, decisions of the European Court of
Justice and decisions and other pronouncements by the Com-
mission of the European Community.
HARRIS, R. (editor), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AFRICA; Schenk-
man Publishing Co., Cambridge, MA 02138; distributed by
Halsted Press, Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third
Avenue, New York, NY 10016 (1975); $15.95; ISBN 0-470-
35420-8, LC 75-29391; ix, 270 p.; footnotes, tables, maps.
In his introduction, Harris argues that Western writing on
the development process in Africa has tended to neglect the
impact on the people of the Continent. Taking a neo-Marxist
view, the authors describe the various national manifestations
of the metropole-satellite relationship and its extension from
the developed centers to the hinterlands of some of the world's
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poorest states. The authors believe, in the final analysis, that
only liberation from the neo-colonial paradigm in which they
find themselves trapped will lead to real development and free-
dom for Africa.
HODGMAN, D.R., NATIONAL MONETARY POLICIES AND
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION; Little, Brown & Co.,
34 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 02106 (1974); $12.95; LC 73-
13356; ix, 266 p.; footnotes, index. Little, Brown Series in Eco-
nomics.
Professor Hodgman undertakes a comparison of the work-
ings of monetary and credit policy within specific national en-
vironments and an analysis of the implications of dissimilar
national monetary and credit systems and objectives. The
monetary and credit systems of Belgium, France, Luxembourg,
West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom are examined with emphasis on financial framework,
budgetary policy, administrative controls over markets and
capital movements, and national economic goals.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, INC., 55TH ANNUAL
REPORT: UNDERSTANDING ECONOMIC CHANGE; National Bureau
of Economic Research, Inc., 261 Madison Avenue, New York,
NY 10016 (1975); 129 p.; tables, footnotes.
This publication, essentially a compendium of staff re-
ports on research under way, has one section dealing with inter-
national studies. Among the research topics are: Studies of
Multinational Firms and The Role of Prices in International
Trade Flow. These summaries should be useful to international
lawyers and law students interested in the economics of inter-
national transactions.
RAICHUR, S. & LISKE, C. (editors), THE POLITICS OF AID, TRADE
AND INVESTMENT; Sage Publications, Inc., Halsted Press, Divi-
sion of John Wiley & Sons, 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY
10016 (1976); ISBN 0-470-54117-1, LC 75-31886; 218 p.; foot-
notes, chapter references, tables. Comparative Political Econ-
omy and Public Policy Series, Vol. 2.
Raichur and Liske present this collection of articles by
eight scholars as the second in their series on political economy
and public policy. Here they treat the social, political and eco-
nomic factors which affect American and Soviet foreign policy
decisions. Statistical analysis of both public and private in-
vestment patterns and their relation to public policy show that
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expediency and pure economics play a large role in American
financial connections with Third World countries, especially
those in Latin America.
International Law
CASTEL, J.-G., INTERNATIONAL LAW; Butterworths, 2265 Mid-
land Avenue, Scarborough, Ontario, Canada MIP 4S1 (3rd ed.,
1976); $40.00; ISBN 0-409-82126-8; xxxi, 1268 p.; footnotes,
table of cases, index. Canadian Legal Casebook Series.
International law texts, each with a particular focus and
often bias, have proliferated in recent years as the importance
of international legal training has become more widely recog-
nized by American law schools and practitioners. Castel's stan-
dard work for the Canadian law student has a stated bias to-
ward Canadian interpretations and applications. However, his
thorough and comprehensive coverage of public and private
international law makes this text a useful tool for American
students and lawyers as well.
LIEBESNY, M.J., THE LAW OF THE NEAR & MIDDLE EAST: READ-
INGS, CASES & MATERIALS; State University of New York Press,
99 Washington Avenue, Albany, NY 12210 (1975); $22.00;
ISBN 0-87395-256-1, LC 74-22046; xii, 316 p.; footnotes, bibli-
ography, glossary, appendices, index.
A recognized expert in Islamic and civil law, Professor Lie-
besny has produced a text and reference for students of com-
parative law and Islamic culture. Further, the book contains
extensive English translations of Islamic codes and cases which
should be of particular value to businessmen and others requir-
ing access to the legal structure and practices of the Near and
Middle East. The first part of the text treats the development
of basic principles of law, providing an historical overview cou-
pled with extensive discussion of modern codes. The second
part deals with particular social and cultural institutions and
areas of law.
MANNING, C.A.W., THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY;
Halsted Press, a Division of John Wiley & Sons, 605 Third
Avenue, New York, NY 10016 (1976); $19.75; ISBN 0-470-
56750-0, LC 75-23427; xxxvi, 220 p.; index. Reissue of 1962
edition.
This is a welcome reissue of a unique volume of thoughts
on the international system by one of Britain's leading teachers
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of international relations. Professor Manning's book should be
required reading for all students of the subject, particularly
those who have pretensions of making a "science" of the study
of the relations between sovereign states. One need not accept
his viewpoint in order to find valuable insights in his work, and
to take pleasure in the reading of this delightfully written book.
RovINE, A.W., DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1974; Department of State (1975); avail-
able through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402; $10.25; Stock
#044-000-01566; xxii, 796 p.; index. Department of State Publi-
cation No. 8809. Introduction by Monroe Leigh.
Mr. Rovine, of the Office of the Legal Advisor of the De-
partment of State, has compiled extracts from those docu-
ments reflecting the significant developments in international
law in 1974. Developments relating to international economic
law and the individual in international law receive particularly
extensive treatment. While the breadth of its coverage pre-
cludes an in-depth analysis of the highlights of that year, in-
cluding the Trade Act of 1974, the agreement on an Interna-
tional Energy Program, and the inconclusive efforts to draft a
treaty on the law of the sea, the exhaustive scope of this heavily
documented survey renders it a valuable reference resource.
SMITH, H., GREAT BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS; Kraus Re-
print Co., Millwood, NY 10546 (1975); ISBN 0-527-03242-5
(v.1), ISBN 0-527-03243-3 (v.2), LC 75-23085; xvi, 416 p. (v.1);
x, 422 p. (v.2); footnotes. Reprint of the 1932 (v.1) and 1935
(v.2) editions published by P.S. King & Son, Ltd., Orchard
House, Westminster, UK.
A reprint of Professor Smith's work in the early 1930's, this
two volume set records the attitude officially adopted by Great
Britain toward the problems of international law from the
French Revolution to the early twentieth century. This selec-
tion of legal opinions and pronouncements, together with com-
ment and expansion, documents the foreign affairs of the Bri-
tish Empire in response to a number of varied international
problems. Organized topically, rather than chronologically,
these volumes may well serve as a background reference to
many contemporary aspects of international law.
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International Organizations
BIBO, I., THE PARALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE
REMEDIES: A STUDY OF SELF-DETERMINATION, CONCORD AMONG
THE MAJOR POWERS, AND POLITICAL ARBITRATION; Halsted Press,
a Division of John Wiley & Sons, 605 Third Avenue, New York,
NY 10016 (1976); $17.50; ISBN 0-470-07208-3, LC 75-17182; xi,
152 p.; index. Introduction by Professor Bernard Crick.
The author, an Hungarian scholar who has never been
translated into English prior to this work, presents a well rea-
soned, but general discussion of the current state of existing
international institutions. He asserts that these institutions,
particularly the United Nations, are all but paralyzed in their
abilities to deal with international conflict. His argument de-
velops along the lines of the importance of national sovereignty
to the world order by showing continuing threat to world order
which is posed by any state whose government is continually
unstable. Although the book is not footnoted, due to research
difficulties encountered by the author-having only recently
been released from prison-the arguments presented would be
useful to any student of international law.
International Politics and Government
HELLMAN, R.G. & ROSENBAUM, H.J. (editors), LATIN AMERICA:
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ROLE; Halsted Press, a
Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New
York, NY 10016 (1975); $17.50; ISBN 0-47-36917-5, LC 75-692;
297 p.; footnotes, tables, index of persons, references. Latin
American International Affairs Series, Vol. I.
The stated purpose of the Latin American International
Affairs Series in general and this volume in particular is to
provide readers in the United States with a better understand-
ing of the other nations in this hemisphere. To reach this end,
the editors present a series of articles by authorities in the
fields of Latin American domestic and foreign affairs. These
authorities, who consist of businessmen, journalists, officials
and scholars from Latin America, the United States and else-
where, examine the prospects and problems to be encountered
by various Latin American nations as they seek greater influ-
ence and integration internationally and regionally. The vari-
ety of expertise demonstrated in these essays allows for a multi-
faceted examination of the general theme. Consequently, the
reader is presented with a view of the domestic factors of Inter-
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American foreign policy, Intra- and Inter-American relations
and Latin America in international relations.
PENNIMAN, H.R. (editor), BRITAIN AT THE POLLS: THE PARLIA-
MENTARY ELECTIONS OF 1974; American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20036 (1975); $3.00; ISBN 0-8447-3158-7, LC 75-
7597; 256 p.; footnotes, tables, appendix, index.
This first, and perhaps most thorough of Penniman's stud-
ies of democratic electoral institutions focuses upon the Febru-
ary and October 1974 British general elections. These elections,
some of the contributors assert, mark the beginning of a new
era in the political history of Great Britain. In the first election
of 1974, neither major party gained a majority in the House of
Commons. The strength of the national parties of Scotland and
Wales, combined with the several splinter parties in England,
created an unstable coalition which held together for six
months. The October elections witnessed a slim majority by
the Labour party, but with such a strong showing by the
smaller parties that neither major party won 40 percent of the
popular vote. These essays provide an extensive and useful
exposition of the nature and direction of British politics, with
some emphasis on the economic and international implications
of the 1974 elections.
PENNIMAN, H.R. (editor), CANADA AT THE POLLS: THE GENERAL
ELECTION OF 1974; American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036 (1975); $4.50; LC 75-24771; 290 p.; footnotes, ap-
pendix, index.
Another in the AEI series of studies of selected elections
in democratic countries, this study describes the election that
produced an absolute Liberal majority in the House of Com-
mons. Canadian politics and the processes which led to the
election are analyzed from the perspectives of (1) the Canadian
Party System, (2) the campaign of the three political parties,
(3) financing of the campaigns, (4) opinion polls, and (5) the
role of the media. Penniman's series of inquiries into the elec-
tions of Canada, France, Great Britain, and Japan reaches one
primary and inescapable conclusion: although the fundamen-
tal democratic traditions of these several states are similar, at
least in the modern context, each political system is uniquely
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related to the cultural, economic, and historical roots of its
people.
PENNIMAN, N.R. (editor), FRANCE AT THE POLLS; American En-
terprise Institute for Public Policy, 1150 Seventeenth Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036 (1975); $4.50; ISBN 0-8447-
3171-4, LC 75-15146; 253 p.; footnotes, appendix, index.
France's presidential electoral process is viewed sequen-
tially beginning with the Third Republic, moving to the Fourth
and Fifth, and ending with an in-depth analysis of the election
contest between the Gaullist, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, and
the candidate of of the Left, Francois Mitterand. The focus of
this survey is on the difficulties which a country encounters
when attempting to change its methods for selecting a major
official. Despite France's history of utilizing substantial demo-
cratic institutions, the Presidential election process of 1974 did
not proceed smoothly. Reinforcing this point are available com-
parisons of France's changing electoral process with those of
other countries. Chapter Five utilizes an electoral geography
research process to determine continuity and change in French
voting patterns for presidential elections since 1965.
RUSH, M., How COMMUNIST STATES CHANGE THEIR RULERS; Cor-
nell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, NY 14580
(1974); $15.00; ISBN 0-8014-0883-0, LC 74-10412; 346 p.; foot-
notes, appendices, index.
The author analyzes the problem of succession in Com-
munist states by examining the manner and circumstances of
various changes of leadership within the Soviet bloc (Soviet
Union 1953-55, de-Stalinization 1956, Romania 1965, Czecho-
slovakia 1967-69, Poland 1970, East Germany 1971), attempts
to designate successors (Stalin 1945-53), and plots to overthrow
incumbent rulers (1960-65). He also discusses non-Soviet bloc
succession arrangments (Yugoslavia and China). The result of
Professor Rush's study sheds additional light not only upon the
internal procedures for succession but also upon the entire So-
viet political system. The comparative aspects of the study give
insight into power struggles within the European Communist
bloc.
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WESSON, R.G., THE RUSSIAN DILEMMA: A POLITICAL AND
GEOPOLITICAL VIEW; Rutgers University Press, 30 College Ave-
nue, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 (1974); $12.50 (cloth), $3.95
(paper); ISBN 0-8135-0774-X (cloth), 0-8135-0787-I (paper),
LC 74-1412; x, 228 p.; footnotes, index.
Professor Wesson, a frequent contributor to SOVIET
STUDIES, departs from the conventional mold of analyzing the
U.S.S.R.'s problem of its 177 distinct nationalities in terms of
historical perspectives; he attempts to relate the nationalities
to the geographic realities of the Soviet Union as well. Drawing
from his previous works, THE SOVIET RUSSIAN STATE (1972) and
THE SOVIET STATE: AN AGING REVOLUTION (1972), Wesson en-
deavors to answer Soviet historian A. Amalrik's timely ques-
tion, "Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?" He answers
"No," but with qualifications. He feels that unless the conflict
between state-fostered pluralism and the geopolitical realism
of nationality consciousness is not dissolved, the Soviet Union
will be unable to adapt to the contemporary world. Wesson's
book should be valuable to the expert in Russian affairs in that
it presents a number of broad conclusions about the future of
the Soviet state.
International Protection of the Environment
WALTER, I., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS OF POLLUTION; Halsted
Press, a Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue,
New York, NY 10016 (1975); $17.50; ISBN 0-470-91928-0, LC
75-28273; 208 p.; footnotes, tables, diagrams, index.
The interrelationships of political, economic and environ-
mental policies and considerations are discussed in a compre-
hensive and detailed manner. Walter looks at how these poli-
cies effect international trade flows and competition, commer-
cial policies of multinational organizations and planning and
placement of industry. The book begins with an examination
of the political and economic dynamics of environmental policy
formation and leads to a conclusion supporting the develop-
ment of broad international agreements on environmental pol-
icy.
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Law of the Sea
GULLAND, J.A., POPULATION DYNAMICS OF WORLD FISHERIES; Uni-
versity of Washington Press, Seattle, WA 98105 (1972); $7.50;
xiii, 336 p.; tables, maps, references. Prepared for the Washing-
ton Sea Grant Program, No. WSG 72-1. Foreword by O.A.
Mathisen.
This publication provides the reader with a series of lec-
tures which apply the techniques of population dynamics to
describe world fisheries. The result of this examination is a
demonstration that fish population dynamics may be utilized
to benefit these fisheries. Mr. Gulland retains a refreshing de-
livery throughout these presentations amid ample statistical
data, charts and formulae. Due to the importance of fisheries
in international nutrition and economics this publication on
the state of global fisheries should serve to inform those in-
volved in these areas from the practical or academic stand-
point.
United States Foreign Policy
BASSIOUNI, M.C. (editor), ISSUES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN; Chi-
cago Council on Foreign Relations, 116 South Michigan Ave.
Chicago, IL 60603 (1975); $1.50; LC 75-35380; xvi, 103 p.
In April and May 1975, the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations brought together a number of experts on the Mediter-
ranean region to form a study group that would analyze the
prospects for the future of the area. This volume, edited by
Professor Bassiouni, brings together some of the papers pre-
sented at those meetings among which are: American World
Strategy and the Mediterranean Basin, by Morton Kaplan and
Mediterranean Politics in Historical Perspective, by Edward
Luttwak. Professor Robert Friedlander provides an excellent
summary and analysis of the sessions showing the consensus
achieved by the study group.
FAIRBANK, J.K., CHINESE-AMERICAN INTERACTIONS: A HISTORICAL
SURVEY; Rutgers University Press, 30 College Avenue, New
Brunswick, NJ 08903 (1975); $6.50 (cloth), $2.95 (paper); ISBN
0-0135-0784-7 (cloth), 0-8135-0785-5 (paper), LC 74-22192; 79
p.; bibliographical notes, index.
Professor Fairbank is a recognized authority on Chinese
culture and history. In this highly readable book, he examines
the impact of American missionaries, educators and merchants
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on modern China. He stresses the American misconceptions of
Chinese culture and collective social order which differs radi-
cally from Yankee enterprise individualism. The role of "power
politics" and ideological rhetoric in determining American for-
eign policies toward China is discussed. Fairbank suggests that
Americans must learn to view the Chinese from a realistic his-
torical perspective free from classic stereotypes.
JOHNSON, S., AMERIcAN ATTITUDES TOWARD JAPAN: 1941-1975;
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150
Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1975);
$3.00; 114 p.; footnotes. AEI-Hoover Policy Study 15.
This book is not really concerned with foreign policy on a
statewide level, but rather the perceptions of the people of one
nation about another nation. Specifically it is a study of the
American perception of the Japanese, as discerned from Ameri-
can publications from 1941-1975. Although it provides enter-
taining and pleasant reading, it provides very little insight into
the mechanics and manipulations of these perceptions, and
instead just leaves the reader with a sense of the changing
views that Americans have generally shared concerning the
Japanese people. Indeed, the scope of the book includes a num-
ber of subtle and complex sociological questions, such as trends
of inter-racial marriage, but merely skims the surface. Al-
though many of the theories of these various trends are noted,
they are not explored in any depth. As a result, the reader is
often left grasping for some data or references to fill the void,
neither of which are provided.
LEWIS, J.W., THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN;
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150
Seventeenth Street, N.W.; Washington, D.C. 20036 (1976);
$3.75; ISBN 0-8447-3197-8, LC 75-37446; 169 p.; footnotes, ta-
bles, maps, appendix. Foreign Affairs Study 29. Foreword by
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.
Since World War II, the United States has witnessed an
accelerating and somewhat alarming dimunition of its naval
strength in relation to the Soviet Union. The Mediterranean,
the author argues, is the focal point of naval power and yet
receives only occasional attention as a zone of conflict from
American policy makers and then usually during a cri-
sis-which is often too late. The growth of Soviet naval
strength in the region should be marked with concern. The
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author recommends as a potential response the creation of a
permanent Mediterranean task force to monitor developments
and to make policy recommendations in the regional context.
NAKHLEH, E., THE UNITED STATES AND SAUDI ARABIA; American
Enterprise Institute, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washing-
ton, D.C. 20036 (1975); $3.00; LC 75-33486; vi, 69 p.; maps,
tables, footnotes. Foreign Affairs Study 26.
Saudi Arabia is a society in transition: a highly religious
tribal society now being faced by pressures from outside pow-
ers, oil revenues, and a new middle class of educated princes
and technocrats. Professor Nakhleh analyzes the new Saudi
polity and concludes that Saudi Arabia will remain a corner-
stone of American policy in the Middle East for years to come.
SIMON, S.W., ASIAN NEUTRALISM AND U.S. POLICY; American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1150
Seventeenth Street, N.W.,Washington, D.C. 20036 (1975);
$3.00; ISBN 0-8447-3166-8, LC 75-13644; 111 p.; footnotes,
maps, tables. Foreign Affairs Study 21.
Prefaced from the standpoint of an unclear future role for
America in the security of Asian nations, this monograph eval-
uates options for nations of the region. Faced with a reduced
commitment on the part of the United States, an evident
threat of continued Communist expansionary pressures, and
several factors which inhibit regional cooperation, the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations and other new regional organi-
zations have uncertain prospects for survival. Upon this foun-
dation, the author compares Asian security options for the re-
mainder of the decade and constructs many of the arguments
which must be met by Asian leaders in reaching future security
decisions.
WILCOX, F.O. & FRANK, R.A. (editors), THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY: AN INQUIRY BY A PANEL OF THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; Praeger Publishers,
111 Fourth Avenue, New York, NY 10003 (1976); $14.00 (cloth),
$4.95 (paper); ISBN 0-275-55860-6 (cloth), 0-275-89480-0
(paper), LC 75-23999; xiv, 145 p.; footnotes, index.
The editors have condensed many of the discussions held
by a Panel of the American Society of International Law during
1973 and 1974 into a useful collection of essays on the interrela-
tionship between various constitutional provisions and the con-
duct of foreign policy. The panel faced four primary areas of
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inquiry: secrecy and the flow of public information; public par-
ticipation in the foreign policy process; the power to wage war;
and making foreign policy through international agreement.
The essays are preceeded by a series of specific recommenda-
tions of the panel. The book would make an excellent addition
to courses both in public and international affairs and in con-
stitutional interpretation.
World Energy
ANTHONY, J.D. (editor), THE MIDDLE EAST: OIL, POLITICS, AND
DEVELOPMENT; American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20036 (1975); $6.00 (cloth), $3.00 (paper); ISBN 0-8447-2067-4
(cloth), 0-8447-2066-6 (paper), LC 75-29629; 109 p.; footnotes,
tables, maps, appendix.
The title of this book was the subject of a conference spon-
sored by various international organizations at the University
of Toronto. Ten recognized scholars contributed papers or com-
mentaries to the conference, and these proceedings have been
condensed and edited into book form. The collection provides
a precise and authoritative examination of several topics in-
cluding: how the Arab States divested control of oil production
from the grip of multinational corporations, how world-wide
dependence on petroleum arose, and the obstacles which con-
front the wealthy OPEC nations in their quest for balanced,
industrial economies.
World Peace
BELL, J.B., TRANSNATIONAL TERROR; American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 (1975); $3.00; ISBN 0-8447-
3187-0, LC 75-27369; 91 p.; footnotes, tables, selected bibliog-
raphy. AEI-Hoover Policy Study 17.
In an effort to better understand both the motivations of
those behind international terrorism and the means of combat-
ting it, Bell examines the political pressures, economic exigen-
cies and personal intentions of several terrorists. The result is
a conclusion that certain practical measures, short of costly
security and restrictions on personal freedoms, can be used to
control terrorism. Bell contends that better intelligence on ac-
tive and potential terrorist groups and individuals, further
study into more effective technological security measures, and
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intensive study of the nature of terrorism itself to provide pre-
dictive parameters will serve to give international society some
relief from the current wave of terrorism.
COHAN, A.S., THEORIES OF REVOLUTION: AN INTRODUCTION;
Halsted Press, a Division of John Wiley & Sons, 605 Third
Avenue, New York, NY 10016 (1976); $9.95; ISBN 0-470-16322-
4, LC 75-6259; 228 p.; footnotes, index.
Although the author endeavors to present both Marxist
and non-Marxist theories of revolution, the bulk of the work is
devoted to Marxist theories. The study is, however, compre-
hensive and objective in efforts to dissect and analyze societal
pressures which lead to massive popular revolution, both vio-
lent and peaceful. Extensive references and footnotes lead the
reader to supplemental materials for virtually all of the argu-
ments and conclusions of the author.
FRIEDLANDER, S. & HUSSEIN, M., ARABS & ISRAELIS: A DIALOGUE;
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 101 Fifth Avenue, New York,
NY 10003 (1975); $12.95; ISBN 0-8419-0208-9, LC 75-9147; xi,
223 p.; maps. Moderated by Jean Lacouture.
The successful use of the techniques of dialogue rarely is
seen outside of the purely philosophical arena. The dialogue
between Friedlander and Hussein in this book, while bordering
on the philosophical, involves the reader in an exciting political
dispute. Although the underlying currents of the Arab-Israeli
conflict direct the discussion, the participants range from the
history of Zionism to Arab views of Israel as an instrument of
Western imperialism. This is an important book for anyone
seeking to better comprehend the intricacies of the search for
elusive peace in the Middle East.
GUHIN, M.A., NUCLEAR PARADOX: SECURITY RISKS OF THE
PEACEFUL ATOM; American Enterprise Institute for Public Pol-
icy Research, 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington,
D.C. 20036 (1976); $3.00; ISBN 0-8447-3204-4, LC 76-6139; 77
p.; footnotes, bibliography, appendix. Foreign Affairs Study
32.
The production and transportation of plutonium-the
stuff of which atomic bombs are made-has raised serious
questions about the guarantees of the peaceful uses of atomic
power. The author examines the relationships between prior
nonproliferation efforts and the worldwide expansion of nuclear
VOL. 6:205
1976 BoOK NOTES 223
energy industries. He concludes that the threat of unauthorized
use of nuclear waste products and fuel products, particularly
in light of the impending development of plutonium-fired
"breeder" reactors, should be met by high priority efforts to
increase international controls and cooperation on public and
private levels.

